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Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence

Caroline F. Ziemke
Philippe Loustaunau
Amy Alrich

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SUPERVISING PROJECT OFFICER: Dr. Anthony Fainberg, Chief, Advanced Concepts and Technologies Division, ASCO, DTRA, (703) 767-5709.

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PREFACE

Since its formation in 1998, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has contracted with IDA for analytical support, through the agency's Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO). In fiscal year 2000 the ASCO commissioned studies from IDA on five questions:

1. How will the challenge of asymmetric conflict have evolved over the two-decade period from the wake-up call of the Persian Gulf war to 2010?
2. What are the stability challenges associated with a more multipolar nuclear world?
3. How can the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence be enhanced with an understanding of the strategic personality of states?
4. How might an adversary's use of a contagious disease such as smallpox affect the ability of US forces to sustain the war fight?
5. How would the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty affect foreign nuclear weapons ambitions and programs?

This document provides an answer to the third question. It applies the Strategic Personality Typology recently developed at IDA to the challenge of rethinking US approaches to nuclear deterrence in light of the changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. The paper presents a series of historical case studies that demonstrate how differences in the Strategic Personalities of states have shaped their deterrence and threat reduction strategies in the past, and how Strategic Personality affects the credibility and effectiveness of those approaches. It concludes with a discussion of how decision-makers might use insights from Strategic Personality Typing to forge more effective strategies in the future. The Strategic Personality Typology presented here is designed to serve as a complement to other social sciences and International Relations. The ultimate goal is to provide decision makers and analysts with a new and relatively simple tool to enable them to anticipate the actions and reactions of potential challengers (or strategic partners) through a basic understanding of how they think about the world.

The author is indebted to the many colleagues who contributed time and intellectual energy to this effort. Dr. Philippe Loustaunau and Ms. Amy Alrich were instrumental in researching and drafting the case studies and in grappling with the theoretical aspects of the problem. Dr. Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at IDA, has been a diligent mentor and a key collaborator

in the development of this methodology from its inception (for which he also deserves much of the credit). General Larry Welch, President of IDA, and Mr. Michael Leonard, Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, saw merit in the approach early on and have provided generous intellectual, moral, and administrative support over the four years during which this methodology has evolved. Dr. David Graham, Dr. Robert Zirkle, Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig, Dr. Brad Roberts, Ms. Susan Clark-Sestak, Mr. John Tillson, and Mr. Jason Dechant of IDA all provided valuable comments on previous versions of this work, as did Dr. Ivan Oelrich of DTRA. Ms. Eileen Doherty and Ms. Barbara Varvaglionone provided editorial and production guidance and support. Finally, the author wants to thank Dr. Tony Fainberg of DTRA for implementing, defining, refining, and critiquing this work at all its stages of development. Responsibility for any inaccuracies, omissions, or other lapses in judgment is, of course, the author's alone.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The emergence of additional nuclear-armed states, the approaching emergence of a triad of powerful non-allied nuclear states (the United States, Russia, and China), and the increased complexity of nuclear relationships that results require us to reevaluate the theoretical assumptions that guided nuclear deterrence between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Models like Realism and Strategic Cultures Theory provide valuable insights into how states might behave in this new security environment; but given the growing diversity of potential threats and challengers, any reevaluation of deterrence theory should bring the broadest possible spectrum of insights to bear. The Strategic Personality Typology developed at IDA offers a new tool to facilitate the development of deterrent approaches tailored to specific states and threats. The Strategic Personality Typology focuses on broad historical and cultural patterns that evolve over the whole course of a state's history (its historical plot) and identifies the fundamental consistencies in its long-term strategic conduct in order to shed light on how they might shape its current and future strategic decisions.

The methodology is not deterministic and, hence, not precisely predictive. It trades the point predictive precision of other sorts of models for greater accuracy regarding a state's broad strategic outlook and its impact on decisions and actions. The suggestion is not that states do certain things *because* they are of a particular Strategic Personality Type. Rather, the Strategic Personality Types describe in very general terms the nature of the historical habits and predispositions that shaped states' strategic conduct in the past and can reasonably be expected to do so in the future. The emphasis on broad patterns builds into the Strategic Personality framework the flexibility necessary to allow for the inherent unpredictability of complex systems that follow from such constantly evolving factors as the nature of political systems, elite groups, and individual leaders. Each of these factors can have a powerful influence on specific policies and actions, but each must also operate within the context of the cultural, historical, and rational tendencies that Strategic Personality describes.

HISTORY, ULTIMATE CONCERNS, AND STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

Every country, over the whole course of its historical plot, finds that certain kinds of challenges arise again and again. China and Germany, both lacking secure natural boundaries, needed to exercise constant vigilance against hostile invasions, for example. These historical challenges instill in each state a unique set of Ultimate Concerns—material, moral, spiritual, or ideological factors that it has come to see as key to its long-

term survival, coherence, and sense of well-being. And over the course of its history, each state finds that certain strategies, philosophies, and social mechanisms for coping with those challenges succeed better than others. The nature of the Ultimate Concerns and the means of coping with them are passed from generation to generation in various ways, but the two most important are culture and national myth. Both transmit to future generations the lessons of the past: what behaviors and strategies are most successful in ensuring the survival and prosperity of the society. Strategic Personality Typing captures the cognitive patterns that emerge from history, culture, and national myth in an attempt to understand how they shape a state's view of its place in the world, and the strategies and approaches it takes to defending and promoting its Ultimate Concerns.

Ultimate Concerns are often objective and concrete, but they can also be subjective (such as an ideology, or traditional religious or social ethos) and, hence, not readily discernible to the foreign eye. The Cold War strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction assumed that the threat of virtual social annihilation would be sufficient to deter any rational national leadership. To be sure, rational strategic behavior aims at the preservation of society; but depending on their Ultimate Concerns and Strategic Personality, states can have very different definitions of "preservation of society" that may not hinge solely on physical survival, and they can have very different strategies for pursuing it.

Ultimate Concerns are dominant interests over a very long period of time and change, if at all, only extremely slowly. But in specific points in time, these Ultimate Concerns are translated into the national interests that most analytical approaches treat as the drivers of national strategy. National interests are much more mutable than the Ultimate Concerns from which they are derived. Understanding the underlying perceptive and decision-making predispositions of a state—what this study calls "Strategic Personality"—provides insight into how it translates its Ultimate Concerns in to national interests, how it defines "national survival," how it calculates risks, and how it translates all this into strategies and actions.

THE STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TYPES

The Strategic Personality methodology breaks a state's strategic decision-making habits into three parts: its orientation toward the outside world (Introverted or Extroverted); what kind of information it pays the most attention to and invests with the most credibility (Sensing or Intuitive); and how it analyzes that information, defines its interests, and decides how to act (Thinking or Feeling). Every state's Strategic

Personality is unique, as it flows from singular historical and cultural experiences. The Strategic Personality Typology merely groups those unique personalities according to general, shared characteristics to facilitate analysis and comparison. Not every state of each type will display every characteristic of these definitions of the pure type, so the manifestations of Strategy Personality Type vary from state to state.

- Introverted (I) states look inward to identify their national interests, see the international system as a loose conglomerate of autonomous actors, see their history as self-contained, are boundary sensitive, and seek primarily to defend their Ultimate Concerns against external stresses.
- Extroverted (E) states look outward to identify and consolidate their national interests, see the international system as an integrated body that must cooperate and compete for the good of the whole, see their histories as correspondingly integrated, are relatively less boundary sensitive than Introverted states, and have Ultimate Concerns rooted in their ability to share, export, and expand their universalist worldviews.
- Sensing (S) states pay the most attention to concrete, observable things and events, put their greatest trust in what is directly verifiable and measurable through the senses, are acutely aware of their environment, and are disinclined to engage in counter-factual speculations or to look around the next corner until they reach it. The Sensing states have historical plots driven by concerns with geography and material culture, and their Ultimate Concerns are usually tied to territorial or social cohesion.
- Intuitive (N) states pay the most attention to the patterns that emerge as events unfold, focus on the interconnections between current events and the insights they provide into how things might develop in the future, and are constantly looking for the possibilities revealed by unfolding events. The Ultimate Concerns of Intuitive states are tied to the shared national vision, and implementation of that vision drives their historical plot.
- Thinking (T) states prefer to apply logical, scientific, or legalistic rationality to their analysis of events. Values are important to the Thinking states and can provide the basis for their rational orientation (for instance, when those laws are derived from moral codes), but the hierarchy of laws and values is clearly defined, and when values conflict with logic, the Thinking states err on the side of logic. The Ultimate Concerns of Thinking states are usually tied to maintaining the proper order of things, either internally or externally.
- Feeling (F) states arrive at conclusions by evaluating situations and alternatives according to their own unique hierarchy of values. In any particular event, only certain of their constituent values apply and one or more values may come into conflict. The specific elements of the Feeling state's value structure may change somewhat with time and circumstances (the US value system, for example, no longer tolerates legal segregation). The Feeling states do not deny the utility of logical principles as a way of analyzing problems, but they are suspicious of logic as a final arbiter of conduct; so, if the dictate of logic is in direct conflict with the

value structure, the Feeling states will err on the side of values. The Ultimate Concerns of Feeling states are tied to defending the values systems that they see as key to stability, harmony, and cohesion in their societies.

SHAPING CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENTS

There are two measures of the utility of deterrent threats: credibility and effectiveness. Credibility depends upon two factors: 1) the defender's technical ability to carry out the threat, and 2) the degree to which both the defender and the challenger recognize that the defender's Ultimate Concerns are at stake. US attempts to convince Japan to abandon its increasingly aggressive expansionist agenda in the Pacific between 1939 and 1941 were not credible. The US military presence in the region was weak, and the Intuitive US had a long history of not following up its idealistic proclamations with concrete actions. These facts combined to convince the Sensing Japanese—who believed that the survival of their society depended upon eliminating Western influences from Asia—that the US interests at stake were not fundamental to its Ultimate Concerns and, thus, that there was a good chance the Americans would not carry through with their threats.

The Egyptian decision to challenge Israel's overwhelming and highly credible conventional deterrent in October 1973 demonstrates graphically that a credible threat is not necessarily an effective deterrent. For deterrence to be effective, the would-be challenger must actually decide because of it to not pursue a course of action that it might otherwise have undertaken. In addition to credibility, effectiveness depends on the *balance of Ultimate Concerns* between the defender and the would-be challenger *as the challenger perceives it*. In 1973, the Sensing Egyptians understood full well the degree of their conventional disadvantage against the Israel Defense Force, but they were confident that Israel would not risk all-out war and superpower intervention in defense of captured territory it was holding in pursuit of its broader (Intuitive) interest—a comprehensive peace treaty with all the Arab states. Egypt, a Sensing state, would be fighting for its Ultimate Concerns (regaining lost territory of the homeland), while Israel would be fighting merely for bargaining chips. Provided Egypt kept its objectives limited—regaining the Sinai territory lost in the 1967 Six Day War—the balance of Ultimate Concerns was in its favor, even if a conventional military victory was well beyond its reach. The effectiveness of deterrence is likely to be greatest when the defender is pursuing interests more central to its Ultimate Concerns than those of the would-be challenger, and the challenger *recognizes* that fact. On the flip side, the effectiveness of deterrence is likely to be low when the challenger sees its Ultimate Concerns as clearly at

stake but the defender's interests as peripheral to its Ultimate Concerns. In such a case, even a nuclear deterrent may be of limited effectiveness for the same reason that Israel's conventional one was in 1973—a highly motivated challenger may doubt the defender's willingness to unleash a potentially catastrophic nuclear exchange for any interests but those most vital to its own Ultimate Concerns.

USING STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TO SHAPE EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

Effective deterrence thus depends on two key factors: 1) how well each side communicates its Ultimate Concerns, interests, and will in a way the other can understand, and 2) the balance of Ultimate Concerns at stake between the defender and the would-be challenger. Accordingly, communication and comprehension are key to the effectiveness of a deterrent threat. Strategic Personality Typing points to key, and often avoidable, sources of conflict or miscommunication between the United States and potential would-be challengers. Eleventh-hour attempts to deter Japan from expanding its wars of aggression into the South Pacific failed in 1941 because the Intuitive US did not communicate effectively to Sensing Japan either the degree to which it saw its Ultimate Concerns at stake in the region, or the fact that American willingness to fight to defend those Ultimate Concerns was rising steeply. Japan challenged, in part, because it believed there was a good chance that either the United States would (as it had in the past) fail to follow up threats with actions or, if it resisted, would only do so until the costs began to rise.

Strategic Personality points to ways of structuring more effective deterrence by providing insight into the balance of Ultimate Concerns. It can also, over the longer run, provide a means to monitor that balance and mitigate tensions between two states long before an explicit challenger-versus-defender relationship evolves. When Germany unified in 1870, the British saw it as a potential strategic partner and a counter-balance to Britain's then-peer competitors, France and Russia. Had the Sensing British looked out over the longer term they might have recognized that Germany's Ultimate Concerns might lead to its emergence as a potential peer competitor. While Britain could not change Germany's Ultimate Concerns, it might have taken steps to shape their strategic relationship in a way that avoided or at least mitigated the rising tension between their Ultimate Concerns. Absent such stewardship of the balance of Ultimate Concerns, the Anglo-German relations slid into a costly naval rivalry and eventually contributed to a catastrophic World War.

Strategic Personality analysis provides a means to analyze the messages the United States sends to would-be challengers and potential peer competitors in a crisis, to look for potential sources of miscommunication, and to facilitate the composition of more effective and less provocative approaches. It also provides a means to assess the likely effectiveness of a deterrent, make adjustments, and enhance effectiveness or relieve tensions between Ultimate Concerns. Finally, Strategic Personality provides a peacetime tool to monitor the balance of Ultimate Concerns between the US and its allies and competitors, avoid policies and actions that might disrupt the balance, recognize the warning signs that the balance might be shifting in destabilizing ways, and take steps to mitigate those shifts to reduce threats while they remain on the distant horizon.

Extroverted US versus Introverted Challenger

Most future challengers the United States will face are likely to be Introverted states. Introverted states are not naturally more aggressive than Extroverted ones, but for the past half-century and for the foreseeable future, the Extroverted states (after two disastrous World Wars and the decades-long shadow of a third) have decided that there are better ways to resolve their differences than the resort to force. Introverted states are likely to continue to be defensive of their internal prerogatives and their ability to pursue their Ultimate Concerns free from interference and international restrictions imposed by the Extroverted states. This is likely to be especially true whenever the United States is directly involved. International or US pressure may lead Introverted states to shore up their barriers rather than relax them, and nuclear weapons may in some cases appear to be particularly effective in building more robust boundaries. Introverted and Extroverted states analyze events in fundamentally different contexts: Extroverted states naturally think in terms of universal laws, international norms, and global solutions; Introverted states, at most, look for regional and bilateral solutions on a limited, case-by-case basis.

Intuitive US versus Sensing Challenger

When the Intuitive US is sending messages to a Sensing would-be challenger, it needs to translate them into explicit, material terms that Sensing states readily understand. It is also important, over the longer term, to consistently back statements of policy and ideals with concrete actions to build a history of action that will enhance credibility in the eyes of states that perceive the world in this way (or, at the very least, be aware that the lack of such a record of action is likely to undermine credibility and set a higher threshold for establishing a credible deterrent). The Introverted US must also take care that its messages (including both talk and actions) to Sensing challengers are as clear and consistent as possible, to leave minimal doubt as to its will to carry through with its

deterrent threats. Sensing states can have trouble ascertaining the threshold of risk of the Intuitive US; thus it is important to make that threshold clear in fairly explicit terms to avoid ambiguity.

Intuitive US versus Intuitive Challenger

The United States is probably best suited to deter Intuitive would-be challengers, even though these are often the most threatening looking of strategic stand-offs, steeped as they are in abstract, often apocalyptic rhetoric. But most efforts to deter fellow Intuitive states will involve Introverted and much smaller powers. It is likely to be difficult to convince them that US Ultimate Concerns are credibly at risk proportional to their own. At the same time, they may be less likely than a Sensing challenger to doubt our will based on pragmatic evidence. There are a number of keys to sending deterrent messages that an Intuitive challenger will find credible. It is important to understand the nature of the would-be challenger's vision, how that vision shapes its interests, and what price it is willing to pay to protect or advance those interests. It is also important to know, going into a stand-off with an Intuitive challenger, how much the United States and its allies are willing to pay to break that challenger's will, a calculation that is not as straightforward as a Sensing challenger's would be. Even for an Intuitive defender, deterring an Intuitive state that believes its vision and, hence, its Ultimate Concerns are at risk can be difficult. This is all the more so when the defender's vision and Ultimate Concerns are not so obviously at risk (in the eyes of the would-be challenger). Moreover, determining what to put at risk in a deterrent threat aimed at an Intuitive would-be challenger can be tricky since what it values most may not be material but spiritual or ideological. On the other hand, deterring an Intuitive state may not be so challenging when the interests at stake are primarily material and not intimately linked to the Intuitive state's vision.

Feeling US versus Thinking Challenger

Thinking states are unlikely to find deterrent threats expressed in terms of values very credible, as they are less inclined than Feeling states to see values as a legitimate foundation for foreign policy decisions. Communication often breaks down between Thinking and Feeling states because Thinking states find the Feeling state's subjective, highly context-dependent strategic calculus confusing. When the Feeling state's messages do not make sense, a Thinking state is likely to try to project its own logic onto the defender's actions or invent logic for the opponent. Feeling states like the United States want to avoid situations where the Thinking state fills in the blanks, since the chances that the solutions they come up with would match true US intentions are slim.

Rationalizations that generate messages in terms the Thinking states will understand can dramatically reduce the risk of miscommunication or rational mirror-imaging by a Thinking challenger.

Feeling US versus Feeling Challenger

A Feeling challenger is more likely to understand the judgment of a Feeling defender and comprehend the meaning of its messages. Still, the problems inherent in Feeling relativism do not entirely disappear when communication is between two Feeling states. Two Feeling states rarely define and pursue interests according to precisely the same values, and Feeling states can have strong conflicts of values—potentially as dangerous as the subjective-objective disconnect between Thinking and Feeling states. Moreover, it is in the subjective nature of values that they can mean different things to different people and at different times. So even when two Feeling states do share the same values, they may prioritize and act on them in very different ways. Two states might, for example, agree on the value of individual liberty (as did Britain and the American colonists before the Revolutionary War) but disagree strongly as to its importance relative to other values or how best to ensure it. It may, however, be easier to send mutually comprehensible messages provided both sides are mindful of the differences in the value systems that guide their actions.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE US STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

Any effort to rethink deterrence strategies must flow from a clear understanding of the US strategic personality and its implications. The unavoidable reality is that given the US ENF Strategic Personality and the nature of its Ultimate Concerns, it will continue to pursue economic and political engagement, and such engagement will continue to spark new threats. Even if the United States chooses to back away from military engagement and its current commitment actively to “expand the territory of democracy,” and limit its engagement purely to the economic sphere, its very existence will create tensions. Much of what US entrepreneurs seek to export—computers, communication technology and services, popular culture, and ideas—is inherently threatening to repressive and culturally conservative regimes. There is, then, much to be gained by understanding the dynamics of Strategic Personalities in order to anticipate and if possible mitigate tensions, manage the threats that do arise, and shape effective deterrent strategies.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES

It has become a virtual truism that in the wake of the Cold War, the theoretical assumptions upon which the past half-century of deterrence thinking lies have been called into question or, at the very least, that the realities of the current strategic environment necessitate a reevaluation of the utility of Cold War deterrence theory. This need for reassessment follows from two essential facts. First, increased access to historical sources on both sides of the Cold War divide may make it possible—for the first time—for historians and social scientists to assess whether deterrence strategy as the US and Soviet Union practiced it during the Cold War actually worked as we trusted it did at the time. Second, even if Cold War deterrence theory did in fact deter nuclear war, the Cold War is over and the cast of potential nuclear players has grown and promises to grow more. And the national interests that these new nuclear powers are likely to pursue are not nearly so simple or symmetrical as the ideological standoff between the US and the Soviet Union.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that the deterrence theory as it stands accurately describes what happened in the Cold War. It still does not necessary follow that the same approaches will work in deterring the much more diverse set of potential nuclear challengers emerging in the twenty-first century. An increasing percentage of the people who think and write about international relations in general and nuclear issues in particular (including both deterrence and nonproliferation) have begun to warn that the one-size-fits-all approaches of the past are losing whatever utility they once had. The need to develop tools to understand individual adversaries' mindsets and behavioral styles in order accurately to assess how they calculate utility when making decisions concerning the use of force to achieve their national objectives grows with the number of new potential nuclear powers. In *Deterrence in the Nuclear Age*, Keith Payne, one of the most outspoken advocates of the need for new approaches to thinking about nuclear deterrence, writes that

There is nothing wrong if, as an intellectual exercise, one posits "countries A and B," assumes that "strategic man" is at the helm of each, calculates force exchanges, and then draws conclusions about the stability of the deterrence relationship for countries A and B. The problem is that the practitioners of such deterrence analyses have tended to forget that they had created a fictitious world and have claimed that their conclusions are valid for the real world of international relations. It should not be considered quibbling to note that there is no country A or B on the UN

roster, and on some occasions “strategic man” will not be at the helm of those countries that do exist. A large grain of salt should be taken with any claims about deterrence that so ignore the character of opponents and context.¹

There is an even more fundamental issue to tackle in forging new deterrence approaches for the multi-lateral nuclear environment relating to the true nature of the changes in the international system. Analysts like Samuel Huntington, in his provocative *Foreign Affairs* article and later book entitled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), have argued that the demise of the Soviet empire and the consequent end of the US-Soviet competition have fundamentally altered the structure of the international system and that those changes have created new threats with which future deterrence strategies must learn to cope. But as many critics have noted, especially those from outside the West, Huntington’s view takes a particularly Euro-centric view of things. Paul Bracken is one of those who have argued that the fundamental fallacy of the “new beginning” approach is its assumption that the US-Soviet struggle was as central to the national security outlooks and strategies of the rest of the world during the Cold War years as it was to the West and its Soviet nemesis. In fact, Bracken points out, for most of the rest of the world it was post-colonialism rather than the Cold War that drove national interests and security concerns over the half-century since the end of World War II. This study takes Bracken’s view one step further, arguing that what we are seeing is the continuation of an historical struggle that goes back at least to the European Age of Exploration in the 16th century between the expansive, extroverted West and the more traditional, introverted rest (including, but not limited to, Asia and much of the Middle East). So, because the Cold War has not shaped their strategic and security viewpoint in so central a way, the end of the Cold War cannot be automatically assumed to have changed the views of non-Western nations concerning the acquisition or utility of nuclear weapons.² New approaches to nuclear deterrence thus need to take a much longer historical view of the roots of the strategic conduct of states than merely the events of the past ten, or even the past fifty, years.

1. The Limits of Rational Actor Models

The deficiencies that Payne and others have identified in standard US-Soviet deterrence theory have their roots in its heavy reliance on realism which, in turn, assumes that decision-makers formulate their policies and decide how to act in crises through

¹ Keith Payne, *Deterrence in the Nuclear Age* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 75.

² Paul Bracken, “The Second Nuclear Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, January / February 2000, pp. 148-149.

objective calculations of what will best serve the interests of state power (military, economic, or political). Such rational actor models assume that national leaders, when confronted with a problem, gather all the relevant information, define and rank the interests at stake, identify and assess a full range of alternative courses of action, and decide how to proceed according to a logical calculation of what will maximize their returns. The obvious problem is that in the real world, national leaders under pressure take short-cuts—they pay the most attention to certain kinds of information (often, information that reinforces existing opinions and perceptions), ignore other kinds of information, rank interests in both objective and highly subjective terms, and consider only certain kinds of alternative courses of action that are often conditioned by culture or long historical habits. Finally, how states calculate “maximum return” depends on how they perceive the situation and define their interests, which may or may not conform to objective measures of economic, political, or military power. Real decisions are made by real individuals and groups whose perceptions and interpretations of events are conditioned by their beliefs, cultural attitudes, historical experiences, and definition of National Interests. Realism provides one model of how decisions might be made under ideal circumstances, and it can provide insight into how decisions often are made, but with the important caveat that its correlation to how decisions are actually made by real world actors is unreliable.³

The idea that culture is one of the most important influences shaping the strategic behavior of states has gradually gained currency among analysts of international security in recent years, particularly as regards how norms and values influence a state’s perception of its strategic options. As personality and cognitive psychology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology have each demonstrated, the way people think has very concrete implications for how they act, and knowing something about their cognitive structure can also provide important insight into their attitudes and behaviors. Culture, myth, and historical experience clearly have important implications for the way people think. But International Relations theory has found it difficult to define a mechanism for objectively measuring such influence and how it operates that can be incorporated into theoretical models. One approach to incorporating insights from culture into formal International Relations theory that has gained in influence over the past decade is “Strategic Cultures Theory.”

³ For an in-depth analysis of the limits of rational actor theory, see Alex R. Hybel, *Power over Rationality: The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

2. Strategic Culture

The concept of strategic culture is still imprecisely defined, but in general its adherents share the view that “subjective” strategic preferences, rooted in culture and historical experience, constrain state responses to the “objective” strategic environment. Students of Strategic Culture see these sets of unique constraints and preferences, collectively labeled strategic culture, as only somewhat durable over time. They seem to agree that the Realist game theory model, which assumes states evaluate their strategic alternatives according to what they expect from other players in the international system, may not be the only dynamic at work in a particular state’s strategic behavior. The earliest attempts to define strategic culture grew out of efforts to understand and predict Soviet nuclear strategy during the Cold War. Jack Snyder, a RAND analyst, was among the first to use the term “strategic culture,” which he defined as the “sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.”⁴

The study and analysis of strategic cultures has run into a number of conceptual and methodological problems, not the least of which has been defining what, exactly, constitutes strategic culture. The notion implies a fixed set of typical beliefs and assumptions shared by members of a state’s military and political elite, but it does not explain where those beliefs originate, whether they are tied to broader cultural patterns, how they are transmitted from generation to generation, and how or why a state’s strategic behavior might change over time. When Japan went from its pre-World War II belligerent, expansionist militarism to militant pacifism, did its strategic culture change, or is militarism still lingering beneath the surface as some claim and others (particularly Japan’s neighbors) fear? If its strategic culture did change, where did all the old assumptions go? Were they simply collectively abandoned or somehow purged? How did that happen? Moreover, most strategic culture theories to date apply deterministic models of state behavior, suggesting that specific artifacts of strategic culture result in a specific set of preferred options. This implies that a state’s unique history, geography, political structure, culture, and strategic experience point to a narrow set of strategic options rather than a fairly broad range of possible strategic approaches. Finally, strategic culture models focus on the outcome—the behaviors resulting from a given strategic culture—

⁴ Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977), p. 9.

but they do little to explain the link between culture and state behavior. They cannot explain what it is culture does to limit strategic choices.

Alastair Johnston of Harvard University attempted, in a 1995 article in *International Security*, to address some of these conceptual weaknesses, beginning with a proposed definition of strategic culture as a “system of symbols” comprising a “central paradigm” by which states reduce their level of uncertainty about the strategic environment. The result, he suggests, might be not a single, predetermined approach but a preference ranking of alternate strategies determined by cultural as well as non-cultural variables, such as technology and threats.⁵ Still, the objective is a new model that codifies culture as a series of symbols that can be quantitatively analyzed to derive theoretical laws that predict likely behaviors and strategic outcomes. Moreover, the factor most limiting the practical utility of strategic cultures theories is their narrow focus on the military and national security aspects of state behavior. How the concept might be applied to other aspects of state conduct not related to the use or threat of force, including diplomacy and economic interaction, are beyond the scope of current strategic culture models. Nor do most strategic culture models provide a mechanism for using other aspects of state behavior—economic engagement, for example—as a clue to future strategic conduct.

3. Strategic Personality

Strategic Personality adopts a non-linear approach that incorporates all levels of a state’s culture and history in attempting to understand its strategic conduct. Most International Relations theories and paradigms focus on the surface level of events, and even when they incorporate deeper levels of culture or history, they do so selectively (as, for example, in strategic culture’s focus on military culture and history). Strategic Personality provides an abstract structure through which to gain insight into the broader historical and cultural patterns that have evolved over very long periods—usually a state’s entire history. It seeks a comprehensive approach that focuses on the reasoning and motives underlying state conduct and how differences in cognitive orientations can influence state interactions and the direction and stability of the international system. And because it is an historically and culturally comprehensive approach, it looks for the fundamental consistencies in a state’s long-term strategic conduct. In short, it assumes that the key to forming realistic expectations concerning a particular state’s strategic

⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” *International Security*, Vol. 19: 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 46-48.

conduct is identifying past patterns in that conduct, and understanding how they might shape its current and future strategic decisions.

The fundamental weakness in strategic culture theory lies in its determinism—it seeks to draw linear, measurable, and quantifiable connections between particular artifacts of culture (say, the military maxims of Sun Tzu) and specific strategic behaviors (the Chinese taste for deception). But cultural symbols usually do not work that way. Strategic Personality Typing instead asks whether there is something about China and its historical experience that predisposes it to defensiveness and deception (and thus accounts for both Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong). And, more important, it asks what the ages-old Chinese emphasis on deception really means in terms of its long-term strategic conduct. Like strategic culture theory, Strategic Personality is founded on the assumption that culture influences the strategic behavior of states. Strategic Personality differs from strategic culture, however, in some fundamental respects. Strategic Personality provides a structure through which to understand state conduct over time. Rather than seeking a predictive model of specific aspects of state behavior, Strategic Personality aims to project the likely patterns of a specific state's strategic conduct both laterally across the whole spectrum of strategic interactions and longitudinally into the future. Strategic Personality treats individual states as purposive agents whose conduct is guided by a complex variety of shaping factors—motives, preferences, beliefs, and prejudices, or ways of thinking—rather than as a “black box” motivated by some dynamic of stimulus and response. Instead of moving from specific data sets to general, narrowly predictive “laws” of state behavior, Strategic Personality starts with the general, observable patterns that emerge across a state's history and explains how those patterns manifest themselves in current (and future) decisions and actions. In so doing, it allows leeway for the inherently unpredictable nature of complex systems like state decision making, in which various causes and effects interact in chaotic and unintended ways. It also builds in the analytical flexibility to incorporate differences between democratic and non-democratic systems and the role of particular elite groups (militaries, political parties, cliques) and individual leaders. What the methodology lacks in point predictive precision, it makes up for in accuracy concerning how a state's broad strategic outlook shapes, and will continue to shape, the patterns of its decisions and actions.

**B. STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
PURPOSE AND APPROACH**

Responding effectively to the challenge of developing nuclear deterrence strategies that can cope with the new complexities emerging in the international system will require breaking away from the Euro-centric assumptions and approaches that underlay Cold War thinking and facilitate a better understanding of how deterrence worked in the past. We will have to unlearn the lessons we thought we learned from the Cold War deterrence experience and accept the reality that those parts of the world for whom the Cold War was not the defining strategic experience will not go along quietly with the notion that the best way to guarantee their peace and well-being in the future is to accept the continuation of the current, Western-dominated nuclear status-quo.

The problem with many culturally and historically focused approaches has been the challenge of connecting the unique insights gained from regional and historical analyses to the broader questions of deterrence theory. What is needed is a middle ground between the "one-size-fits-all" theory and the view that every relationship and every situation is so unique that there are *no* general lessons to be learned. This study proposes a way to fill that gap by using Strategic Personality as the framework for linking insights concerning specific actors, behaviors, and contexts with the more abstract levels of deterrence theory. The challenge the US faces is to devise nuclear deterrence strategies that are flexible enough to deal with the whole spectrum of potential nuclear challengers and incentives to acquire and use nuclear weapons. Such a deterrence strategy will have to take into consideration not just the relative balance of military capabilities, but the context of the crisis, the challenger's perceptions and goals, and what rules and values are most important in shaping the challenger's decisions. As the historical examples presented here will show, a potential challenger's rational calculations do not always make sense when viewed in terms of standard deterrence theory's "perfect rationality," but they almost always make sense when viewed in terms of the challenger's own rational orientation. Occasionally, individual states or (more likely) leaders pursue actions that do not make sense in either regard; but even in these rare cases of "strategic irrationality," Strategic Personality provides a framework for determining when a state's actions are truly "irrational," whether or not the new pattern of action is sustainable, what caused the sudden shift, whether the action is an aberration or a sign of a new pattern, and how other states should respond. When historical events are evaluated in terms of each state's unique cognitive orientation, new insights emerge that not only increase our

understanding of past events, but also inform our thinking about current and future deterrence challenges.

C. DEFINITIONS

1. Ultimate Concerns

The first step in formulating effective deterrence strategies is to understand what is at stake and the threshold of “unacceptable” risk for a would-be challenger in order to determine what threats are likely to be credible, when attempts to deter are likely to succeed, and when particular deterrent approaches might have no effect or might even provoke the opposite of the desired effect. The Strategic Personality framework presented here characterizes the thresholds of risk in terms of a state’s “Ultimate Concerns”—those factors, whether material, moral, or ideological, that a state has through the course of its historical experience come to see as key to its long-term survival and well being. The idea of Ultimate Concerns is borrowed from the Lutheran theologian Paul Tillich who described the individual’s Ultimate Concern as that upon which everything else depends for its being, without which life would have no order or meaning, and from which all other aspects of life derive their meaning. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the dominant Cold War deterrent strategy, is based on the assumption that every state’s Ultimate Concern is reducible to one value—the physical survival of society as a whole—and that for the society as a whole, nothing—not even the ideological confrontation between Marxism-Leninism and liberal democracy—is worth dying for. This framework suggests a slightly different perspective that expands the scope of “interests” to allow for the possibility that some states may have Ultimate Concerns that are more dear to them than the physical continuation of their society. A state’s Ultimate Concerns are often fairly objective and concrete—preservation of territorial integrity or autonomy, for example—but not always. Ultimate Concerns can also be subjective, such as the defense of an ideology or a traditional social ethos or religion. This focus on each state’s set of unique “Ultimate Concerns” and how they play out in a crisis does not take issue with the fundamental notion that strategic behavior can be considered rational when it takes a course of action aimed at the preservation of society, but it does suggest that different societies have different definitions of “preservation of society” which may not necessarily hinge solely on physical survival. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, would likely be willing to risk everything to ensure its continuation as an Islamically righteous nation if the alternative was occupation and contamination by Western “infidels.”

2. National Interests

A concern is “ultimate” when it is a consistently dominant interest over a very long period of time, one upon which the state and its citizens have come to believe that their being and survival depends and without which survival would be meaningless. But states also have numerous other concerns—national interests—that are generally considered to be the drivers of national strategy. National interests are, however, more mutable than Ultimate Concerns. Some National Interests are very constant, but others change with shifts in a country’s political, economic, and strategic environment. A few things that states consider national interests may not be tied to Ultimate Concerns, but still fall into the category of “nice to have.” These are not, however, the sorts of interests for which a state is likely to risk all-out war. All vital National Interests, however, derive from a state’s Ultimate Concerns and are, in a sense, an expression of the state’s strategy for advancing or defending its Ultimate Concerns in any given place in time.

3. Credible and Effective Deterrence

There are two measures of the utility of deterrence strategies: credibility and effectiveness. As the historical case studies that follow will demonstrate, a deterrent can be credible and still not be effective. A deterrent is credible when a would-be challenger believes the defender’s threat of retaliation. This study proposes that the credibility of a defender’s deterrent depends upon two factors: its technical ability to carry out the threat, and the proximity of the interests at stake to the defender’s Ultimate Concerns. But credibility ultimately depends on the defender’s ability to communicate both capability and will to the challenger, and the challenger’s accurate perception of that will and capability. The challenger must perceive at least a plausible chance that the defender has the technical capability to retaliate (and in this sense, even “bombs-in-the-basement” can be credible deterrents). But even more important is the challenger’s perception that the issue at stake is of such importance to the defender that it will be willing and politically able to risk the consequences of unleashing a retaliation. In this respect, credibility increases the clearer it is to the would-be challenger that the defender regards its Ultimate Concerns as at stake.

A deterrent is effective when it actually prevents a potential challenger from pursuing a course of action that it would otherwise have undertaken. This study demonstrates that the effectiveness of a deterrent also relies on two key factors: the credibility of the defender’s deterrent and the proximity of the interests at stake to the would-be challenger’s Ultimate Concerns. For a deterrent to be effective, the challenger must believe that the defender has the capability and will to carry out its threat, and

calculate that the interests at stake do not justify the risk of potentially devastating retaliation. The effectiveness of a deterrent depends on the relative balance of Ultimate Concerns between the challenger and the defender *as the challenger perceives it*. So, if the challenger is acting in pursuit of interests very closely tied to its Ultimate Concerns and perceives the defender as pursuing interests more peripheral to its Ultimate Concerns, then the effectiveness of deterrence is likely to be low. If the challenger is acting in pursuit of interests more peripheral to its Ultimate Concerns but perceives the interests at stake for the defender as key to its Ultimate Concerns, then the effectiveness of deterrence is likely to be high. In a few cases, the interest at stake for the challenger is so vital and so key to its Ultimate Concerns that no deterrent (even the threat of national annihilation if they lose) may be effective.

D. THE STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TYPOLOGY

Both the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence depend essentially on five factors: 1) the balance of Ultimate Concerns between the defender and the would-be challenger; 2) the balance of technical capabilities between the defender and challenger; 3) how effectively each communicates its Ultimate Concerns, intentions, and will to the other; 4) how accurately each perceives and interprets the messages of the other; and 5) how each translates interests and perceptions into strategies and actions. The historical case studies that follow consider how and why deterrence has failed in the past by looking through the lens of the strategic personalities of specific historical actors to understand how perceptions, interpretations, and decision-making styles facilitated or undermined effective deterrence. Strategic Personality provides a window through which to understand what a state's Ultimate Concerns are, and the unique rational orientation according to which a state identifies its Ultimate Concerns and translates them into interests, strategies, and actions. As an analytical device, Strategic Personality provides a tool for understanding the dynamics at work in past deterrence events by determining the balance of Ultimate Concerns between a defender and a challenger; how each perceived the balance of Ultimate Concerns, capabilities, and will; how effectively they communicated capabilities, intentions, and will; and finally, how they translated Ultimate Concerns and perceptions into actions. Strategic Personality also provides a framework within which to determine what, if any, deterrent approaches might have worked better or whether, in fact, a challenger was not deterable given the particular balance of Ultimate Concerns, capabilities, and will.

1. The Strategic Personality Methodology

This study uses a methodology that breaks a state's strategic decision-making down into three general parts: its orientation to the outside world, what information it pays the most attention to and is likely to invest with the most credibility, and how it decides how to act. A state's historical plot shapes each part of its Strategic Personality in slightly different ways. Whether the pressures and tensions that drove historical change and evolution in a particular state were internal or external determined where it looked for important information and shaped its orientation toward the outside world. Whether its society made the best of circumstances as they came or looked beyond immediate experience to find ways to shape something new and better in the future shaped each state's perception. And the religions and philosophies that states adopted to analyze and strive to make sense of their experiences shaped their habits of judgment. By focusing on how individual states determine what is valuable and important, the Strategic Personality Types provide insight into states' Ultimate Concerns and how they translate those Ultimate Concerns into National Interests and strategies. Each of the definitions below describes an pure version of each type. Based upon their unique historical and cultural experiences and how the three parts of their Strategic Personality interact, not every state of each type will necessarily display all the characteristics of the type. The manifestation of Strategic Personality type will thus vary somewhat from state to state.

2. Introverted States (I)

Through much of their history, the Introverted states all had relatively self-contained historical plots. In some cases, this was the result of geographic isolation (Japan and, to some extent, India). In other cases (China, for example), isolation was at least in part by design. In either case, the historical development of the Introverted states centered on the process of consolidating and maintaining internal social and political stability, which in turn depended on a strong sense of collective identity. Introverted states have self-contained Ultimate Concerns rooted in the struggle to maintain and defend their autonomy and internal cohesion (whatever the source) from external pressures.

The engine that drives historical development and change in the Introverted states is a cyclical process of the rise of internal stresses on the social and political structures, their resolution, often through increasing consolidation of power, followed by a period of growth and change that gives rise to yet another set of internal stresses (some triggered by external events). This cyclical pattern that emerges in the historical plots of most Introverted states and the sense of internally-shared experience and historical autonomy

account for the central characteristics of the Introverted Strategic Personality: they look inward to identify and consolidate their national interests, they see the international system as a loose conglomerate of independent and autonomous states, they see their own historical plot as self-contained, they are acutely boundary-sensitive, and they seek to defend their Ultimate Concerns against external stresses.

One effect of their self-contained historical plots is the Introverted states' keen boundary sensitivity. Boundaries are central to the Introverted states' sense of security to a much greater degree than is the case for any of the Extroverted states. For the Introverted states, strong collective identity depends on strict delineation of in-groups ("us") and out-groups ("them"), and clear definitions of the shared characteristics that define the boundaries between the two are central in their national myths. As a result, the Introverted states tend to draw stark and rigid distinctions between themselves and the rest of the world that probably never were realistic, and certainly are not so in the modern world, but that are nonetheless central to their identity. Introverted states often have geographic myths that place them physically and spiritually at the center of the universe—as in China's Central Kingdom, and Persia/Iran's Center of the Universe myths. At its extreme, this tendency can lead to a total lack of interest in or knowledge of the outside world. At times, the Introverted state's sense of boundaries can take an exaggerated form and translate into a hyper-isolationism and xenophobia that shuts out the outside world altogether and attempts to purge its internal influence as, for example, the Taliban have attempted to do in Afghanistan. But almost as often through history, the Introverted orientation has led states to pursue expansionist strategies that aim to build buffer zones around their Ultimate Concerns, as Japan did prior to World War II. Still, the Introverted state's boundary sensitivity usually takes a much more moderate and benign form, resulting in an Introverted Strategic Personality that relies primarily on introspection in adapting to stress and change, regardless of whether the source of that stress is internal or external.

This boundary sensitivity does not necessarily translate into either unilateralism or isolationism in the Introverted state's participation in the international system. It has been an increasingly undeniable reality of the Introverted states' historical experience since the European Age of Exploration that, in the modern era, isolation and quarantine are counterproductive and probably not sustainable. States with an Introverted orientation do not see states within the international system as wholly unrelated. Rather, they see the international system as made up of independent actors who, by virtue of having to live in proximity with one another, must find ways to cohabitate, preferably peacefully, with

their neighbors. without allowing those neighbors to interfere with their internal prerogatives. The defensive mindset of the Introverted states leads them to see the international system as a threat to their Ultimate Concern, one that must be vigilantly managed. While the Introverted states understand that managing and defending their Ultimate Concerns and interests requires a certain degree of interaction and engagement with the outside world, they do not automatically accept the notion that the International System should reshape or reform the neighborhood as a whole.

3. Extroverted States (E)

The Extroverted states all either lived out their historical plots in the crucible of European history or, like the US, are the political and cultural descendents of European states. The Extroverted states, in keeping with the patterns established over the whole course of their history, grow, develop, and live out their historical plots through interaction with other states. They have a progressive, linear view of history in which states must move forward, grow, and change or stagnate and be overwhelmed by more powerful neighbors, absorbed, or overtaken by the forces of progress in history. The idea that a state might gain strength by severing its ties and interactions with the outside world for long periods of time would be inconceivable to the Extroverted states, even were it possible for them to do so. The force for change, positive as well as negative, in Extroverted societies is external. Extroverted states are much more likely than Introverted states to be influenced and changed by their interaction with the outside world. The process of creative stress that drives the historical plot of Extroverted states accounts for the central characteristics of the Extroverted Strategic Personality: the Extroverted states look outward to identify and consolidate their national interests; they see the international system as an intricately and inextricably integrated whole that must find ways to cooperate for the good of the whole system; they see the historical plots of states as similarly interrelated; they are much less boundary sensitive than are the Introverted states; and their Ultimate Concerns are rooted, in part, in their ability to share, expand, and export their universalist world views.

Extroversion is the inevitable product of Europe's historical development. As a result, an Extroverted state can no more become an Introverted one than can an apple become an orange. A few have tried, and the result has been the distortion of the state's normal Strategic Personality and the rise of internal contradictions that Extroverted states are, by their nature, ill-equipped to resolve purely intentionally. The Extroverted states are instinctive Darwinians. The interactions and competitions between states create stress. Those states that overcome or resolve their external challenges grow stronger and

advance themselves in the process; those that are unable to master external stress are taken over by those that can. The instability of the international system through much of Western history has also been the source of its progress. The competition for power and wealth was the dynamic that created the European state system and, later, the expansion of European cultural influence around the globe. The pace of interaction, competition, and change in Western history has been rapid. As a consequence, the Extroverted states become bored and restive when the international system is too static because it is through the process of adapting to change (be it political, social, technological, or economic) that the Extroverted states grow and advance. If the price of peace and stability is stagnation, then the Extroverted states can be counted upon to continue to stir up the waters. Extroverted states are not satisfied when things stand still.

One result of this interactive dynamic is the relatively weak sense of boundaries inherent in Europe's historical experience. Political frontiers in Europe have always been fluid, with territories and autonomy seen as bargaining chips to be traded back and forth in the interest of maintaining a relatively stable international system of "legitimate" regimes.⁶ To be sure, legal and economic boundaries proliferated through much of European history, including a daunting system of local tariffs that frustrated the development of inland trade into the twentieth century; but as economic historian David Landes points out, these were not boundaries of identity so much as money-making schemes.⁷ And the Extroverted states' weak sense of boundaries also affords them a great cultural dynamism, allowing them to borrow freely, even hungrily, from each other as well as from other cultures and traditions.

In the globalization era, Introverts and Extroverts alike are learning to accept the reality that the long-term success of their Ultimate Concerns will depend on their ability to plug into the global economy in a way that at least does not undermine and ideally advances those Ultimate Concerns. But where the Introverts seek ways to participate in globalization that do not threaten their internally defined Ultimate Concerns, the Extroverts tend to want to use globalization (like imperialism and meliorism before it) as a means to spread their Ultimate Concerns. The United States has exported its idea of liberty all over the world (albeit with mixed success); the British Empire tried to impose order on "chaotic" colonial realms by importing British administrative structures and

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 84-94.

⁷ David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), p. 245.

political mores; and since at least the 17th century, the French have been motivated by their "mission to civilize."

4. Sensing States (S)

Geography was the principal force shaping the historical plots of the Sensing states. For some, like China and Germany, a lack of natural boundaries created a sense of vulnerability, while for others, like Japan and Britain, their physical insularity resulted in a strong, and not always accurate, sense of security and invulnerability. Many of the Sensing states—like Egypt, China, and Japan—grew out of ancient, agricultural societies; others became settled and agricultural later in their historical evolution. Most of the agricultural Sensing states enjoyed adequate or abundant resources, although a few, like Japan and Egypt, faced special geographic challenges in exploiting them. A few of the Sensing states had historical plots driven by the scarcity of resources in their heartlands. Sweden, Germany, and Spain all produced marauders who ventured into the outside world to find new lands and resources to supplement the hardscrabble existence in their homelands. Because they were bound by external threat, internal challenges, or geographic insularity, all of the Sensing states developed a defining sense of racial, ethnic, or even "national" identity early in their historical plots.

The Sensing states pay the most attention to concrete, observable things and events. They are focused on actual present and past events, and put their greatest trust in what is directly verifiable and measurable through the senses. They are solidly grounded in the here and now with roots embedded deeply in experience. The actual, observable aspects of circumstances and events have a great impact on the strategic conduct of Sensing states; but the hypothetical aspects do not. All states favoring the Sensing function, Introverted as well as Extroverted, are acutely aware of their environment and are focused primarily on what is going on around them in the present, have little patience with counter-factual speculations, and are disinclined to look around the next corner until they arrive there.

The Sensing states often shave myths of national origin with strong ties to a particular piece of territory that impart an important element of "nation as territory" into their definition of nationhood. The "evil other" is often identified with forces or out-groups that have sought to violate or otherwise undermine the connection between the people and the land from which they sprang. Sensing states also often have hierarchical social structures in which status is defined by material measures: blood, historical status, wealth, land ownership. Residence and citizenship standards are often strict, and

naturalization can be difficult and relies to a great extent on the ability of new groups to assimilate into the dominant culture. The Sensing states are frequently ethnically and linguistically homogenous (or seek to be) and tie language to their definition of national identity. These states define their sources of cultural power in terms of stability, tradition, and historical longevity. Their shared reservoirs of identity and patriotic rituals normally have a strong traditionalist bent as, for example, the many public rituals associated with the British royal family. The Golden Ages of Sensing states often lie deep in their past (especially for Introverted Sensing states) and even for those who have a more forward-looking national myth (the Extroverted Sensing states, especially), some historical Golden Age is usually an important motif of their national myth. The Sensing states tend to fall in one of two broad categories: those whose historical plot was driven by the constant need to defend their social structures and homelands from invasion (like China or Germany), and those that were geographically separate from their neighbors and did not have to worry, through much of their history, about invasion (like Japan and Britain). Overall, the Sensing states tend to have Ultimate Concerns tied closely to territory, tradition, and social order.

5. Intuitive States (N)

The Intuitive states for the most part lack the natural sources of identity that shaped the historical plots of the Sensing states. These are societies defined less by a particular territory or race than by an often “god-given” mission or ideal that provided the impetus for their historical evolution. Most of the Intuitive states are racially or ethnically heterogeneous and, like France and India, needed an idea and a blueprint to pull them together into a nation. These were often societies that developed large-scale agriculture quite late and some, like Iran (Persia) and Russia, did so only after the arrival of new religions (Zoroastrianism and Russian Orthodoxy) that preached the virtues of stability, community, and common purpose to a previously nomadic or pastoral people. Many—like the United States, Turkey, modern Israel, and Pakistan—are “manufactured” states, created largely as a result of human will, but all share a strong visionary strain. A few fall into the category of small states with big dreams whose determination not to be swallowed up by a neighboring, dominant, but somehow discordant or hostile culture drove their historical plots: Portugal (Spain), the Netherlands (Germany, Spain), Pakistan (India), Israel (Europe, Islam).

States with the Intuitive orientation pay the most attention to the patterns that emerge as events unfold. They are focused on the interconnections between current events and the insights they provide into how things might develop in the future. In a

sense, the Intuitive states do not note and remember the details of actual events, but rather their abstract impressions of events. The distinction may seem small, but the effect on the cognitive strategies of Strategic Personality types can be profound. The Intuitive states are every bit as aware of the real world as the Sensing states, but the assumption that guides their perception is that there is more to “reality” than meets the eye. The Intuitive states are constantly looking for the possibilities revealed by events. For the Intuitive states, where they are going is just as important a consideration in identifying their options as where they are at present.

Intuitive states have myths of national origins that are strongly associated with a particular idea or doctrine, and evil is defined as any force that stands in the way of the nation achieving its guiding ideal. The Ultimate Concerns of the Introverted states are usually tied to the quest to implement and defend a shared national vision. Patriotic rituals are closely tied to reinforcing the guiding idea. Residence and citizenship qualifications are often defined in terms of acceptance of the ideal or doctrine that defines the nation. In comparison to the Sensing states, naturalization in Intuitive states is generally easier, and new groups often influence the host culture as much as they are influenced by it. So, assimilation is often a two-way street and, sometimes, a source of internal stress (as change usually is). As a result, Intuitive states are often culturally and ethnically heterogeneous and blood lineage not necessarily a key to the definition of the nation. When language is key to an Intuitive state’s identity—as in France or Israel—it is as a tool of assimilation or indoctrination to the guiding vision. The definition of nationhood for most Intuitive states is some version of the “nation as shared goal” in which physical boundaries are less important than ideological ones, which can be quite rigid. The Intuitive states may have hierarchical social structures, but they are normally defined in terms of merit. Intuitive states often see their sources of cultural power in terms of creativity, potential, or destiny, and their Golden Ages often lie in the future (especially for Extroverted Intuitive states). Some myth of the promised land, paradise, or utopia is normally part of Intuitive national myth.

6. Thinking States (T)

The Thinking states often have historical plots driven by some great challenge that could only be overcome by the imposition of strict order on the chaos of reality. Many were societies that were, in some sense, under siege either from nature—like the desert-dwelling Saudis and the arctic Swedes, or from human competitors—like the geographically insecure Chinese and Germans, the persecuted Jews (Israel), or the Turks who waged a four-century “clash of civilizations” with Christian Europe. Some—like

France, Germany, and India—grew out of an attempt to impose order on a hodgepodge of loosely-related but particularistic tribes, clans, or principalities. What all the Thinking states share is an intellectual predisposition to seek the “proper” order of things, a preference reflected in their religious and secular philosophies. Some—like Germany, China, India, and Saudi Arabia—defined order in natural terms, focusing on social structures and class or caste. Others—like France, Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel—focused on more impersonal political structures as the mechanisms of order. The philosophies that shaped Thinking states’ judgment fall into two broad categories. The legalistic Thinking states include Israel (Jewish law, Talmud), France (statism, Code Napoleon), Germany (Hegelianism, authoritarianism), Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Islamic Law), and Turkey (Attatürkism, statism). The moralistic or “principled” Thinking states include China (Confucianism) and India (Hindu philosophy, Gandhi / Nehru).

The Thinking states prefer to apply logical, scientific, or legalistic rationality to their analysis of events. The laws that guide a Thinking state’s judgment are, like scientific rationality, impersonal and seek to be objective; but they derive their initial assumptions from culture and historical experience that shape a Thinking state’s analysis of how the world works. Values are important to the Thinking states and can provide the basis for their rational orientation (for instance, when those laws are derived from moral codes), but the hierarchy of laws and values is clearly defined. When values conflict with logic, the Thinking states err on the side of logic. These are, if you will, “left brain” states whose judgment stresses analysis and logical reasoning.

The national myths of Thinking states often include a definition of the nation that is concrete and legalistic: either the nation as state (civic nationalism) or the nation as shared language and culture. Thinking states tend to have legal codes that are intricate and clearly defined and that focus on law and order. Government in the Thinking states is often intrusive and designed to establish and maintain social, legal, and economic order. Where government is historically weak (as, for example, in China and Saudi Arabia), rigid systems of social norms often play the role of enforcer. The penal codes of Thinking states may focus narrowly on justice rather than revenge or rehabilitation—the “eye for an eye” approach. Righteousness in Thinking states is achieved by following the rules so as to maintain the all-important order. Thus, the Ultimate Concerns of Thinking states are usually tied to maintaining the proper order of things, either internally or externally. Thinking states regard respect as a crucial element of their national power and will foster long resentments when they sense they have not received the respect they deserve.

Humiliation is particularly unbearable and is likely to mutate, in national myth, into righteous indignation, and is often the source of their chosen traumas.

7. Feeling States (F)

Challenges that were best overcome by relying on shared, cooperative values to force a sense of common purpose for the collective among large, often diverse communities often drove the historical plots of Feeling states. Where Thinking states strove to eliminate chaos, the Feeling states sought to minimize its most disruptive effects. Values that promote social harmony and balance are common among Feeling states with foundations deep in agriculture, like Japan and Egypt. The values that emerged in societies that constantly struggled against hardship and scarcity, such as Russia and Spain, often emphasized heroism and leadership. Some of the Feeling states, including the United States and Iran, faced the challenge of building value systems that could create a shared identity in heterogeneous populations and thus emphasized tolerance, or at least peaceful coexistence. And the value systems that emerged in Feeling states with long traditions of commerce and trade—like Italy, Britain, Portugal, the US, and the Netherlands—emphasized flexibility, consensus-building, and negotiation. Some of the Feeling states—including Japan, Egypt, and Russia—developed value systems that were self-contained and exclusionist. Others—such as the value systems of the US, the Netherlands, Italy, and even Iran (Persia)—were more relativist and inclusive. The religious and philosophical systems that underlie the judgment of the Feeling states fall into two general categories. Some are overtly religious: Egypt (ancient Egyptian faiths, Islam), Portugal and Spain (Roman Catholicism), Russia (Russian Orthodoxy), and Iran (Zoroastrianism, Shi'a Islam). Others developed civic values that were largely secular (although not necessarily irreligious): Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union (Marxism-Leninism), Britain, and the United States.

States with the Feeling orientation arrive at conclusions by evaluating the evidence against a structure of values. The value structures of Feeling states are complex, but normally only certain of their constituent values apply to any particular event. The judgment of Feeling states is, then, highly context-dependent and inherently unpredictable. The Feeling states do not deny the utility of logical principles as a way of analyzing problems, but they are suspicious of logic as a final arbiter conduct. If what logic dictates is in direct conflict with their value structure, the Feeling states will err on the side of values. Moreover, it is in the subjective nature of values that one or more values may come into conflict in a particular situation, and the specific elements of the value structure may change somewhat with time and circumstances. For this reason, the

value structures of the Feeling states are also hierarchical, with some values having primacy over others, and all having primacy over logic. These are the “right brain” states whose judgment is based, first and foremost, on synthesis and, at times, emotion.

The definition of the nation in Feeling states is likely to be subjective rather than objective—some version of the nation as shared history (and shared values) or the nation as shared goal. Righteousness comes through conducting one’s affairs virtuously and doing good. The legal codes in Feeling states are likely to be designed to promote and enforce a particular hierarchy of values (in the United States, for example, personal liberty). In contrast to the Thinking states, the Feeling states often have penal codes that go beyond mere justice and seek retribution or rehabilitation. Government in the Feeling states is often primarily a caretaker of the cherished values and arbiter of differences; at any rate, it is designed primarily for advancement and defense of the value system, not for imposing centralized administrative efficiency. For the Feeling states, being admired and recognized for their virtue is important to their sense of national power. As a result, the national traumas of Feeling states are often associated with actions or periods during which they “slipped” in their adherence to their values or were widely perceived as having done so (as in the case of slavery and the Vietnam War in the US).

E. CASE STUDIES

The next four chapters present a series of case studies of the influence of strategic personality on the evolution of crises and the effectiveness of strategic deterrence. Three of these case studies are historical: Israel’s attempt to deter an Arab attack from the end of the 1967 Six Day War to the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War; the evolution of the strategic relationship of the United States and Japan in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific in December 1941; and the evolution of the strategic relationship between Great Britain and Germany in the decades following German reunification in 1871. The fourth case study—the evolution of the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir—focuses on a continuing crisis and suggests how strategic personality typing provides insight into how the conflict may unfold in the future. The case studies were chosen to cover the spectrum of likely deterrence and threat reduction scenarios that the United States will face in the decades to come. The Egypt-Israel case is an example of immediate deterrence. The US-Japan case provides an analysis of an attempt at general deterrence (US attempts to prevent Japan from pursuing an expansionist and exclusionist agenda in the Pacific) and an immediate counter-deterrent (Japan’s attempt to deter the US from undertaking a war to prevent it from achieving its

imperial ambitions). The analysis of the rise of the Anglo-Germany naval rivalry between 1871 and 1906 focuses on threat reduction and extended deterrence in managing the strategic relationship between a major power and a potential peer competitor. The India-Pakistan case examines an ongoing crisis in which the United States is not a direct participant but has an interest in reducing regional instability in the interest of the long-term stability of the international system as a whole. Each case study begins with a brief description of a few of the key cultural and historical factors that have contributed to the evolution of the strategic personality of the states involved, the relationship between those factors and the state's Ultimate Concerns, and a short profile of the states' general type and its impact on how they derive national interests, strategies, and strategic approaches.

II. THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973

A. EGYPT'S STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. Egypt as "the Gift of the Nile"

Egypt's Introverted, Sensing orientation stems directly from the unique geography that has shaped the rhythms of its culture and the patterns of its history. The Nile Valley has, since ancient times, been the most important source of Egypt's sense of unique national identity and the home for nearly all of its population. The ancient Egyptians probably migrated into the Nile Valley from other places, but retained no historical memory of coming from somewhere else. Ancient Egyptian religion was based on the belief that the land and the people of Egypt were one organic being. Egypt's modern cities are merely the top layer of a progression of settlements that have inhabited the same territories since the very birth of Egyptian civilization. This continuity of settlement has left modern Egypt with an ethnically homogenous population that, whatever its religious and political differences, enjoys a deep sense of shared historical roots. It also leaves Egypt with a long historical experience of centralized rule and shared identity that makes it the world's oldest nation-state.

Over the millennia, the annual Nile floods have established the rhythm of life and provided the rich soil and plentiful waters that have made the Nile valley the most arable and habitable part of northern Africa. The annual inundation altered and often obliterated the lines between plots of land; as a result, the Egyptians became expert surveyors and developed early the Sensing state's keen awareness of the importance of accurate boundaries. Even with the gift of a rich alluvial plain, cultivation was not easy. When the floods rose too high, the water could wash away whole villages, along with their livelihood; when the Nile failed to flood, the looming desert encroached on the green and the whole nation starved. Dams and dykes were necessary to drain the swamps and systematically control the flow of water, both during the floods and during the dry months. None of this could be managed alone, even by the largest of families, so, like Japan, Egypt developed a social ethos to encourage cooperative action in the common interest that contributed to Egypt's Feeling orientation.⁸

The fertile Nile floodplain constitutes only about 5 percent of the total land area of Egypt. The other 95 percent of Egypt consists of the desert that seems to extend

⁸ George Steindorff and Keith C. Seele, *When Egypt Ruled the East*, Revised Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 8.

endlessly beyond the agricultural strip, and covers the entire northeast portion of the African continent. The transition from green to arid is stark and has reminded the Egyptians through the ages that the line between prosperity and suffering is thin and tenuous. It is surely symbolic, as well as practical, that the Egyptian pharaohs built their great necropolises in these vast deserts. Through most of its history, the desert provided Egyptian civilization with a buffer from the trauma of foreign invasion and nomadic incursions that enabled its civilization to grow and mature free from significant external influences. In a sense, ancient Egypt was an island civilization, separated from its nearest neighbors by a sea of sand. The heart of Egyptian civilization lay well south of the only other means of access, the Mediterranean Sea. Invasions did occur, but for the most part Egypt's strong sense of cultural and national identity enabled it to absorb and co-opt invaders and make foreign rulers – like the Greek Ptolemaic dynasty that produced Cleopatra – more pharaonic than the Pharaohs. Egyptian culture was firmly confined and circumscribed by tradition. Innovations from abroad were either sloughed off as temporary fads or became totally absorbed as part of the soul and substance of Egypt, their foreign roots forgotten.⁹

2. The Pharaohs

The nearly three thousand year reign of the Egyptian Pharaohs of the Old and New Kingdoms came to an end in 335 BCE with the invasion of Alexander the Great who established his general, Ptolemy, as the founder of a new Hellenic imperial dynasty. The Ptolemies quickly came to see themselves as a new Pharaonic dynasty—one that ruled Egypt until the assassination of the last of the line (Cleopatra, daughter of Julius Caesar and the last Ptolemaic “Pharaoh,” Cleopatra) by the Roman Empire in 30 BCE. The Roman Emperor Theodosius declared Christianity the official religion of Rome in 380 CE, outlawing the lingering remnants of the ancient Egyptian sects. Egypt was one of the first non-Arab Middle Eastern provinces conquered by the Arab-Muslim ‘Abbasid Caliphate in 641 CE. Successive Arab and Turkish Caliphates administered Egypt as a semi-autonomous province until the French and the British Empires established successive protectorates in Egypt. Even more than Christianity, Islam sought to break all ties with the pre-Islamic *jahiliyah* (time of ignorance), and memories of the more ancient religious traditions that had guided Egypt for thousands of years faded, although many of their values and social mores survived and were gradually absorbed into Muslim identity.

⁹ Steindorff and Seele, *When Egypt Ruled*, p. 115.

The European Age of Exploration triggered new interest in Egyptian antiquities beginning in the seventeenth century, but the real watershed in the rediscovery of Egypt's past came with Napoleon's Egyptian campaign in 1798. Among the scholars who accompanied the French army into Egypt was Jean-François Champollion who, over the next half-century, painstakingly deciphered the ancient hieroglyphic texts and laid the foundations of modern Egyptology.¹⁰ Over the next century, the diligent efforts of European archeologists, linguists, and historians gradually pieced back together the long-buried story of Pharaonic Egypt. The rediscovery of their past glory triggered in the Egyptians a renewed sense of national identity and awareness of what Egyptians free of foreign domination were capable of achieving. Egyptian nationalists and popular culture quickly embraced their long-lost Pharaohs and incorporated them into a national myth of Egyptian uniqueness that gained in power with the nationalist uprising of 1919.¹¹ Its long history of civilization has instilled in Egyptian national myth a strong sense of racial uniqueness that sets Egypt apart—historically, and in the minds of Egypt's most extreme nationalists, racially—from the rest of the Arab world.

It was in large part the Pharaonic system that gave Egypt forty centuries of political and social stability that could stand up to the occasional disruption of foreign invasion or periods of famine. That the Pharaohs were able to maintain such stability was, in turn, largely owing to the strong connection between the ruler and the ancient Egyptian system of religious belief. The king's principal responsibility was to rule in a way that maintained the natural equilibrium of creation throughout his realm. Ancient Egyptian religion established a clear hierarchy of both individuals and regions that gave each region and city a sense of its place in the universal harmony upon which the success of Egyptian civilization depended.

The values and community orientation of ancient Egyptian religion were reflected in its art, which (like the art of Japan, another ISF state) aimed not at realism but at perfect symmetry and at portraying the essential character of the subject and its place in the community and the universe. The only proper subject was nature and man.¹² In Egyptian art, all characteristics were portrayed at once, explaining its apparently tortured postures and perspectives. The overarching goal of the Pharaonic system and its faith was

¹⁰ Champollion published the first comprehensive study of ancient Egyptian religion, *Panthéon*, in 1823, and set down the basic components of ancient Egyptian linguistics in *Grammaire égyptienne* in 1835.

¹¹ The events surrounding the Revolution of 1919 are the historical setting for Egyptian Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz's Cairo Trilogy: *Bayn al-Qasrayn* (*Palace Walk*, 1956), *as-Sukkariyya* (*Sugar Street*, 1957), and *Qasr ash-Shawq* (*Palace of Desire*, 1957).

¹² Steindorff and Seele, *When Egypt Ruled*, p. 193.

to maintain the political stability and sense of community that was so highly valued in an agricultural society. The Pharaoh was judged in the afterlife by the extent to which he had pursued his dynastic goals without disrupting the system of relationships and values that were the foundation of a stable, orderly society. The ancient concept of morality centered on this concept of universal equilibrium, personified in Maat, the goddess of truth and justice. Maat, the daughter of the sun god Ra, embodied divine order and harmony. Her symbol was an ostrich feather; and in the underworld, the heart of the deceased pharaoh was weighed against the feather of Maat.¹³ If his heart was so burdened by sin that it was heavier than the feather, he could not enter the afterlife; if the scale balanced, he became one of the gods. That morality followed from equilibrium was yet another element that would shape Egypt's Sensing orientation.

3. Religion

Egyptian religion saw life as a cyclical reenactment of creation—birth, life, death—to the rhythm of the sun, moon, and floods. The sun god Ra was believed to be born each dawn, was mature at noon, and old in the evening. Each night he passed through the underworld under the protection of the god of chaos and disorder, Seth (whose earthly domain was, significantly, the desert). Ra was then reborn each day at dawn to start the cycle of creation all over. Another great god, Osiris, was also venerated as the first king of Egypt, who taught the Egyptians the secrets of farming and the values that constituted the core of their civilization. When Osiris was murdered by his brother, Seth, his son Horus (the falcon-headed god of the forces of order and the protector of mankind) sought to avenge his father's death; but Horus remained locked in a perpetual struggle with Seth that neither ever won. Osiris was believed to oversee the annual growth of crops, and the cycle of harvesting, threshing, and replanting reenacted his life, murder, and resurrection as a god. Ancient Egypt invented the concept of immortality contingent on judgment of man's earthly deeds by the gods after death. It also instilled in Egyptian culture the sense that stability depends upon a system of shared values and accounts, and the recognition that chaos was an inevitable part of life and that order required constant vigilance that together shaped Egypt's Feeling orientation.

Long after the ancient religious texts were lost and forgotten, Egyptians continued to observe their system of values which were rooted in the natural desire of an agricultural people to maintain nature's equilibrium and social harmony. Egypt's Arab identity traces back to the Muslim invasion; but while Egypt was quick to adopt the Arab

¹³ Nicolas Grimal, *A History of Ancient Egypt* (London: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1992), p. 47.

language, Islamization came more slowly. Egypt was from the beginning predominantly Sunni, but the mystical Sufis had a strong influence, in part because of their willingness to incorporate elements of the indigenous ancient beliefs into their worship. Unlike much of the rest of the Arab world, Egypt remained a semi-autonomous region governed by independent (although foreign) dynasties through most of the Arab and Ottoman imperial eras.¹⁴ Although a small Christian minority survives in modern Egypt (the Copts, who have kept a version of the ancient Egyptian language alive in their liturgical texts), the country is 90 percent Muslim. Unlike some other ISF states (including both Spain and Japan), Egypt has no tradition of “purity of blood,” but persecution of minority sects does crop up from time to time, usually during periods of social stress or unrest when the minority view is seen as disruptive to the underlying value system and, hence, stability. While Islamic purists may condemn and even persecute the Copts as apostates, the Christians remain an integral part of the distinct and homogenous Egyptian population that provides the counter-balance to Egypt’s Islamic and Arab identities.

4. Egypt’s Introverted, Sensing, Feeling Strategic Personality

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Egypt’s strategic personality is the extent to which the Nile and the fate and structure of the culture are entwined, instilling in the Egyptians the sense that they are a people absolutely distinct from and superior to any other. The ISF states are not, strictly speaking, realists—their adherence to their hierarchy of values makes them too subjective in their decision-making to qualify—but they are pragmatists who center their strategic thinking on needs and results rather than on ideas and theories. As a result, their strategic thinking often favors the immediate and operational over a long-term grand strategy. They are often quite good at tactical maneuvering, but they are much less successful at adapting when their initial plans do not work out. In the political realm, this can make political reform difficult. Lacking the Intuitive states’ sense of vision, the ISF state’s sense of unity and shared purpose comes through stability, and reform is inherently disruptive of stability. Because unity and stability are so central to the ISF states’ sense of identity and security, their Ultimate Concerns are likely tied to maintaining social and territorial cohesion.

Historically, Egypt developed much of its core identity in relative cultural and political isolation and is thus sensitive to pressures that undermine the social structures and values that constitute the hard, non-absorbent core of its national identity. Egypt’s strategic personality, as a result, includes a degree of insularity. This translates into a

¹⁴ Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 345-364, 969).

certain reticence in its relations with the outside world, even with Arabs with whom the Egyptians share a language, a dominant religion, and an historical experience of foreign domination. While Egypt does not have a history of isolating itself (as its fellow ISFs, Japan and Spain, have periodically done through their history), it is inclined to hold the outside world at arms length. Egypt has never displayed the extreme isolationism of Tokugawa Japan or Fascist Spain, but its episodic participation in the Arab nationalist project shows the strong influence of Egypt's ISF strategic personality. Since the arrival of Islam and the Caliphates, and especially in modern times, the Egyptians have come to see themselves as political and economic members of the greater Arab community. At the same time, however, they harbor a sense that their civilization and culture—including but not limited to the traditions of ancient Egypt—are superior to and distinct from the rest of the Arab world. While they identify strongly with the rest of the Arab world, for the ISF Egyptians that shared experience is not absolute or free of boundaries. The Egyptians believe they are the natural leaders and cultural center-of-gravity of the Arab world—when the rest of the Arab states accept that leadership, the Egyptians are Arab Nationalists. But when, as they often do, the other Arab states take issue with Egypt's pretensions of Arab leadership (many Arabs share the Egyptian contention that they are not true Arabs), the Egyptians have typically backed away from the Pan-Arab movement. Egypt needs the Arabs and identifies strongly with them, but cooperation is difficult. The Egyptian sense of uniqueness leads to a tendency to want to be either leaders (who can manipulate the Arab agenda to serve Egyptian needs) or loners (free to pursue uniquely Egyptian interests).

B. ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. The Mosaic Covenant

Israel's myth of national origin begins with the ancient biblical epic of the Israelite patriarchs, starting with Abraham. The story of the rise of the Israelites, the exodus, and the return to the Promised Land provides the underlying theme of Israel's entire history and establishes it as, perhaps, the first truly Intuitive nation. In its broad outlines, of course, Israel shares its myth with the entire Western world and even with its most hostile Muslim neighbors. The Exodus myth shaped the direction of Western history, instilling the notion of progress toward a better or at least different future in this world, as well as in the next. Where ancient man (including the ancient Egyptians) had previously seen himself trapped in an endless cycle of fate determined by natural and supernatural forces entirely beyond his control, the Israelites conceived of their history as a progression toward a better future, one shaped by the choices men make in the present.

But the blessings of progress came at a price—with free choices came the twin burdens of responsibility and accountability. There are right and wrong choices; and in Jewish myth, the right choices are those that conform to God's law as defined in his covenant with Abraham and Moses.¹⁵

Much of the narrative of the Hebrew Bible involves the cycle of sin, punishment, and redemption. Their covenant with YHWH was the source of the Israelites' strength and tribal resilience in times of war, exile, and famine, but the temptation was strong to stray from its righteous path in times of ease and plenty. YHWH sent a series of prophets to remind the Israelites that observance of the covenant was as much required in good times as in bad, and to warn them of the perilous consequences of his wrath. The requirements of the covenant were absolute; even Moses paid a heavy price for the one occasion when he broke faith with YHWH during the forty-year journey of the Israelites through the wilderness. Because he had once challenged YHWH, Moses himself would never reach the Promised Land; he led his people to within sight of Judea but died just across the River Jordan from Jericho. The lesson: if the Jewish people stray from the strict terms of God's covenant, the Promised Land will be lost to them.

In modern times, the Mosaic covenant defines the central themes of Israeli national myth and the dimensions of its Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking strategic personality. The Israelites are God's chosen people who have been promised dominion over the Eretz Yisrael (the "land of Israel") provided they keep themselves separate and strictly observe a set of God-given laws. When they violate the covenant, or when they lose sight of their shared obligation and fall into internal dispute, they risk being cast out of the promised land. In Israel's modern myth of national origin, the Mosaic covenant is transformed as the Israelis take charge of their own fate and establish the modern state of Israel.

2. Zionism

The modern version of Israel's Exodus myth begins with the rise of Theodore Herzl's secular, nationalist Zionist movement in Europe in the 1890s and culminates with the establishment of the independent state of Israel in 1948. In the ancient version of the myth, the nation of the Israelites is a product of the will of YHWH who made the Israelites his "chosen people." The Zionists sought to build a secular nationalist vision for the Jews that moved their focus from heaven to the earth: Israel as a nation created by the

¹⁵ Thomas Cahill, *The Gifts of the Jews: How a Tribe of Desert Nomads Changed the Way Everyone Thinks and Feels* (New York: Nan Telese / Doubleday, 1998), pp. 132, 146, 239.

force of human, not heavenly, will.¹⁶ The heroes of the Zionist myth were the Sabra—the “new Jew” with his own language and land, fully in control of his fate, and the halutz—the pioneer who settled and worked the land, took up arms to defend it, submerged his individual identity into the egalitarian collective on the kibbutz, and rolled up his sleeves and built a homeland for his people. But it is also a myth that depends heavily on ignoring the complexities of reality. Israel was not founded on an empty land; in order to translate their vision of a Jewish nation into reality, the Zionist pioneers had to displace another people, the Palestinians, from their homeland.

3. Judaism

In many respects, Israel is torn between the two versions of its vision, a tension that has become painfully apparent in the ongoing debate over the Israel-Palestinian peace process and Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Still, there is broad consensus on the basic outlines of the Israeli vision. Israel is different and unique. It is a nation with a mission (whether God-given or secular) that requires it to remain true to the principles of Jewish law and to resist international pressure to conform to universal norms. Israel is the outward symbol of the redemption of the Jewish people, and even the most secular Jews agree that the laws of the state should conform to Jewish law and the Mosaic covenant. Through millennia of exile, the Talmud provided a substitute for a homeland as the sole source of ethnic and group identity for the Jewish people. But the Talmud was not merely legal code; it was the law of an Intuitive people, an unbounded and infinitely expandable source of information, curiosity, and debate. In it one could find the solution to any problem and the answer to any question, provided you knew where to look. Today, it is the source of acculturation and assimilation in the ethnic melting pot that is modern Israel. Rabbinic Judaism is about observing religious law and hewing to the community more than it is about one’s private beliefs. One can thus be an unbeliever and still be a Jew; but in the public sphere, even among secular Jews, certain aspects of religious law remain central sources of national identity. For all Israelis, secular and observant Jews alike, the exodus is the central theme of their history and national myth and, whatever the cost, the aliyah—the in-gathering of the exiles—must continue. And while Israel is a thoroughly secular state and in no sense a theocracy, Israelis (divided on many aspects of policy) share the consensus that Jewish law must provide the basis for national identity. In Israeli national myth, the ideal state is more

¹⁶ Not all Jews in Israel accept the modern national myth of Israel. The ultra-Orthodox initially condemned Zionism as heretical and blasphemous. The most extreme among the *heredim* continue to refuse to participate in the Israeli democracy; the more pragmatic do participate in a effort to shape the currently secular Jewish state into something more like a Jewish theocracy.

than an institution to ensure the liberties of the individual; it provides a framework within which Jews as a people can pursue their moral and spiritual redemption.¹⁷

4. Israel's Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking Strategic Personality

As a nation born of and united by a shared vision, Israel falls squarely in the ranks of the Intuitive states. As a state whose historical plot has been shaped almost exclusively by the struggle to implement its unique vision, rooted in Judaic law and Zionist principles, Israel falls in the ranks of the Introverted states. More than any other single factor, Israel's national interests are shaped by the national struggle to implement and its Ultimate Concern of defending the Israeli national vision. The Israelis defend their national vision with a single-mindedness and intensity that can, and often does, put them at odds with the outside world—even their friends and allies. And as a Thinking state, the Israelis are not always sensitive to how their actions, which they see as just and rational, might play among states with a different view of things, leading to missteps that often cause Israel unnecessary and occasionally dangerous problems.

The nature of Israel's vision, rooted as it is in legalism and rationality, has shaped Israel's Thinking orientation and its strategic personality. Judaism is not, by its nature, a mystical or highly emotive faith. It sees a universe governed by an immutable, God-given system of law and justice. The chaos of the outside world (that is, the world outside the Jewish community and outside Israel) is the result of man's failure to submit to that justice. While the law comes from God, justice is wholly a matter of man's will. Like the other INTs, Israel expects the international system to function as a forum for justice among states, and it is a forum the Israelis are willing to manipulate to serve their long-term strategic objectives. While the issues that divide Israel and its Arab neighbors trigger deep emotional reactions in Israelis, the Israeli strategy to deal with its Arab neighbors has been, for the most part, coolly rational—and eye for an eye (Israeli retaliatory policy), and tit-for-tat (land for peace, which has been Israel's starting position in its negotiations with its Arab neighbors since 1967). Israel defines its international relations in terms of its struggle for justice in the face of current and historical injustice (the Holocaust, anti-Semitism), and this quest for recognition of its rights and legitimacy has shaped Israel's relations with the Arab world as well as the broader international community more than any other single factor.

¹⁷ Charles S. Liebman, "Religion and Democracy in Israel," in Schlomo Deshen, et. al., eds., *Israeli Judaism*, Volume II: *Studies of Israeli Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), p. 349-353.

As INTs with a strong sense of shared internal vision, the Israelis are not particularly vulnerable to external pressure and can maintain a principled stand in the face of significant international criticism. But internal criticism can be a different story. As a society united by its commitment to community, Israeli public opinion can be sensitive to casualties in military operations that are seen as peripheral to defending Israel and its mission. Israeli public opinion also became sensitive over time to charges that their treatment of the Palestinians was unjust. While they continue to see the Palestinians—both Christian and Muslim—as outside the Israeli “nation,” growing numbers of Israelis see the cost of hostilities as too high, morally and materially, and would like to see some normalization of relations. But this growing sentiment for peace does not translate into a desire for desegregation of Arabs and Jews. Israelis want peace from the Arabs, not integration with them. But even in this, Israel is torn between the two extremes of its secular and religious vision. As one Israeli has put it:

Now we are stuck with the follies of right and left — settlements embedded in the Palestinian heartland, an emerging Palestinian state whose police increasingly act like terrorists. There is neither a biblical past to escape to nor a peaceful future to anticipate. We are caught in a dreamless present, a confused and fearful Israel in the old Middle East. . . . Perhaps for the first time since the birth of Zionism a century ago, we are a people without a vision. . . . Discovering the next Israeli vision will depend on learning patience. . . . And also on learning humility: Zionism allowed us to determine our own destiny; it didn't give us the ability or the right to transform the Middle East.¹⁸

In many ways, the strategic problems that plague the INT Israelis are the opposite of those of the ISF Egyptians. Where the Egyptians often focus on near-term objectives at the expense of long-term strategies, the Israelis are often so focused on achieving their overall goal—peace and full recognition from the Arabs—that they are unable to think in terms of the small tactical steps or missteps that might affect their progress or undermine their credibility in the eyes of the outside world. The INTs are all strategically minded, but it is a strategy born of ideals and absolutes that does not always lend itself to pragmatic, measured, step-by-step approaches—patience. With their eyes on the big picture and the long term, the Israelis, like their fellow INTs, often lose the trees for the forest. The result, too often, is tactical mistakes that can have major, unforeseen costs in terms of progress toward Israel's ultimate objectives.

¹⁸ Yossi Klein Halevi, “Adrift in Israel's Dreamless Present,” *The Washington Post*, November 26, 2000.

C. CONTEXT OF DETERRENCE

1. Legacies of the Six-Day War, 1967

The outcome of the Six-Day War in 1967 significantly altered the strategic balance between Israel and the Arab states aligned against it in a number of important respects. With its occupation of the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank territories, and the Golan Heights, Israel enjoyed the luxury of “defense in depth” for the first time in its history. Control of the West Bank reduced the vulnerability of Israel’s “waist”—the narrow (barely more than ten miles wide at its narrowest point) strip of territory that connected the Galilee in the north to the rest of the country. Military control of the Sinai provided a buffer zone between Israel and its largest and most threatening opponent, Egypt, in the south and enabled Israel to control access to the Suez Canal (effectively blockading access to Mediterranean trade and severely restricting its income). Occupation of the Golan Heights gave Israel control of both shores of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberius) and denied the Syrian army access to strategically important highlands that had, under hostile control, posed a major threat to the security of Israeli settlements and cities in the Galilee. The outcome of the war had also demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) enjoyed huge operational superiority over the combined Arab forces, which suffered not only from superior Israeli training and doctrine but also from their own poor coordination and command structures.

The changes were not all to Israel’s advantage. The 1967 war also introduced new complications to Israel’s strategic calculus. While it improved Israel’s security in material and geographical terms, it also altered the balance of interests between Israel and the Arabs. The security born of the new frontiers, most of which (with the notable exception of East Jerusalem, Hebron, and Bethlehem) fell outside the traditional definition of Eretz Yisrael and hence outside the scope of Israel’s Mosaic/Zionist vision, came at the price of new uncertainties concerning both Israel’s internal will and external legitimacy. Holding on to these territories ran the risk of undermining the purity of Israel’s vision—it would no longer be fighting the righteous fight to defend its vision, but would be seen by many to be fighting an “imperialist” battle as a foreign occupier of land even Israelis did not really regard as legitimately theirs. The war and the ensuing occupation also brought a shift in the focus of Israeli national myth. In an effort to legitimize the occupation (probably in the eyes of Israelis more than in the eyes of the outside world), Israeli leaders increasingly harked back to anti-Semitism, pogroms, and the Holocaust to emphasize the necessity for Jews to defend themselves from hostile forces that sought their destruction. Still, the Israeli leadership was clearly uneasy with the tension that

possession of the occupied territories created and early on had indicated its willingness to negotiate away much of the territory it captured in 1967. In June, shortly after the ceasefire was declared, the Israeli Knesset voted to return the Sinai and the Golan and enter into discussion regarding the status of the West Bank provided Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were willing to make peace and demilitarize their borders with Israel. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, the Arabs rejected the offer by issuing the “Three Noes Resolution” in Khartoum in September: no negotiation with Israel, no recognition of Israel’s legitimate right to exist, and no peace with Israel. Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser would later add a fourth no: no concessions on the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

The outcome of the 1967 War had an understandably more devastating effect on the Arabs, and particularly on Egypt. The Sensing Egyptians had a natural tendency to look to material measures of power—tanks, aircraft, artillery—for the explanation of their defeat. The military imbalance turned out to be worse than the Egyptians thought going into the war, but they would learn the operational lessons of their defeat and apply them to their advantage in the years to come. The Feeling side of Egypt’s strategic personality also came into play, with important political repercussions. Beginning with Muslim religious leaders, but quickly spreading to broader popular opinion, the defeat in 1967 was increasingly blamed on the fact that under the spell of Arab nationalism, Egypt had abandoned the Muslim values that were the cornerstone of its identity and potential power. According to this assessment, the outcome of the war was “divine retribution” visited on an apostate regime that had persecuted its Islamist critics and traded Muslim values for foreign, nationalist, and socialist ones. The result was a period of Islamic revival that many Egyptians later credited with setting the stage for military success in 1973. But Islamic revival came, somewhat ironically, at the cost of Egypt’s ties to the Arab nationalist movement, which under the Socialist Nasser and Ba’athist Assad had taken a decidedly secular, materialist turn. In keeping with its ISF strategic personality, one of the first conclusions Egypt drew from its defeat in 1967 was that, in aligning its interests too closely with those of the broader “Arab Nation,” Egypt had compromised the values and social structures that were the traditional source of its strength and uniqueness.

2. The War of Attrition, 1967-1970

Israel and Egypt drew significantly different pictures of the strategic environment after 1967. Intuitive Israel believed its clear victory in 1967 had brought the realization of one key aspect of its strategic vision within plausible reach: a comprehensive peace with the Arabs that would ensure recognition of Israel's legitimacy not just among the Arab states but throughout the world. For the first time in its history, Israel was negotiating from a position of strength: it was the victor and it held a number of extremely valuable bargaining chips—the Sinai, the Golan, and the West Bank. Israel's vast conventional military advantage and the well-established credibility of its retaliatory policy would be more than sufficient to deter any Arab attempts to take the captured territory back by force. The Thinking Israelis "ran the numbers" and came to the conclusion that the era of Arab-Israeli wars was at an end; the only "rational" alternative for the Arab states was to make peace with Israel.

Egypt saw things very differently. In the view of the Sensing Egyptians, the cost of the 1967 War was enormous. The Suez Canal remained closed, cutting off an important source of revenue for Egypt. The cities along the canal had been extensively damaged, tourism to Egypt had come to a virtual standstill, and the continuous mobilization of Egypt's large army was having a crushing effect on an already weak economy. By all subjective measures of national interest, Egypt had to find a way to establish a permanent peace with Israel. But peace had to come in a manner that did not compromise ISF Egypt's two Ultimate Concerns: restoring the territorial integrity of the Egyptian homeland by regaining the Sinai, and restoring Egypt's national honor and self-respect lost as a result of the humiliating defeat in 1967. Accepting Israel's terms for regaining the Sinai in 1967 would have advanced the first concern but only at the expense of compromising the second. After 1967, Egypt sought a way to fulfill both its objectives.

The Sensing, Feeling Egyptians ultimately had a more utilitarian view of the strategic factors at work and of the strengths and weaknesses of their opponent after 1967 than did the Intuitive Israelis, and sought a venue for a challenge in which Egypt and Israel would be much more closely matched. The Egyptians realized that the IDF's speed and agility gave it a huge advantage in wars of maneuver, but one that would not necessarily apply as well in static wars of attrition. Egyptian leadership also understood that Israel's defensive vision made its public will a potential Achilles' Heel (Nasser had once remarked that a nation that published photos of each day's war dead in its newspapers—as Israel had during the Six Day War—had no chance of winning a war of

attrition).¹⁹ Nasser suspected that Israel's grasp currently exceeded what its vision could comfortably justify. In the face of limited resources and casualty sensitivity, an Egyptian campaign of attrition could wear down Israel's military and psychological resistance straining its ability to sustain losses in pursuit of less than ultimate concerns. President Nasser initiated the period of low-intensity conflict with Israel, later known as the War of Attrition, with three aims in mind: 1) to instill a new offensive spirit in the defensively minded and demoralized Egyptian army; 2) to raise the morale of the nation as a whole; and 3) to raise the cost of holding on to the Sinai to a level higher than what Israeli national will could tolerate merely to hold on to "bargaining chips."

The War of Attrition began barely three weeks after the cease-fire that had ended the 1967 War; it consisted initially of Egyptian ambushes, raids, cross-canal tank and artillery fires, and occasional air-to-air engagements. The Israelis responded by shoring-up defenses along what came to be known as the Bar-Lev Line—a series of defensive and observation positions designed to enable the IDF to withstand the heaviest artillery barrages the Egyptians could throw at them, maintain full control of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, keep casualties to a minimum, and limit the risk of direct engagement with Egyptian troops. By June 1969, in the face of low-level but fairly constant Egyptian harassment, the Israelis had shifted their strategy from a purely defensive one to one of counter-attrition. The Israeli air force entered the battle in the role of deep, flying artillery. Costs rose on both sides, but Egypt paid the higher price in concrete terms. Over the next three months, the Israeli air forces flew 1,000 sorties against Egypt and lost 3 aircraft to dogfights and anti-aircraft defenses. In stark contrast, Egypt was only able to fly 100 sorties against Israeli positions and lost 21 aircraft in the process.²⁰ By March 1970, Israeli commander Moshe Dayan confidently declared that deep penetration air attacks against Egyptian bases during the winter of 1970, combined with Israel's complete command of the air over the Suez line of engagement, had broken Egyptian morale. In an effort to shore up sagging morale, the Egyptians eventually requested Soviet reinforcements in addition to the military aid and advisors the USSR was already providing. More importantly over the long-term, the Soviets also completely renovated the Egyptian air defense system, introducing its SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles. By June 1970, the Israeli Air Force found itself in air-to-air battles against Soviet pilots. The payoff for Egypt of Soviet assistance was initially high, but the Israelis quickly adjusted

¹⁹ Elli Lieberman, *Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?*, McNair Paper 45 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 1995), p. 12.

²⁰ Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 187-211.

and the advantage disappeared. Nasser also grew increasingly wary of the political price he would pay in exchange for Soviet assistance and worried that the strain of the war was taking its toll on the Egyptian army, leadership, and population. The Israelis had no interest in continuing the hostilities either, paving the way for US Secretary of State William Rogers to broker a cease-fire. The 90-Day Cease Fire Agreement took effect on the 8th of August and remained in effect until October 6, 1973.

D. THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE

On the eve of the 1973 War, Israel had every reason to be confident that the deterrent effect of its significant conventional military advantage would hold. Nasser's strategy seemed to have led to a dead-end and Egypt's population was as tired of war as Israel's. What the Sensing Egyptians had failed to take into consideration in launching the War of Attrition was that, for the Intuitive Israelis, the issue was not just a simple cost-benefit calculus. The drive to defend their vision afforded the Israelis tremendous will to resist when they felt they were under attack. While defense of the Sinai was not, to be sure, central to Israel's vision, progress toward its ultimate objective—peace and normalization—was. Moreover, the Israeli leadership had done a good job of linking the two in public opinion, as well as portraying Arab intransigence (e.g., "The Three Noes") as the cause of war. Nasser died shortly after the cease-fire went into effect; and his successor, Anwar Sadat, was generally regarded as a weak, interim leader. The Intuitive Israelis, focused on their long-term objective of peace with all the Arabs and safe behind what it believed was a credible and effective military deterrent, were well situated to wait out Egypt and the rest of the Arabs. But their Thinking orientation contributed to a certain degree of Israeli hubris in the months leading up to the 1973 War. Based on their experiences in the Six-Day War and the War of Attrition, the Israeli military establishment misread both Egyptian capabilities and, more importantly, intentions. As former Israeli President Chaim Herzog put it:

Against this atmosphere of self-satisfaction, the indications available [that war was imminent] were ignored. The Israeli military establishment—and particularly its Minister of Defense, General Dayan, and the intelligence department—became captives of a preconceived concept that the Egyptians would not and could not go to war until certain preconditions had been satisfied, and tended to adapt developments noted along the borders to this idea.²¹

²¹ Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 228.

In other words, the Intuitive Israelis, focused on their overall pre-conception of the Egyptians and the balance of long-term interests, failed to heed the clear and available evidence before them because it did not fit their theory.

The Sensing Egyptians, on the other hand, had learned a great deal about their opponents over the course of the previous three years, and they grasped both the scope and the nature of Israel's military advantage. They also had a good sense of how the Israelis perceived them and they determined to manipulate those preconceptions to Egypt's advantage. Sadat proved not to be the weak player the Israelis thought he would be. Aware of the extraordinary price Egypt had paid for fighting an Arab Nationalist war against Israel, Sadat sought a way to break the political and diplomatic stalemate that stood between Egypt and peace. The result was a military strategy that sought, in a sense, to fly in under Israel's Intuitive radar by launching a limited military campaign in pursuit of limited political objectives and a misinformation campaign that so successfully played to Israel's preconceptions that even Herzog conceded it was both original in conception and masterfully executed.²²

1. Israel's Assessment

Israel understood that the outcome of the 1967 War had created an imbalance of interests between Israel and the now revanchist Arab states that had lost territory. The outcome of the Six Day War had advanced Israel's long-standing strategy vis-à-vis the Arabs: to deter war if possible, do whatever is necessary to prevent the Arabs from gaining a military advantage, destroy as much Arab military capability and infrastructure as possible to extend Arab recovery time, and capture territory to use as bargaining chips. At the same time, Israel also understood that its new status as an occupier undermined the moral position that lay at the foundation of its national vision and created an imbalance of interests that could have undesirable repercussions in the long run.²³ The Israeli leadership understood the limits of its vision—as an INT, Israel's sense of identity and security was enhanced by advancing and defending its vision, but not by territorial expansion beyond the *Eretz Yisrael* and at the expense of its Arab neighbors.

²² Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 229.

²³ One way Israel dealt with the inconsistency between its occupation of Arab territory and its national vision was to shift the focus of its national myth. After 1967, Israeli national myth increasingly emphasized Jewish suffering during the Holocaust and other pogroms over the course of the diaspora in Europe and Russia. Prior to 1967, the Israelis had downplayed the Holocaust because it wanted to avoid casting the Jewish people as weak and victims.

The Israelis also understood that the Egyptians and other Arab states could absorb significantly greater casualty levels than the Israelis because they would now be fighting to regain lost portions of their homelands, not just to force Israel out of the Palestinians' homeland. For this reason, Israel sought to maintain a level of conventional military deterrence that would convince the Egyptians of the futility of attacking Israel by demonstrating that Israel could escalate any conflict to a level of pain well beyond what Egypt could withstand. Escalation was a risky game because, while they almost certainly were capable of inflicting a total defeat on the Arabs, the Israelis also suspected that the superpowers would not allow that to happen. As an INT, Israel operated under the assumption that to have the superpowers—even its US ally—intervene would undermine Israel's interests. The Soviets would almost certainly prevent a total Arab defeat, and the US could be counted on to come to Israel's assistance. Such an outcome, however, would risk direct confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers that threatened dangerous escalation. Rather than allow such a risk of nuclear confrontation to develop, the US would almost certainly put pressure on Israel to make political or territorial compromises on its ultimate objectives. So Israel's deterrent had to skirt a fine line between maintaining a threat of escalation that was credible in the eyes of the Egyptians without looking provocative to the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union.

Intuitive Israel had focused its deterrent on preventing a total war between itself and the Arabs in which each would fight for ultimate objectives. It assumed that the Arabs would not undertake another attack against Israel until they were confident they could defeat the IDF, and until that time the Intuitive, Thinking Israelis assumed the Egyptians would see the military balance the same way and maintain their defensive posture. The Thinking Israelis failed to recognize the importance that restoring national honor held for the Feeling Egyptians. While war would not afford the Egyptians any gains the Israelis had not already offered, a negotiated settlement was impossible until Egypt could feel it was negotiating from a position of strength. The fundamental weakness in the Israeli deterrent strategy, as it turned out, was its focus on Arab grand strategy—the ultimate Arab objective of defeating Israel once-and-for-all and, ideally, regaining Palestine for the Arabs. In so doing, they failed to realize that the Egyptians might change their objectives and develop a limited strategy. As Herzog put it: "The mistake of the Israeli General Staff was to judge the Arab General Staff by its own

standards of military thinking.”²⁴ Israel was focused on grand strategy; Sadat was doing tactics.

2. Egypt's Assessment

Israel's retaliatory threats were perfectly credible, but Egypt's assessment of its needs and the military/strategic reality made such credibility irrelevant. Sadat's strategy was based on three steps calculated to neutralize the Israeli advantage. First, Sadat's strategic assessment proceeded from the necessity of keeping the conflict limited and, hence, below the level that would justify escalation in Israel's (and the superpowers') mind. Rather than challenge Israel at the level of its Ultimate Concerns—another full-scale war aimed at defeating the IDF—Sensing Egypt analyzed the military realities and adopted an approach that could advance Egypt's Ultimate Concern *without* triggering Israel's. Sadat was realistic, however, in the sense that he fully understood that however limited Egypt's military operations were, the Israeli response would be massive. The second element of Egypt's strategic assessment was, thus, the need to do everything in their power to narrow (but not necessarily close) the gap between Egyptian and IDF military capabilities. With Soviet help, Egypt established a rigid “missile wall” of AAAs and SAMs that the Egyptians hoped would prevent Israel from gaining air superiority over the battle area as they had during the War of Attrition. The Soviets also gave the Egyptians SCUD missiles capable of striking deep into Israeli territory (where the Egyptian air force dared not venture), which gave Egypt a credible deterrent against the kind of deep-penetration air attacks Israel had launched against the Egyptian interior in 1970. (The Israelis would later come to regret the decision to launch those attacks. Their Thinking orientation had prevented them from taking Egyptian reactions fully into consideration. Had they done so, they might have anticipated that the trauma of Israeli air raids in the Egyptian heartland created irresistible pressure on Nasser to open up Egypt to Soviet advisors, who were in large part responsible for neutralizing Israeli air superiority in the initial phases of the 1973 War.) At the same time that they were upgrading their capabilities, the Sensing Egyptians were conducting a deception operation to hide their intentions, including a long series of military exercises along the west bank of the Suez Canal that lulled Israeli intelligence into an assumption that they were just conducting routine maneuvers. Even when the Egyptian attack commenced on October 6, it was several hours before the Israeli defense establishment acknowledged that their theory had been wrong and that this was not just another meaningless Egyptian drill.

²⁴ Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 322.

The Egyptians took into consideration the possibility that despite their best efforts Israel might escalate beyond what the Egyptians could handle. Here, Sadat counted on the Soviet pledge to defend the Egyptian regime in the event that another military humiliation seemed likely, and on US squeamishness over the possibility that the two superpowers might be drawn into the conflict and risk direct confrontation. Thus, he expected US intervention to pressure Israel into compromise rather than risk further escalation. The Yom Kippur War played out pretty much as Sadat had anticipated. The Egyptians calculated from the outset that their chances of “winning” the war outright were slim; but they took the chance that with the threat of superpower intervention, they could achieve their objectives anyway. Egypt did not need to win, it just needed to do well enough against the IDF to restore its national honor. Egypt’s strategic personality also came into play in its dealings with its Arab allies. Consistent with the on-again, off-again engagement style of the ISFs, once Egypt had attained its objectives—a foothold on the east bank of the Suez and a cease-fire that ensured the Egyptian army’s survival—Sadat was content to consolidate his gains and hesitant to risk them by bailing out his erstwhile Arab allies.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. Credibility

The Israeli deterrent as it was constituted was credible between the end of the War of Attrition in 1970 and 1973. Egypt understood that Israel saw its Ultimate Concerns at stake in resisting Arab aggression, if not so much in holding on to the captured Sinai, and they entertained no doubt that the IDF was capable of retaliating with great vigor should Israel come under attack again. But when Egypt looked at the balance of Ultimate Concerns, it still calculated that it enjoyed the advantage as the would-be challenger, and therefore the Israeli deterrent was not entirely effective. Egypt was an ISF state fighting for honor and its homeland, both vital to its Ultimate Concern. Israel was an INT state fighting to hold on to territory unrelated to its vision as a possible future bargaining chip, something that might advance its Ultimate Concern but was not directly tied to it.

Egypt considered the balance of Ultimate Concerns and determined that its interests were more deeply at stake than Israel’s, provided that Egypt could keep its objectives strictly limited to aims that would not threaten Israel proper—restoring national honor, regaining the lost territory of the homeland by establishing a foothold on the east bank of the Suez Canal, and reducing the burden of war and military mobilization on the ailing Egyptian economic and social structure. At that limited level, Egypt enjoyed

an advantage in the balance of Ultimate Concerns. Egypt would be fighting for a goal central to its Ultimate Concern while Israel would be fighting for something much more peripheral (bargaining chips). Maintaining that imbalance, however, required Egypt to craft its objectives and tactics carefully so that the Intuitive Israelis could not turn Egypt's limited war into an all-out defensive war that would certainly mobilize public will. The Israeli threat of escalation was less credible once the Egyptians chose to limit their objectives.

2. Effectiveness

Israel's deterrent was Intuitive—it aimed to shape the long-term threat environment in a way that would enable Israel to advance its Ultimate Concern (implementing the national vision free from external interference and threats), even if that involved some short-term setbacks. It was structured to deter an all-out war with the Arabs that might result in the destruction of the state of Israel or escalation to a broader regional or even world war. At this level, the Israeli deterrent was effective. Egypt knew it had no chance of winning an unlimited war with Israel, even with the help of its Syrian and Jordanian allies. Nasser and Sadat both were forced to pursue Egypt's Ultimate Concerns at a more limited level that would not trigger Israel's Ultimate Concerns. The Israeli deterrent also succeeded in forcing Egypt to decouple its objectives from the broader Arab nationalist agenda. While Israel would have preferred an outcome that included peace agreements with all its Arab opponents, Egypt's decision to return to a focus on national rather than Pan-Arab objectives had a significant positive effect on Israel's Ultimate Concerns. While not the outcome Israel intended, the Israeli deterrent shaped the threat environment in a way that brought significant improvement in Israeli security by removing its largest and most capable opponent from its threat horizon.

The Israeli deterrent was not effective at the level of limited war because its credibility and effectiveness at the level of deterring general war prompted Egypt to shift to an asymmetric strategy. Given Egypt's humiliation in 1967 and its strategic personality, some sort of challenge was likely and (in the Egyptian view, anyway) necessary to break the strategic and political log-jam and enable both Israel and Egypt to advance their Ultimate Concerns. Egypt's response to the Israeli deterrent was to challenge below Israel's deterrent threshold. Sensing Egypt understood that it could not defeat Israel, it responded by formulating a strategy that could advance its Ultimate Concerns without an outright victory. Egypt's risk calculus was straightforward: the greatest risk to Egypt would come if Israel escalated the conflict, but limited aims would significantly reduce the risk of escalation. Some modernization of Egypt's capabilities

and an increased training tempo would narrow (although not close) the capabilities gap and reduce the risk of military humiliation for Egypt. Egypt did take one significant risk in betting that the superpowers would intervene in the conflict to prevent a total Israeli victory.

3. Third Parties

The superpower “nuclear umbrella” had an important effect on strategic calculations on both sides in the Yom Kippur War. The Sensing Egyptians understood that for their limited strategy to work, they had to be very careful not to cross the line between a limited war for limited ends and an all-out war that might pose a threat to Israeli national survival. But Sadat also understood that the threat of superpower intervention could either deter Israel from escalating the war or trigger US pressure on Israelis to make concessions to avoid a direct US-USSR confrontation. Israel was likewise fully cognizant that escalation would increase the risk of outside intervention in the crisis—an outcome that the INT Israelis wanted to avoid if at all possible. So, as it turns out, the existence of the superpower nuclear deterrent had considerable power to shape this limited conflict by forcing the superpowers’ allies on both sides to pursue more limited alternatives. The Israelis, for example, decided against capturing Damascus and possibly removing the Syrian Army as a threat for years to come rather than risk direct Soviet intervention to bail out the floundering Syrians. Without the existence of the superpower “balance of terror,” the crisis almost certainly would have escalated into another general war with much higher costs on all sides.

4. Options for Enhancing Effectiveness?

Could the Israelis have structured a more effective deterrent against a possible Egyptian challenge after 1970? Two principal weaknesses related to Israel’s strategic personality undermined the overall effectiveness of its deterrent in 1973. First, the Intuitive Israelis based their calculation of the likelihood of an Egyptian challenge on their preconceived “theory” of Egypt’s intentions and capabilities based largely on its performance in the last war. The Intuitive orientation inclines states to look for patterns rather than focusing on particulars, and to assume that patterns will continue indefinitely. But the Egyptians succeeded in changing the pattern enough to gain at least temporary surprise. Their success was enhanced by the deception campaign that the Sensing Egyptians successfully used to mask their real capabilities and intentions. The Sensing Egyptians had, in fact, sent some clear signals—including an increased training tempo, force modernization, and a number of exercises along the west bank of the Suez—that the Israelis might have interpreted as warning signs if they had been thinking and planning in

terms of Egypt's Strategic Personality. The Egyptians were aware of the risk, but seemed to understand the Israeli way of thinking well enough to be reasonably confident that the defenders would misread the warning signs to the challenger's advantage.

A second factor limiting the effectiveness of Israeli deterrence stemmed from its broad strategic focus. Where a Sensing state might have crafted a deterrent aimed at each individual Arab state, the Intuitive Israelis preferred a deterrent strategy that assumed the Arabs would act as a group and therefore deterred the Arabs as a group. This allowed the Egyptians to craft a strategy that "flew in under the radar" of the Israeli deterrent. If the Israelis had thought about Egypt's options from a more "Sensing" perspective and in terms of the balance of Ultimate Concerns, they probably could have anticipated at least the possibility of an asymmetric response. Given the balance of Ultimate Concerns, such a focused deterrent might still not have deterred Egypt's challenge, but it could have limited the cost of that failure.

The existence of a declared Israeli nuclear deterrent probably would not have prevented the Egyptians from challenging for the same reason its conventional deterrent failed to do so. For the Sensing Egyptians, the status quo was intolerable in terms of their Ultimate Concerns—at a minimum they had to get the Sinai back. And if they calculated that the Israelis would not risk an all-out conventional war for "bargaining chips," how much less likely were they to risk a nuclear exchange that would almost certainly have catastrophic consequences for Israel as well? If it did not trigger some sort of retaliation—perhaps by the Soviet Union—it would at least make Israel an international pariah and would almost certainly mean the end of its special relationship with the United States.

III. THE PATH TO PEARL HARBOR, 1941

A. JAPAN'S STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. The Rice Culture

Modern Japanese national myth sees much of what is unique about Japan as “historically-determined” by its deep roots in the rice culture.²⁵ Japan has been a rice-based civilization since about the third century BCE. It has a warm, humid climate, normally abundant rainfall, and mild winters that in most years allow the Japanese to cultivate rice year-round. Japan’s physical geography—with its narrow river valleys and coastal plains separated by rugged hills and mountains—leaves barely twenty percent of its land available for farming, and most of that is unsuitable for either large-scale dry field cultivation (like wheat) or animal herding. Combined with its historically high population density (when the first Portuguese traders reached Japan in the 1540s, Kyoto’s population was well over half a million—far larger than any European city at that time), the constraints of geography favored the high-yield, labor-intensive cultivation of rice. These key elements of Japan’s natural environment—is dependence on the cultivation of rice, its limited habitable and arable land, and its high population density—all shaped its Sensing orientation.

Successful rice farming required great human effort and the cooperation of entire communities. It could take decades to drain marshes, swamps, and coastal flatlands, clear and level fields, terrace hillsides, and build dykes and irrigation canals—work that required more labor than a single family could provide. Because families could not be self-sufficient, the sense of duty in traditional Japanese society was to the broader community, and its group-oriented social ethic emerged very early. From ancient times, the Japanese discouraged competition as destructive of the social cohesion and harmony that made life bearable and productive in densely populated and highly interdependent rice villages and cities. The central tenets of the Japanese social ethos are *wa* (“harmony”), which puts a high premium on conformity and group identity over individualism and creativity, and diligence, which encourages selfless labor for the good of the whole community. In the Japanese version of Aesop’s fables, the ant shares his food with the grasshopper and everyone lives happily ever after. The most cited Japanese proverb is “The nail that sticks up is the one that gets hit.” The belief that shared

²⁵ Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India – China – Tibet – Japan* (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press, 1964), p. 399, 530; see also, Peter N. Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

values are the foundation of social order and, hence, national survival instilled a strong Feeling orientation in the Japanese strategic personality.

The close bond between Japan's culture and its environment is reflected in its arts. Traditional Japanese myth sees the world as composed of myriad sentient parts—not just living things but mountains, rivers, stones, and rain have will and personality. Like the ancient Egyptians, the Japanese traditionally were less concerned with the metaphysical forces they could not understand than with maintaining their awe and respect for the harmony and equilibrium of nature as they observe it in the here-and-now. Unlike the Egyptians, however, the Japanese did not develop a strong tradition of the afterlife. The Japanese refer to themselves as a nature-loving people; by this they mean that they have a deep appreciation for the *shizen*—things as they are. In Japanese art (as in ancient Egyptian art) this translates into an emphasis on form over creativity. The goal of art is to capture the essence of nature and reduce it to its utmost simplicity, whether in the sparse brushstrokes of Japanese painting or the simple and economical structure of the *haiku*.²⁶

2. Shinto

According to the Japanese myth of national origin, as recorded in the ancient chronicles the *Kohiki* ("The Record of Ancient Matters," 712 CE) and the *Niho-shoki* ("The History of Japan," 720 CE), Japanese history began when the heavens, earth, and seas emerged from chaos and seven generations of gods were born. The siblings Izanagi and Izanami, the seventh generation of gods, created Japan as an island in the center of the primal sea and made it their home. They then gave life to a pantheon of deities representing all the manifestations of nature: the moon, mountains, rivers, trees, storms, and earthquakes. Their beautiful daughter, Ameratsu, returned to heaven to reign supreme over all nature as the sun goddess *Ama-terasu-o-mi-Kami* ("The Heaven-Shining-Great-Deity"). Ameratsu's son, Ninigi, returned to earth to bestow divine Imperial authority upon Japan. Ninigi's grandson, Jimmu Tenno, pacified and consolidated the tribes of the main islands, Kyushu and Honshu, established the Japanese Empire in 660 BCE, and reigned as its first Emperor, Yamato.²⁷ Modern Japanese emperors, like their ancient predecessors, base their claims of legitimacy on their direct descent from Amaterasu and Yamato (although, as one of the terms of Japan's surrender in 1945, they no longer claim

²⁶ Jun'ichiro Tanizaki, *In Praise of Shadows*, trans. by Thomas J. Harper and Edward G. Seidensticker (Stony Creek, Ct.: Leete's Island Books, 1977).

²⁷ The historical date of the establishment of the first Japanese empire was probably much later, likely around the turn of the Common Era, but the Japanese continue to observe February 11, 660 BCE as the date of the birth of Japan.

divine status). Sensing Japan sees itself, in a sense, as a single organism, its creation myth and myth of national origin are, significantly, one-in-the-same and inseparable from the land of Japan.

Japan's indigenous religion, Shinto ("The Way of the Gods"), has its roots in the ancient polytheistic myth of national origin. Traditional Shinto had no doctrine, but consisted primarily of a system of purification rituals intended to ensure health and good harvests. Shinto did not differentiate right and wrong in terms of sin or evil, but in terms of offenses. "Heavenly offenses" were wrongs against the community (violations of the social ethos), and "earthly offenses" were those misfortunes (including disease, injury, and death) that affected individuals and rendered them useless to the community. Society was divided into "proper" people—those free of offense and hence worthy of the protection of the community, and "improper" people—foreigners, strangers, and those who had committed grievous "heavenly offenses," or stigmatized victims of "earthly offenses."²⁸ The Japanese did not call their system of religious rituals "Shinto" until the arrival of Buddhism in the sixth century CE. Japan also imported Confucianism from China; but Japanese Confucianism put less emphasis than the Chinese version on rules and logical axioms and more on mutual loyalty between inferior and superior classes. The Shinto that survives today is a conglomerate of the ancient Japanese cults, Chinese and Korean Buddhism, Confucianism, and a few elements of Christianity. Most modern Japanese celebrate Shinto wedding ceremonies, have Buddhist funerals, and describe themselves as having no personal religious faith.²⁹ Shinto remains the mythic basis for the Emperor's place at the head of Japanese society as well as the foundation for the Japanese social ethic. Since 1945, however, it is no longer the Constitutional basis for Imperial rule or the focus of the hyper-nationalism that characterized "State Shinto" during the 1920s and 1930s. With its emphasis on community values rather than sins and on governing man's relationship with man and nature in this life rather than speculating on the nature of the next one, Shinto reinforced Japan's Sensing, Feeling orientation.

²⁸ Postwar Japan saw the emergence of whole new categories of "improper people:" survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who were "polluted" by radiation, war orphans and street children, war widows, and ex-POWs, stigmatized for surviving defeat, and shell-shocked and maimed veterans. John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: The New Press, 1999), p. 61.

²⁹ G. Cameron Hurst, "The Enigmatic Japanese Spirit," *Orbis*, Vol. 42:2 (Spring 1998), p. 302.

3. Adaptation and Uniqueness

Much of Japan's myth focuses on the isolation that came of being an island nation: it is separated from the Asian mainland at the narrowest point (the Straits of Tsushima) by 115 miles of ocean. But for much of its history Japan has also been a nation uniquely able to examine foreign religions, philosophies, and material culture and adopt those elements that suit Japanese needs and temperament. Japan's historical plot unfolded in cycles of intense cultural borrowing followed by periods of extreme isolation. These cycles began when Japan established (or renewed) contact with a more advanced culture—first China, later the West—and experienced a wave of cultural inferiority. Japan responded by mastering those elements of the foreign cultures that would enable it to catch-up. This process of importing, selecting, and assimilating elements of foreign culture reinforced Japan's sense of unique identity which, in turn, led to periods of withdrawal. Thus, periods of extreme isolation, such as the Tokugawa quarantine (1600-1858) that followed Japan's initial contact with the West, were not expressions of Japanese insecurity but assertions of its renewed cultural confidence and sense of uniqueness. Its flexibility has shaped Japan's Feeling orientation. Aspects of foreign culture are easily, if gradually, accommodated because the existing hierarchy of values is flexible and, unlike the more rigid structures common in Thinking states, like Jewish Law in INT Israel or the Confucianism of IST China, does not require internal logical and legal consistency to continue to serve its function for social order and national identity.

Uniqueness is central to Japanese national myth, and while the Japanese see adaptation as a pragmatic response to the chaos inherent in human societies, they retain the rigid boundaries of the Introverted state. Japan treasures its "hard, non-absorbent core of individual character, which resists and in its turn works upon the invading influences" of foreign cultures and prevents it from "overwhelming or fundamentally transforming Japan."³⁰ The Japanese always remain keenly aware of what is borrowed and what is indigenous, to the point of maintaining a separate alphabet, *katakana*, for writing foreign words. Japan forged its sense of a single national identity long ago and, as a result, is an extremely homogenous culture with very rigid boundaries. Ninety-seven percent of Japanese are descended from residents of Tokugawa Japan (the standard for being ethnically Japanese), and the majority of ethnic Japanese (again, ninety-seven percent)

³⁰ G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 15.

still live in Japan. The bond between Japanese national identity, the communal ethos, and the land is so strong in Sensing Japan that to emigrate is to cease to be Japanese.³¹

4. Japan's Introverted, Sensing, Feeling Strategic Personality

Shibui is an untranslatable word that encapsulates the essence of Japan's ISF strategic personality. In Japan, what is *shibui* is diffident, restrained, and in tune with the great traditions of Japan. It is a quality beyond the ken of foreigners because it reflects the existential, impenetrable core of "Japanese-ness." It is also a quality that exemplifies the ISF state's emphasis on staying grounded in its historical experience and physical and social geography. The essence of the Introverted, Intuitive state lies in its vision, but for Introverted, Sensing Japan, its essence lies in the cooperative values (*wa*, loyalty, diligence) that underlie its sense of identity and the expression of those values in culture and social structures. The preservation of those cultural and social structures and defense of the territory from which they spring is thus an Ultimate Concern of ISF Japan. The particular challenges of Japanese history and environment have shaped the hierarchy of values that Japan strives to defend in its interaction with the outside world, but those values are not necessarily rigid. Like all Feeling states, Japan tailors its values to fit changing circumstances, but rarely abandons them altogether. Herein lies the challenge for outsiders trying to understand or manipulate Japan—the deeply indigenous and unique character of Japan's essential identity and the complexities of its hierarchy of values make both untranslatable into simple "rules of thumb" for managing relations with Japan.

Japan's abiding sense of uniqueness born of its long history as a more-or-less cohesive nation affords it a sense of cultural superiority that shapes its interactions with the outside world. With its strong sense of national and cultural identity and uniqueness, Japan can appear arrogant and insular in its interaction with the outside world. It is a trait the ISFs share with ESF states (like Britain), but the ESFs are likely to respond to changes in the international system that threaten their interests by becoming more engaged in an effort to rectify the problem. The ISF Japanese, in contrast, have historically responded to external pressure or internal unrest by distancing (historically, quarantining) themselves from the outside world, as Japan did during the Tokugawa Shogunate (in response to the social unrest unleashed by the spread of Portuguese

³¹ Assimilation is nearly impossible for foreigners in Japan, no matter how long they stay. This is equally the case for ex-patriot Japanese who return after long absences. Even Japanese diplomats who leave for short foreign postings find their children often have difficulty re-assimilating and gaining acceptance from their peers. Taichi Sakaiya, *What Is Japan? Contradictions and Transformations*, trans. by Steven Karpa (New York, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1993), pp. 146-148.

firearms and Christianity following Japan's "first contact" with the West), and would try to do in 1941. The ISF Japanese are, at the same time, perfectly capable of engaging with the outside world when it serves their interests and is not too destabilizing. Modern Japan realizes that effective engagement is necessary if it is to control its own fate. But like the Egyptians, the Japanese are less than comfortable with formal alliances that constrict their freedom of action.³² (Just as the Egyptian interpretation of Pan-Arab nationalism subordinated the interests of the rest of the Arab world to those of Egypt, Japan's short and much more virulent experiment in Pan-Asianism during the 1930s sought primarily to advance Japan's economic and political agenda. "Asia for the Asians" really meant "Asia for the Japanese." Japan has shown a distinct reluctance to engage in Pan-Asian structures since the end of World War II—a sentiment most of their Asian neighbors share.) The resulting tension—between the necessity of engagement and the instinct of defensive isolation—has created a paradox in Japan's strategic personality manifested in its openness to elements of foreign culture and drives for vast empire (political and military in the 1930s, and economic in the 1970s and 1980s) contrasted with periods of profound cultural and economic isolation.

Despite their strong sense of boundaries, the essentially pragmatic ISF states do not see themselves as engaged in a metaphysical or philosophical struggle with the outside world (as, for example, the INT Israelis tend to do), and in their international relations they react to events, not ideas. This pragmatism, inherent in Japan's sensing orientation, makes the Japanese keen tacticians with a realistic comprehension of their strengths and vulnerabilities relative to the outside world. But because they lack the Intuitive state's natural grasp of the big picture or the Thinking state's systematic rationality, the Japanese have from time to time fallen victim to a lack of strategic forethought that has occasionally prevented their turning tactical acumen into long-term strategic success. The ISF strategic personality can also give rise to a certain degree of cognitive rigidity; when things go according to plan—as they did, for example, for Egypt in 1973—this is not necessarily a weakness. But as Japan learned in World War II, the ISF's failure to consider fall-back strategies can have fatal consequences when plans go awry or opponents do not behave in a manner consistent with historical experience. Just as Egypt has found the political and economic reform necessary for economic

³² Despite their reliance on the United States for their defense since 1945, there is a strong preference among Japanese for less constricting euphemisms like "strategic partnership" and "cooperation" rather than the more formal "alliance" to describe Japan's relationship with the US. The presence of US troops on Japanese territory remains a periodic source of tension. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 360-366.

modernization nearly impossible, Japan's devotion to its traditional ways of doing business have undermined its ability to recover quickly and relatively painlessly from the Asian economic crisis of 1998. Still, their tactical pragmatism can also enable the ISF states to absorb defeat with a degree of equanimity rarely found in Introverted, Intuitive states. After Japan's 1945 surrender, its population quickly adjusted to the reality that resistance was futile and drew upon its long history of absorption and adaptation to deal with defeat and get on with the business of rebuilding the nation, which they did in a remarkably short time. In his history of postwar Japan, historian John Dower explains that

Despite the emergence of a conservative postwar state, the ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan—not as a borrowed ideology but as a lived experience and a seized opportunity.³³

Japan's experience stands in stark contrast to the great difficulty Russia has had recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Leninist/Stalinist vision. It is easier to rebuild social structures than it is to rebuild visions. It is an advantage of the Sensing states like Japan that they can, when necessary, sacrifice ideology for survival.

B. THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. The Quest for Liberty

The US Intuitive orientation flows directly from its historical experience as a nation born out of philosophy rather than experience. The American Revolution, like its sister revolution in France, had its roots in natural law philosophy and Enlightenment rationalism. British philosopher John Locke's formula of "life, liberty, and property" appears in numerous revolutionary documents, including the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen," but where their Thinking orientation led the French to define liberty as a legal concept, the Feeling orientation of American revolutionaries led them to define liberty as a value. The French sought to ensure the citizen's right to participate *in* government, American revolutionaries sought liberty *from* the government. The French coupled rights with responsibilities and emphasized that French citizens enjoyed individual freedom only so long as the exercise of that freedom allowed them to cooperate and conform to the common welfare of the "social body." Thomas Jefferson fundamentally altered the concept of liberty and reinforced the American Feeling orientation by substituting "pursuit of happiness" for "property," rendering the individual's right to pursue a personal vision, unconstrained by government, the unique

³³ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 23.

feature of the American concept of liberty. For Americans, the pursuit of happiness and the blessings of liberty were guarantees made to individuals, not, as in France, to the “social body.” By tying the concept of liberty to natural law rather than British Common Law, Jefferson also transformed liberty from a set of specific rights and privileges enjoyed by the few under terms established by the government into a “universal, open-ended entitlement,” thus adding a strong Extroverted strain into the US vision with portentous consequences for later US foreign policy.³⁴

The quest for liberty is embodied in the myth of the American Dream, which implies that there is something unique about the material, moral, and political environment of the United States that offers the prospect of individual fulfillment through liberty. But there are different concepts of liberty and different American Dreams. This system of alternative and sometimes conflicting views of liberty is another manifestation of the US Feeling orientation. The Puritans and later millenarian religious groups like the Amish, Hasidic Jews, and separatist Christian Fundamentalists have pursued an American Dream that focuses on spiritual liberty—the freedom to pursue personal righteousness in a community governed by religious principles and free from moral compromise.³⁵ Generations of immigrants fleeing the economic dislocation brought on by industrialization and shortages of agricultural land—from Europe and later from Asia—sought their American Dream through economic liberty that promised the opportunity for self-sufficiency and economic security. African Americans came to the US not through choice but by coercion. Through their long struggle for civil rights, they pursued an American Dream of political liberty—the right to full participation in the processes of democracy and full protection under the law. In the past half-century, waves of political refugees—from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Southeast Asia, Iran, and Kosovo (to name just a few), came seeking an American Dream of personal liberty—the freedom to say, write, think, and pray whatever their consciences dictated without fear of persecution or death. All of these immigrants with all their various American Dreams are united not by blood, language, material culture, or even history but by a shared vision rooted in one, deeply held value: liberty. The American vision is a Feeling vision; it means different things to different Americans, and different things at different times.

³⁴ Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), pp.15-17.

³⁵ Many of these groups were, and are, exclusionary—seeking liberty for themselves but not necessarily recognizing the same right to liberty for other, competing worldviews. This exclusionary vision of liberty does not, however, resonate with the polity at large.

2. “We, the People”

The United States has no royal family, no state religion, no single racial or ethnic identity, no powerful and menacing neighbors, and a profusion of historical, cultural, ethnic, and religious identities. In short, the United States enjoys none of the traditional touchstones of national identity. Immediately after the American Revolution, the United States was a weak confederation of thirteen fiercely independent colonies. Once the unifying force of opposition to the “tyranny” of George III disappeared, there seemed little to hold the states together. In drafting the opening words of the Constitution, its authors undertook one of the most radical redefinitions of American national identity in the nation’s history. The Constitutional Convention created, virtually out of whole cloth, an “American People” bound not by history but by their shared commitment to a vision of a “perfect Union” founded on a few fundamental values. “We, the People” did not describe a homogenous, corporate consensus, but a community unified by its participation in a shared way of life rooted in the commitment to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The main body of the US Constitution treats the structure and processes of national government in the most general terms, focusing primarily on the relationship between the nation and the individual states. The Bill of Rights (the first ten additional articles, or amendments, to the Constitution) contains the essential guarantees of American freedom, and answers the perennial concern that the power of government erodes liberty and that democracy treads on individual rights. British liberty, in contrast, was a set of specific privileges granted through the sufferance of the monarch. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was a “catechism” designed to educate people in their duties as well as their rights.³⁶ The American Bill of Rights defined and animated with the force of law the uniquely American idea of liberty as a body of universal human rights that place limits only on the government and that applies inherently to all “the People.”³⁷

³⁶ Pauline Maier, *American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), p. 168.

³⁷ Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, p. 25.

3. The Frontier

For most nations, their “frontiers” define their limits, establish their boundaries, and mark the point where their territory ends and the land of the “other” begins. For the Intuitive United States, the concept of the Frontier has almost the opposite meaning. In US national myth, the frontier is not a static boundary but a catalyst for freedom, growth, and the sense of unconstrained space and unlimited possibilities. The frontier is not a static boundary but a crucible—a zone in which old growth meets new, nature meets culture, undeveloped meets developed, and both experience metabolic changes that shape them into something wholly new. In the 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” historian Frederick Jackson Turner posited that “[t]he existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward” determined the American national character and shaped the course of American history.³⁸ When he wrote, Turner believed he was heralding the demise of the Myth of the Frontier. In 1890, the US Bureau of the Census had declared the frontier closed, a development that Turner and others feared would spark a national identity crisis. From the pilgrims on, Americans saw their liberty as inextricably tied to individuals’ right and ability to remake themselves and build new lives. America’s transient culture, in which individuals and families moved from place to place and status to status, marked a radical departure from traditional European concepts of geographic and social boundaries.

As it turned out, the frontier did not close; it expanded, albeit in a variety of different forms. Beginning in the 1890s, the US extended its frontiers beyond the continent in the drive for informal empire, expanding its “frontiers” into the Pacific (and on a collision course with Japan). In 1961, President John F. Kennedy called for the establishment of a New Frontier: an economy that could expand indefinitely, abolish poverty, level society, and expand the principles of democracy throughout the world. To the New Frontier he added the “Final Frontier”—the manned exploration of outer space. In modern American life, frontiers abound: the frontiers of science, the frontiers of medicine, the information frontier, and the frontiers of democracy. In 1893, Turner wrote that “the frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization,” and to guardians of cultural tradition the world over, his words have an alarming resonance as the US pushes to expand the frontiers of democracy.³⁹

³⁸ Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), p. 9.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The myth of the Frontier shapes the Intuitive and Feeling orientations of the United States' strategic personality. The faith in America's divinely inspired mission has been manifested through the centuries in territorial and economic expansion and, most recently, in global leadership. This American expansionism—or expansiveness—is rooted in what one historian of US "Manifest Destiny" described as "the half-belief that God, who walked with Noah, rode with the American pioneer in his journey over the continent." Americans, like the crusaders with whom they are often compared, believe that their nation has grown in size, wealth, and influence because of the values embodied in the pioneer spirit and because God willed it. In both its territorial and economic expansionism and its international activism, the United States has acted out of a supreme faith in the righteousness of its mission, even when its actions encounter resistance from those arguing from international law or norms.⁴⁰ There is a direct historical and mythic link between the waves of pioneers in their Conestoga wagons in the 19th century and the expansion of liberal democracy as the cornerstone of US national strategy in the 21st: the expansion of the territory of liberty.

4. The US Extroverted, Intuitive, Feeling Strategic Personality

The United States is a nation founded on a vision, and in both its internal and external policy its ultimate concerns are tied to the expansion of that vision. Like Japan, the United States analyzes events and makes decisions in the context of a core set of values. Its Intuitive orientation leaves the US less concerned with the here-and-now than with the situations, trends, and behaviors that bear on its ability to implement and expand its vision, and inclined to ignore those events and circumstances that do not seem relevant in that context. The Intuitive orientation also predisposes the US to translate its vision and values into principled activism—a sort of global evangelism for American values. It wants the International System to do good, to work together to make life better for everyone. But the US tends to define "making life better" in terms of expanding its values to those who have not yet "seen the light." The Intuitive US is less expedient than the Sensing states (like Japan and Egypt) and tends to see its allies and friends as sharing its vision, or at least its values (even when to do so required considerable mental gymnastics). The ENFs can certainly participate in expedient partnerships, but they tend to perceive shared values where, often, they do not exist, as was the case in the US alliance with the Soviet Union in World War II.

⁴⁰Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963 [1935]), pp. 128-131.

It is in the subjective nature of the Feeling states' value systems that they are not always consistent or internally logical. Certain values take precedence over others, and which values take precedence shifts from situation to situation, with constituent values all too often working at cross-purposes. Those values are not necessarily defined in moral terms: two of the key values that have shaped US foreign policy from its earliest days are the freedom of the seas and open trade. Unlike Introverted Japan, however, the Extrovert US lives out its historical plot through its interaction with the outside world. Where Japan seeks to defend its value system from the pressures of outside influence, the US, in a sense, seeks to *be* that outside influence by exporting its values. According to the *Realpolitik* model that has shaped thinking about international relations for at least the past three centuries, the competition between states for material advantage drives the international system. But the Extroverted, Intuitive, Feeling US sees the international system as driven by the competition of values. The US feels most secure when—as has been the case for the past decade—its value system is expanding and it is fulfilling its mission to be “a light unto the nations.” When those values are in retreat or under attack—as they were during the Cold War—insecurity sets in. In normal times, the US sees competition between values in terms of a free-market of ideas, in which American values are destined to prevail once everyone sees their merits. Hence the confidence that increased trade and interaction with China will eventually lead to that country's liberalization and democratization. Outsiders, however, are likely to see such altruistic evangelizing as patronizing, self-serving, and self-righteous meddling at best, and “cultural imperialism” at worst. For the most part, however, US expansiveness is the product of a failure to appreciate that not everyone shares our faith in the US vision, rather than of aggression or hegemonic design.

The charge most often leveled against US foreign policy by its critics (both foreign and domestic) is that it allows values to interfere with the pursuit of “vital national interests” or principles of “international law.” But vital interests are defined according to a state's Ultimate Concerns, and for the Intuitive, Feeling US its values are indistinguishable from its Ultimate Concerns. While the US may be as keen as any Sensing state in assessing its material interests, those interests that do not trigger key values (and hence Ultimate Concerns) are not vital. When Realism and values conflict, values will usually take precedence. And at times, one value must take precedence over another. The US, for example, abandoned some democratic movements over the course of the Cold War (in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example) and backed some reprehensible dictatorships (such as those in the Philippines and Chile) in the interests of

pursuing its larger goal of defeating global communism. The US, in fact, finds it difficult to opt out of situations in which a core value is triggered on the grounds either that "vital interests" are not at stake or that a particular course of action is a violation of international norms. Conversely, even when material interests are at stake, the US can find intervention difficult until it can be justified on the grounds of core values. Defining strategic objectives that conform to core values can take time. And goals that are defined in terms of values are often difficult or impossible to codify in the concrete, limited terms of *Realpolitik*. Thus, Realists often condemn the US tendency to turn conflicts into crusades, and it is certainly true that once the US vision and values have been triggered, Americans can become determined, stubborn, and occasionally rigid in pursuit of those objectives.

The ENF states are extremely good at grand strategy: they know where they want events to go. At the same time, the breadth of their Intuitive reach often leads them to neglect the important tactical details of how to implement their visions. Upon entering into a new commitment, the US always knows where it wants things to end up, but it does not always have a clear idea how to get there. A perennial criticism of US strategies is their lack of clearly defined and limited military objectives and "exit strategies" for leaving when the job is done, or hopeless. Their Feeling orientation can also make the US vision incomprehensible to outsiders, even allies, because of the apparently constant shifting of emphasis and attention.

C. CONTEXT OF DETERRENCE

Japan, like the United States, emerged from the First World War in a much stronger position than it had enjoyed before the war. Still, Japanese military and civilian leadership believed they learned some important lessons from the First World War that did not bode well for Japan's long-term prospects. These lessons shaped Japanese policies and strategies through the 1920s and 1930s. First, the Japanese came away from the war believing (as the German Army did) that Germany had lost because of internal political weaknesses that neutralized its considerable military and economic superiority. This lesson hit home particularly hard. Japan had admired Germany as an example of a country that rapidly transformed itself into a major economic power. Germany had also provided valued advice to Japan in its military and bureaucratic modernization. More immediately, under the pressure of rapid Westernization and economic modernization, Japan's internal social and political situation was growing increasingly chaotic—a source of grave concern to ISF Japan, whose Ultimate Concern was the maintenance of internal

social and political cohesion. But the genie was out of the bottle and withdrawal on the Tokugawa model was simply not an option; Japan had grown too dependent on imports to supply not only raw materials and oil to fuel its growing industrial base but also food for its growing population.⁴¹ Second, Japan's erstwhile Western allies had, in postwar negotiations, treated it as a second-rate nation. The realization that racism would prevent the Western powers from ever treating Japan as an equal stung Japanese pride, but it also contributed the strategic calculation that Japanese and Western interests in Asia were bound to come into direct conflict because the West would never allow Japan to dominate Asia and become a world power. Finally, the global economic collapse in 1929 had a devastating effect in Japan, contributing further to social dislocation, particularly among the peasant classes that constituted the bedrock of Japanese social order. Japanese leadership blamed the Western powers, which they saw as materialistic and short-sighted, for the crisis and the most conservative saw it as one more sign of the dangers of allowing Japan to become too entwined with the outside world.

The impact of the Great Depression was most severe among the Japanese rural classes that also provided most of the manpower for the Japanese armed forces. Rural populations migrated to the cities in large numbers in search of work, but found urban life inhospitable to their traditional social structures. Shintoism and other traditional coping mechanisms bore little relevance to the hardships of these transplanted peasants. Radical political ideas spread quickly through the ranks of the young, frustrated unemployed, to the alarm of the Army. And the economic crisis came at a time when Japan's population seemed to have reached the limits of what its agricultural base could sustain. A nation of 30 million at the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 had swelled to nearly 65 million by 1930. To make matters worse, the United States had refused at Versailles to consider lifting immigration quotas and naturalization restrictions against Japanese immigrants. Emigration to the US and South America had been an important outlet for relieving some of Japan's increasingly acute population pressure.

The Army officers, many of whom saw themselves as heirs of the great Samurai traditions, were naturally inclined to conservatism and nationalism, but the impact of economic hardship, poverty, and in some areas—often in the villages from which many Army officers hailed—near starvation intensified the feeling among them that Japan must decouple itself from the West and return to its cultural roots. The “Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would attempt to transform China and much of Southeast Asia

⁴¹ Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: US-Japanese Relations Through History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 134.

into Japanese colonies was intended as a mechanism to solve two of the problems that conservative Japanese in the Army and in the civilian government believed were contributing to the decline of Japan: economic dependence on the West, and economic crises in Japan's rural heartland. Militant Japanese nationalism may have been born in the army, but it spread quickly in the civilian realm as well. One of the leading civilian nationalist organizations was the Showa Kenkyukai Association, an ultra-nationalist organization founded by intellectual elites who preached Japan's need to free itself from Western influence and place itself back under the guidance of traditional Japanese values. In the name of the Emperor (Showa), the ultra-nationalists vowed to replace the "Western concept of freedom" —and by implication, social license—with the traditional "Japanese concept of morality."⁴²

Japan's war of conquest in China began in 1931 when Japan staged an attack against a Japanese railroad as an excuse to seize Manchuria and established a puppet regime there in 1931, triggering fierce Chinese nationalist resistance that erupted in violence in Shanghai in 1932. A Japanese bombing raid that killed thousands of civilians in Shanghai in retaliation for the murder of five Japanese Buddhist monks brought stiff criticism from the international community. Continued international efforts to curb its imperialist activities and harassment of Western interests in China contributed to Japan's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations in 1933. Full-scale war broke out between Japan and China in 1937, setting Japan on a collision course with the United States and Britain, both of which had extensive economic and political interests in China. The war was a costly one for Japan; and despite military success and constant army assurances that victory was just around the corner, the Japanese were no closer to defeating the Nationalist/Communist resistance in China by mid-1941 when the US stepped up its economic pressure on Japan to end its aggression. The US embargo on sales of strategic materials to Japan, beginning with aluminum in 1939 and later including petroleum, put a serious strain on Japan's ability to continue the pace of military operations in China and threatened to derail Japanese imperial ambitions altogether. The Japanese military devised a strategy to secure vital materials by expanding south through Indochina, with the ultimate prize being the seizure of the Netherlands East Indies and its abundant petroleum reserves. But the strategy had no chance of success as long as the United States remained in the Philippines, which the Americans could use as a base either for preventing Japanese expansion altogether or at least for harassing its lines of communication. The 1939 embargo made Japan's situation all the more desperate,

⁴² LaFeber, *The Clash*, p. 181.

presenting it with only two options—either abandon its expansionist ambitions and withdraw from China, or go to war with the US.

US interests in China and Japan went back to the mid-19th century when Commodore Perry's "black ships" (as they were remembered in Japanese myth) forced Tokugawa Japan to reopen its borders to foreign trade. The initial US agenda in East Asia, the "Open Door" policy of Secretary of State John Hay, quickly crumbled in the face of the Western and eventually Japanese race to carve out economic "spheres of influence" in China. By 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt brokered the peace agreement that ended the Russo-Japanese War (fought largely over the issue of interests in Manchuria), the US had adopted a policy aimed at protecting and expanding what had become a sort of informal empire of protectorates, coaling stations, military outposts, and territories along the periphery of Asia. It was backed by a moral agenda that Roosevelt had characterized as "militant decency" that combined "power with high purpose." All over Asia and the Pacific, American fleets and traders were followed by missionaries and progressive reformers bent on bringing not just the material artifacts of American culture to Asia, but also the spiritual benefits of "liberty, democracy, and justice."⁴³ Hay's idealistic Open Door Policy met first with resistance from the other imperialist powers in China, and then found some de facto acceptance as the more pragmatic powers used the Intuitive American declaration of principle (which they knew it could not and would not enforce) as a mutual agreement not to interfere with one another's spheres-of-influence and economic prerogatives. When the Japanese began expanding and tightening their imperial control in China in the 1930s, they inevitably ran up against this long-standing non-interference policy. And in typical Introverted style, the Japanese gave little practical thought to what the Western reactions might be.

In the years following the end of the First World War, the idealism of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson gave way to a more unilateralist mood with a strong Intuitive bent, especially with the onset of the Great Depression after 1929. US public opinion, reinforced by a isolationist Republic Congress, had become convinced that greedy businessmen had tricked the US administration into entering the war in Europe, in which no US vital interest was at stake, to protect their investments and business interests. These were, moreover, the same selfish and careless businesses that Americans now blamed for the widespread suffering and hardship of the Great Depression. Congress responded by passing a series of neutrality laws designed to make it nearly impossible for

⁴³ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 120-121.

any American president to involve the US in another such war by restricting the ability of US banks and manufacturers to loan money or sell military equipment to belligerent nations.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had already made clear his desire to keep the US out of war when the earliest signs of trouble appeared in Europe in the mid-1930s. His administration had taken a hard rhetorical line against Japanese imperialism and aggression in China through the 1930s, insisting that the Japanese respect the Open Door, but once again, idealistic admonitions were never backed up by concrete actions. Even as US public opinion became increasingly outraged at Japanese abuses in China, the Roosevelt administration showed few signs of doing anything about them. As late as 1938, only months before the economic embargo went into effect, the US was showing no sign of building up its military forces in the Pacific. The signals to the Sensing Japanese seemed clear—the US did not care enough about China to fight to get Japan out.

D. THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE

1. The US Assessment

The US posture in the Pacific began to change in 1939 as it saw Japan apparently shift its strategy from domination of China to using its military force to cordon off significant parts of Asia and the Pacific as exclusively Japanese fiefdoms, thus effectively constricting America's economic "frontiers." It was becoming increasingly apparent to the Extroverted United States that its interwar mood of unilateralism and non-engagement had produced consequences that threatened seriously to undermine the US Ultimate Concern with establishing a free and open economic world grounded in democratic principles. Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan seemed bent on dividing the world into ideologically hostile economic blocs that would strangle future US economic growth. By 1940, the administration and a growing proportion of public opinion had come to believe that defending the US Ultimate Concern depended on preventing the emergence of such economic blocs, and globalizing free markets. "The United States," as FDR put it, cannot live "as a lone island in a world dominated by force." Journalist Henry Luce, on the eve of the war, wrote of the goal of building an "American Century" in which the US shaped the world it lived in. The two-decade experiment in isolation and the New Deal proved that introverted, national approaches could not work for the United States. It needed to stretch beyond its old frontiers, to think in terms of an international economy and an international moral order. In the years to come, Asia could become useless to the US (if Japan got its way), or worth billions of

dollars a year if the US stood up to Japanese aggression. The time had come, Luce warned, to admit “pitiful impotence” or shape the world of the future.⁴⁴

The economic embargoes of 1939 were the first step of the American deterrent posture and initially aimed not at forcing Japan out of China, but at deterring Japan from expanding its campaign of conquest south toward the Netherlands East Indies. Roosevelt did not want war in the Pacific; he believed America’s most important battle would be in Europe against Germany. The US intention in freezing Japanese assets and blocking the sale of strategic materials to Japan was to make it clear just how vulnerable Japan was to US economic pressure and convince it to abandon its imperialist ambitions without war. In 1940, the administration backed the economic embargo with an expanded military presence in the Pacific. The US Pacific Fleet relocated from the west coast to Pearl Harbor in 1940, and the US Army stepped up the pace of its program to train self-defense forces in the Philippines. The US Army and Air Force presence in the Philippines also increased, with a small fleet consisting mostly of submarines stationed there to back up an increased Royal Navy presence in Singapore.

At the same time the US was building up its force presence in the Pacific, it was also engaged in diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated settlement that might preclude a US-Japanese war. The Roosevelt administration was willing to make significant compromises with Japan to avoid a war it felt would be a political side-show (next to the real war in Europe) and its Navy felt could be a military disaster for the US.⁴⁵ Japan proposed an interim compromise in the last weeks before the outbreak of war by which it would cease expansion into Southeast Asia and agree to evacuate Indochina within a mutually agreed upon period, provided the US would agree to restore trade with Japan and cease all military aid to the Chinese resistance. The Roosevelt administration considered the offer, largely in the interest of buying time to build up military forces in the Philippines. But in the end, true to its intuitive vision of the world of the future, free from hostile economic blocs, the one concession the US was increasingly unwilling to make was the one that struck most directly at the heart of Japanese Ultimate Concerns: the US was unwilling to concede a free hand to Japan in China.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ LaFeber, *The Clash*, p. 216.

⁴⁵ Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 312.

⁴⁶ Ronald Spector, *The Eagle Against the Sun* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 85.

2. The Japanese Assessment

Japanese civilian and military leadership agreed that the only way Japan could defend the traditional social values that were so central to Sensing, Feeling Japan's Ultimate Concern was to break its long dependence on the West and create a new Asian order defined and controlled by Japan. The "Co-Prosperity Sphere" had roots in state Shinto, which taught that only Japan's divine Emperor was qualified to guide Asia to a better future and rescue it from the polluting influence of Western economic competitiveness. The Japanese also agreed that they were in a race war between the Asians and Western "liberals" and that Japan could prevail in that battle only by reasserting its ancient "uniqueness." The civil-military cooperation in defining Japanese policy ended there, however. The military had excluded civilian politicians from the army and navy ministries since the late 19th century, and the military had virtual veto power over new government cabinet posts. As a result, the Army was able to clear the government of all dissenting voices (especially those who advanced a different view of Japanese values) and had a virtually free hand in committing the nation to an expansionist agenda in pursuit of Japan's values as *it* defined them.

The Japanese general staff was essentially committed to war by the summer of 1941, and by autumn had drafted extremely detailed war plans, including careful schedules and milestones, to implement its strategy. The general staff considered a number of options, and settled on the one that, while the most risky and difficult to implement, had the greatest appeal to ISF Japan because it represented a consensus of the Army and Navy views. Historian Ronald Spector characterized this strategy-making by consensus as typically Japanese:

Compromises which would enable the services to give an appearance of unanimity were sought more eagerly than hard analysis. When agreement was fairly unanimous, it was easier to join the group than to cause trouble. . . . Had anyone attempted to probe deeply, he would have been told not to quibble. . . . Hence as a general rule no one said anything even when assailed by doubts.⁴⁷

Japan would have preferred to get what it wanted from the US without going to war, and continued to pursue diplomatic alternatives. But by the autumn of 1941, the Japanese military had come to see war as virtually inevitable. To avoid war with the US, Japan would have to give up China. To give up China meant Japan would quickly lose all the gains it had shed so much blood for in China, Indochina, and Manchuria over the previous decade, and collapse internally under the weight of its excess population and

⁴⁷ Spector, *The Eagle Against the Sun*, p. 76.

growing resource demands. Of course, if it did go to war against the US, with its vastly superior resources and military potential, Japan might still lose everything eventually. Japan compared itself as a patient dying of a lingering disease: it could do nothing and die a slow, painful death; or it could take heroic action that might result in immediate death, but that also might succeed and return the patient to robust good health.⁴⁸

What ultimately shifted the balance of opinion in favor of war was Japan's perception that the United States was not willing to back its lofty, idealistic rhetoric of freedom and the Open Door with concrete action. Japan's decision to challenge the US deterrent in the Pacific hinged on two critical assumptions: that the morally weak and wavering US would not be willing to bear the cost of a full-scale war to resist Japanese expansion and force it out of China and Indochina; and that US racism and cultural ties would lead it to put the bulk of its attention and resources into the European war. As a general staff memorandum concluded,

Although America's total defeat is judged utterly impossible, it is not inconceivable that a shift in American public opinion due to our victories in Southeast Asia or England's surrender might bring the war to an end.⁴⁹

If the Japanese could hurt the US enough in the opening phases of a war, the US might be forced to sue for peace before it had time to mobilize its vast military and industrial potential. From Japan's perspective, the decision to challenge the US was a perfectly rationally sound: its leadership believed that defense of its Ultimate Concern depended wholly on holding on to China as a means to keep Japan's economy and social order afloat and free of Western influence, but the US was unwilling to allow Japan to stay in China. The Japanese decision-makers knew that if their strategy failed, the result might be the complete annihilation of Japan in a war against the US, but that alternative seemed more remote and, at any rate, was preferable to giving in without a fight. To give in would, in their view, also lead to the annihilation of Japanese culture, but in a much less honorable fashion. As one Japanese scholar has written, the legitimacy of Japan's goals "were assumed to have existed throughout the long history of the Japanese nation and were to be realized regardless of the sacrifices."⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Spector, *The Eagle Against the Sun*, p. 78.

⁴⁹ Saburo Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II* (New York: Pantheon, 1968), p. 139.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Carl Boyd, "Japanese Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period," in Williamson Murry and Alan R. Millett, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, Vol. I: *The Interwar Period* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 133.

There were, however, two critical deficiencies in Japan's strategic plans that stemmed not from flawed rationality but from its narrow perspective, both geographic and chronological. First, Japan's strategy was a wholly introverted, defensive one. As a result, it included no plans to move outside the perimeter of Japan's new empire and hence no plan to carry the battle into US territory. This may account for Japan's critical miscalculation at Pearl Harbor. By focusing only on US power-projection capabilities—its surface fleet—it failed to destroy other key capabilities, including petroleum, submarine, and port facilities, that would at least have forced the US to move its key naval base back to the US mainland for a considerable period of time. Second, Sensing Japan's war plans had no fall-back position and no contingency plans for an orderly retreat from its empire if the strategy failed. As a result, even after the tide of war turned permanently against Japan after 1942, the general staff clung to its only strategic card—raising the cost of war to ever higher levels in the hopes of breaking US will. The Japanese remained skillful tacticians to the end, but the only result was pointless loss for the Japanese, perhaps best embodied in its Kamikaze operations. Lacking either the Intuitive state's vision or the Thinking state's systematic analysis, Japan in the end fell victim to cognitive rigidity and a lack of strategic forethought that further undermined the prospects of success.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. Credibility

The credibility of US deterrent threats against Japan in the months leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was not very high. The United States had not sent sufficiently clear messages to Sensing Japan concerning whether, how, and to what extent it saw its Ultimate Concerns at stake in the stand-off over Japan's campaign of conquest in China. US capabilities in-being and in-theater did not do much to enhance the credibility of its deterrent. But in the end, it was not a miscalculation of US capabilities on the part of Japan's General Staff that undermined credibility—Sensing states usually have a good grasp of such matters—but their tragic misunderstanding of US will. Sensing Japan naturally equated will with concrete action. Over the four decades since the United States first issued its Open Door policy in China, they had never backed its idealistic demands with concrete actions: the Open Door had no more credibility among European imperialists at the turn of the century than it did with Japan in 1939. Japan took this as clear evidence that 1) the US was not willing to back its ideologies with force (which was, for much of the period, a quite accurate conclusion); and 2) the issue of free and open economic markets in Asia was not very important to the

United States (which, for the entire period, was a very inaccurate conclusion). This view was almost certainly reinforced in the minds of the Sensing Japanese by the spectacle of Anglo-French appeasement of Germany during the Munich Conference of 1938 that bought peace at the cost of transferring most of Czechoslovakia into the maw of the Third Reich.

Japan's Introverted orientation also prevented it from understanding that the so-called "isolationism" of the US in the 1920s and 1930s was 1) not really isolationism, and 2) an aberration that was not sustainable given the United States' Extroverted, Intuitive strategic personality. Instead, Japan projected its own strategic personality—which saw introversion as natural and sustainable—on the United States. As a result, it failed to recognize the warning signs beginning in 1938 and 1939 that the Americans' isolationist mood was wearing off and that the economic embargo was not just another empty gesture but marked a shift back in the direction of activist engagement. The US, for its part, was both late and not particularly effective in communicating to Japan the extent to which it saw Japanese imperialist ambitions as a serious threat to its own most vital interests.

The Japanese had another fully rational basis for concluding that the United States probably would not go to war against Japan. Through most of the 1930s, the Japanese operated under the assumption, often reinforced by American and British businessmen, Congressional Representatives, and even diplomats, that the US and Britain would tolerate the Japanese war of conquest in China if it served to erode the expansion of Communist control within China. The Americans in particular did not want to see the Communists gain a foothold in China, and were (the Japanese concluded) willing to let Japan do the dirty work. This might have been a more or less accurate perception at one time, especially the early 1930s when the Depression in the US created something of a "Red Scare." But by the late 1930s, the value at stake for the United States had clearly shifted, a shift that the Introverted, Sensing Japanese failed to catch.⁵¹

An additional factor undermining the credibility of the US deterrent in 1941 was the gross imbalance of the broad, Intuitive strategy that US Ultimate Concerns were increasingly leading it to pursue, and the military capabilities to carry them out that existed until very late in the game. After a nearly two-decade experiment in non-engagement, US long-term national strategy was shifting back toward the Wilsonian view that its Ultimate Concerns would be best served by taking a leading role in shaping a future world that was not divided into ideologically hostile economic and political blocs.

⁵¹ Ienaga, *The Pacific War*, p. 79.

But the US military capabilities in place to enforce its new objectives looked—to the Sensing Japanese—wholly defensive and barely sufficient to achieve the minimum objective of deterring Japan from attacking the Philippines and Hawaii. The message the Japanese received was that the United States was only prepared to fight to hold on to its bases in the Pacific—if those were lost, the war was over. A more effective deterrent would have to send the clear message that the US was willing to pay a very big price to prevent Japanese domination of Asia, and that Japan would have to pay a very big price to win it. Such a deterrent was unlikely at the time, however, since before Pearl Harbor it was not even clear that Americans believed they were willing to fight that fight.

The Japanese general staff did not doubt that the US would retaliate with all the force it could muster in the event of a Japanese surprise attack against its possessions in the Pacific by December 1941. The relocation of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor and the military build-up in the Philippines sent a clearer message to Japan that the United States intended to defend its bases in the Pacific. That said, the long-term credibility of the US deterrent remained relatively low. While the Japanese were sure the US would defend Hawaii, the Philippines, and its other Pacific possessions, and understood the enormous latent military potential of the United States once it decided to mobilize, it had not made it at all clear that their willingness to fight Japan extended beyond the immediate defense of its existing position. The Japanese had a couple of reasons for doubting US staying power over the long term. First, the Japanese harbored the ISF sense of moral and cultural superiority and tended to mirror-image Westerners in general, and the United States in particular, as materialistic and morally weak. In addition, its Sensing orientation led Japan to conclude that the US interests at stake did not justify the cost of a long war and, hence, that they could be counted upon to sue for peace if Japan dealt the Americans a knock-out blow from the outset. Second, the Japanese concluded that should the United States be drawn into the European war (which, by mid-1941, seemed a virtual sure thing) it would not be able to fight aggressively in two theaters simultaneously, and given the racial, cultural, and political ties at stake, the first US priority would be the war in Europe. This latter point was a perfectly rational assumption, and one the Japanese shared with most American strategists at the time.

2. Effectiveness

The United States' deterrent was obviously not effective against Japan in 1941. Its failure stemmed from a number of factors. First, the US clearly did not comprehend the degree to which ISF Japan saw its Ultimate Concerns at stake in China. As a result, the deterrent force it put in place at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines was totally inadequate

to deter a determined challenger that saw its very survival at stake and was willing to take high risks and absorb heavy costs. Second, Japan perceived a drastic imbalance of interests (and Ultimate Concerns) between itself and the United States in their dispute over Japan's imperial ambitions. Japan was fighting for its cultural and social survival, an interest that constituted the core of Japan's Ultimate Concerns. Obliteration was preferable to peace bought at the price of its uniqueness and its honor. Survival on US terms would not be survival. The United States, on the other hand, was—from the perspective of the Sensing, Feeling Japanese—fighting for profits, the right to meddle in the affairs of racial inferiors, and to keep the “yellow” Japanese from taking their place among the world powers. None of these interests involved US national survival as the Japanese saw it; and none was backed by any apparent willingness to shed blood on their behalf. If the United States lost to Japan, its pride and its profit margin might suffer, but its social order would remain intact. Japan's calculation was not all that far off the mark in terms of the balance of Ultimate Concerns *as Japan perceived it*. Its miscalculation was rooted in the US failure to make its interests, in terms of its Ultimate Concerns, crystal clear in terms the Sensing Japanese could understand.

3. Options for Enhancing Credibility and Effectiveness?

Given the circumstances at the time, and the stand-off between the United States and Japan regarding China, Japan was not deterrable by late 1941. But what, if anything, could the United States have done to make its deterrent more effective? Perhaps the single most important factor in the failure of the US deterrent against Japan was the clash between Japan's Sensing orientation and the United States Intuitive orientation. From the earliest days of the Open Door policy in China, the United States sent mixed messages to Japan. The Intuitive United States was focused on the world it wanted to shape and the values it wanted to promote, without paying much attention to the concrete actions that might be required to implement them. But the pragmatic ISF Japanese reacted to events, not ideas; and the message the Sensing Japanese took from US inconsistency and willingness to compromise (which followed, in part, from the natural tendency of ENF states to shift their attention from one value or goal to another and back again) was that the Americans were not serious about their policies. A harder-line approach (toward the Europeans as well as the Japanese in China) backed, from the very beginning, by concrete actions might have shaped Japanese ambitions in a different direction. The missionary spirit of the ENF Americans also led them to assume that their values were universal, and universally applicable. As a result, the United States failed almost from the beginning of its relationship with Japan to take Japan's legitimate cultural concerns into

consideration in shaping its economic and political activities. Over the long run, to do so might have led to a Japan that did not see the United States as its mortal cultural enemy.

Critics of arms control frequently blame US compliance with the naval building limits established in the Washington Naval Treaty for the failure of deterrence against Japan. Would an earlier or more extensive naval rearmament have changed the course of events in 1941? Probably not. The key factor was ISF Japan's perception that Western presence in Asia threatened its Ultimate Concerns, and that the conquest and economic subjugation of China was essential to maintaining Japan's social structure and ancient uniqueness. Japan was, in short, determined to act. The Japanese general staff, in making its decision to challenge the United States militarily, did not miscalculate the US advantage in military capabilities. They understood perfectly that if the war lasted more than a few months, Japan would lose and would probably lose catastrophically. They were willing to take that risk; the interests at stake were that important. What a more extensive United States' military build-up in the Pacific might have accomplished was to limit Japan's initial gains and hold the Philippines, thus eliminating the need for US forces to win back lost territory and shortening the war.

IV: THE RISE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY, 1870-1906

A. GERMANY'S STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. The German Dialectic and the Quest for *Ordnung*

The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once asserted that the Germans would be Hegelians even if Hegel had never existed. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy of "objective idealism" saw human history as the concrete manifestation of the logical evolution of an "absolute spirit." Hegel rejected Enlightenment rationalism with its emphasis on abstract ideals—like "inalienable rights" of the individual or the "social contract"—as a blueprint for engineering human progress. He believed the only sound basis for political theory was direct analysis of human experience to discern the internal logic that emerges over the course of a nation's history. Hegel saw history as a logical process that moves forward through a productive clash of opposites—the dialectic. At each stage in a nation's political development, contradictions (antitheses) arise that challenge the status quo (thesis). The result is a power struggle that leads, eventually, not to the clear victory of one or the other, but to a synthesis that advances historical development to the next, more rational level. Hegel's dialectical theory had a strong influence on German political thought and contributed directly to the rise of *Realpolitik*.

The doctrine of *Realpolitik* was the brainchild of a frustrated liberal reformer, August Ludwig von Rochau. In attempting to understand the failure of the liberal Revolution of 1848, von Rochau concluded that the answer lay in the fundamental reality that social and political power, not idealism, were the real engines of political life. In *Principles of Realpolitik, Applied to the Political Conditions of Germany* (1853), von Rochau concluded that

To rule means to exercise power, and only he who possesses power can exercise it. This direct connection of power and rule forms the fundamental truth of all politics and the key to all history.⁵²

Rochau's doctrine resonated with Germans and became the intellectual paradigm through which they came to understand their historical plot. Just as natural scientists sought to discover rational laws governing biology and physics through empirical observation, German historians through the late 19th century struggled to uncover the internal logic of history by studying the past, in the words of historian Leopold von Ranke, "*wie es*

⁵² Quoted in Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 117.

gewesen ist”—as it actually was. They constructed a German myth of national origin that embodied all three elements of its strategic personality: Extroversion (national survival depended on success in the constructive competition of international relations), Sensing (success was all about power), and Thinking (it all developed according to the logical unfolding of the dialectic).

The escalating power struggle between the temporal universalist ambitions of German emperors and the spiritual universalist ambition of the popes in Rome drove the first phase of the German dialectic from the coronation of Otto the Great as Holy Roman Emperor in 936 to the humiliation of Emperor Henry IV at the gates of the pope's residence at Canossa in 1077. The early German Emperors were realists who knew that expansion of their power in Italy required concessions to local German princes to keep the peace at home. The devolution of imperial powers to local princes enabled the Emperors to turn their full attention to dealing with the popes, but it started Germany down the slippery slope to particularism (the tendency toward political organization that invested virtual independence to local princes at the expense of the central authority) and handed the papacy a valuable lever to use against them in the form of ambitious and increasingly autonomous local princes. So through the Middle Ages as the Holy Roman Emperors expanded their multi-national power into Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, their authority in the German heartland became a hollow illusion. The eventual disastrous result was the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Initially a religious war between Catholic and Protestant princes in Germany, it expanded into a dynastic power struggle between rising European powers—France, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire—and an overextended Hapsburg (Holy Roman) Empire. Germany was being forged in the crucible of international power politics.

The balance of power shifted several times over the course of the Thirty Years War, and the outcome was inconclusive. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) suspended the power struggle by ossifying the Protestant-Catholic balance in Germany as it stood at the outset of the conflict. For the next two centuries German particularism and its resulting political and military weakness became the fulcrum of a new European balance-of-power that relied on political and military power rather than religious identity to maintain peace and stability. Germany paid a horrible price for the war, losing 35 percent of its population and suffering psychological trauma and widespread physical devastation that left it impoverished and economically backward for the next century. To a war-weary population, the rise of petty absolutist princes promised the restoration of order and at least the hope of rebuilding a shattered society. For the next two centuries, Germany was

a society whose historical plot was driven by political and social particularism and the quest for *Ordnung* (order) through unquestioning obedience to existing authority. This equation of security with social and political order would shape Germany's Sensing, Thinking orientation and long outlive memories of the horrors of the religious wars.

Napoleonic France smashed the Westphalian system and in the process ushered in a new period of invasion and disorder in Germany by spreading the virus of nationalism. Sentiment for unification had been growing in the German territories for some time and, in the wake of military humiliation at the hands of Napoleon's conscript armies, led to the rise of two nationalist movements: the *Großdeutsch* party sought to create a confederation of Germany, Italy, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire under Hapsburg rule; and the *Kleindeutsch* party favored a federal state that excluded Austria (with all of its non-German subjects). The liberal revolution of 1848 failed to forge a unified Germany, largely because particularist Germans could not agree on a capital or a head of state. Prussian conservatives, particularly Prussian Minister-President Prince Otto von Bismarck, while hostile to the liberalism of the 1848 movement, nonetheless recognized that unification was probably inevitable and presented Germany's only hope to modernize and industrialize its economy and build an adequate defense against the powerful states that surrounded it. Through a combination of selective war and skillful diplomacy, Bismarck engineered the unification of Germany on the *Kleindeutsch* model and the coronation of King Wilhelm II of Prussia as Kaiser Wilhelm I as German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in January 1871. Bismarck had turned the creative competition for power in the European system to Germany's advantage. The German Reich that Bismarck created forged its legitimacy not from principles of self-determination, but from Prussia's power.

2. *Das Volk*

Germany's lack of natural boundaries has shaped the historical plot of both the Germans and the rest of Europe and lies at the root of its Extroverted, Sensing Strategic Personality. Its great rivers radiated outward from the German heartland to the farthest corners of Europe, encouraging cultural contact, migration, and trade, but providing few natural boundaries. Much of the land was hard and rocky, and the constant search for arable land made the ancient Germans a migratory and warlike people. German myth takes great pride in the fact that the ancient Germanic tribes were the one people that the Romans could not conquer. The great migration of the fourth and fifth centuries, the *Völkerwanderung*, shaped the ethnic and political map of Europe for centuries as Germanic tribes from Southern Scandinavia and northern Germany fanned out across the

continent. When the dust settled after 711 CE, much of Europe was under the rule of Germanic kings.

The distinct German identity that already existed when the Roman historian Tacitus wrote his *Germania* (98 CE) endured, despite its lack of a unified homeland, into modern Germany and became the foundation for the *Kleindeutsch* view of the *Kulturnation* as the foundation of German national identity. Modern *Völkish* nationalism had its roots in early nineteenth century German Romanticism, which venerated the ancient German tribes, German peasants, and medieval German myth as embodiments of the *Kulturnation*, rooted in nature and free of intervening layers of philosophy and artifice. This view held great appeal for a people whose long history of fluid boundaries and particularist government provided little basis for national identity other than blood and language. *Völkish* nationalism remains one of the most persistent threads in German national myth, and contributed directly to Germany's Sensing orientation. Until very recently, *das Volk* remained the standard of Germanness. Under EU pressure, the German government finally redefined its exclusionary qualifications for citizenship in 2000, backing away somewhat from the terms of Article 116 of the Basic Law that defined the Federal Republic of Germany as an "objective" nation grounded in common descent, not a "subjective" nation based on the individual's will to join the national group that translated Sensing ethnic identity into Thinking legal principle.⁵³ For the first time, ethnic non-Germans born in Germany—formerly afforded only the ambiguous legal status of *gastarbeiter* (guest workers)—could carry German passports and enjoy the full legal status of German citizenship. Assimilation, however, remains a different and much more difficult issue. As one young Turkish-German put it:

I was born in Germany. I speak German. I speak English better than I speak Turkish. And I have a German passport. But if I say I'm German, which I am, Germans look at me and say "No, you're not German. Where are you from?"⁵⁴

3. The German Idea of Freedom

Hegel's dialectic has a theoretical end point beyond which no further internal contradictions can arise to trigger struggle and synthesis. This "end of history" as Hegel saw it was the achievement of freedom. But Hegel was no proto-libertarian. In his view, freedom does not mean the individual's freedom to do whatever he pleases so long as he is not hurting anyone else, and it does not give free rein to feeling and impulse. The

⁵³ Heinrich August Winkler, "Rebuilding of a Nation," in Michael Mertes, Steven Muller, and Winkler, *In Search of Germany* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p. 74.

⁵⁴ Peter Finn, "Germany's German Question," *The Washington Post*, November 25, 2000.

freedom that constitutes the highest level of historical evolution is “concrete freedom,” which results when the individuals and groups that make up civilized society submit to the rational management of the state and its laws and institutions. Through that act of submission to the reason of the state, man gains the concrete freedom to subordinate irrational passions to rationality and in so doing realize his true nature and potential.⁵⁵ The German idea of freedom is a manifestation of its Sensing objectivism and its Thinking veneration of order.

The German historical plot instilled in the Germans the deep and abiding fear of the consequences of dissolution of the existing social and political order. *Ordnung* is the only defensive boundary the Germans possess; historically, when *Ordnung* is strong, Germany is safe, but when it breaks down, Germany falls victim to invasion and suffering. Germany has enjoyed few extended periods of political, social, or economic stability in its history, making the goal all the more precious. As one German put it “the self-confidence of the Germans is characterized by the fact that they have no self-confidence.”⁵⁶ The Sensing, Thinking Germans put so much emphasis on order and stability because they have so seldom had it. Herein lies the kernel of the German idea of freedom. As the Germans see it, *Ordnung* is a source of freedom because it is a source of security.

4. Germany’s Extroverted, Sensing, Thinking Strategic Personality

More than any other strategic personality type, the EST states live in and relate to the outside world precisely as it is, stripped bare of either abstraction or ideology. They conduct their affairs according to the rules that have, since the end of World War II, been the standard by which sound international strategy is judged. They are the Realists. In their international relations, the realist ESTs focus almost exclusively on the here-and-now and make their judgments according to objective, methodically deductive calculations. They are keen analysts of their immediate environment and base their strategic conduct on straightforward assessments of their economic, political, and military power relative to the international system. And they see the international system operating according to scientific laws that national leaders can observe, comprehend, and manipulate to their advantage, but that are beyond the power of individual states to alter in any fundamental way. For the ESTs, like other Thinking states, chaos is not the natural state of affairs, it is the unfortunate result of man’s inability or unwillingness to follow

⁵⁵ *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, c.f. “Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich – Freedom.”

⁵⁶ Quoted in Adolph Schalk, *The Germans* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. xx.

the rules. They are also the most transparent of all the strategic personality types: if you are paying attention, what you see is what you get.

Germany's Thinking orientation is in large part a product of the historical legacy of shared traumas—especially the horrible social and political price it paid for the period of rampant religious conflict during the Thirty Years War—that taught the Germans that law and order is a better foundation for stability and security than religion or philosophy because it makes the world more predictable and manageable. Its Sensing orientation also followed from painful historical experience with invasion and forced atomization—during the Thirty Years War, and again during the Napoleonic Wars. Unlike the Feeling British who sought to control their fate and shape the international system through diplomacy and consensus-building, the Thinking Germans concluded that the only way Germany would be able to control its own fate would be through the exercise of power. The Germans preferred action to ideals and talk, a quintessentially EST view expressed concisely by Bismarck in a speech to the Prussian Diet in September 1862: “The great questions of the time are not decided by speeches and majority decisions. . . but by iron and blood.”

Germany lay at the heart of Europe; and while surrounded by potential enemies, its borders were tenuous at best. The tumultuous history of the Germans has involved a wide variety of disparate and dramatic political regimes and events. Despite these shifts in political, economic, and cultural systems, a relatively stable German Ultimate Concern has helped to form the multitude of identities throughout the history of the German-speaking peoples. Tied to the dual desire for external security and domestic order and stability, Germany's Ultimate Concern is rooted in its insecurity: tenuous borders; the close proximity of enemies; a long adolescence as a mass of tribes and then states unable and/or unwilling to form a nation; nearly evenly divided Protestant and Catholic populations; and contradictory rational yet also romanticist tendencies. Throughout the many political arrangements of the Germans, they have sought to achieve a level of external security that would allow them to consolidate internal political cohesion, stimulate economic growth, and attain or maintain their rightful place as a major European power. This Ultimate Concern has helped determine not only how Germans understand their existence as a political entity or entities, but also how they see their place as extroverts in the world around them. Before unification they were a people with a great deal of potential: it was therefore rational that they should unify and fulfill that potential, thereby ascending to Germany's rightful position in Europe. Unification was an

expression of the Ultimate Concern of the German-speaking peoples that had formed a key part of their identity for hundreds of years.

B. BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. The Sceptered Isle

On Christmas Day in 1066, the Norman William the Conqueror was anointed King of England at Westminster Abbey, and the English became an oppressed minority in their own country. William's invasion and defeat of King Harold at the Battle of Hastings was made possible by the inability of rival English Kings to agree on succession or even to join forces to prevent foreign invasion. The Normans introduced an alien royal dynasty, a new ruling class, and a new language (French) and culture, making no effort to assimilate the existing Anglo-Saxon hierarchy. For the next three centuries, England and France became a single cross-channel political community in which French culture was dominant; the kings and nobility of England spoke French while English became the language of tradesmen and peasants. Still, the period following the Norman Conquest saw more continuity than change in English society and, despite the Normans' best efforts, continental feudalism never took root in England, where local custom and law stubbornly held sway.⁵⁷ Still, the British resented their political and cultural subjugation. The political link between Britain and France ended when Henry VI of England lost the Battle of Castillon to end the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and England's claim to the French throne. The Norman invasion of 1066 was, according to British national myth, the last foreign conquest it would ever suffer (William of Orange was technically an invited guest) but remained a searing national trauma that shaped later British identity and colored its internal politics, external relations, and Sensing orientation into modern times.

The lesson of 1066, that the lack of clear lines of succession breed internal divisiveness and external vulnerability, was reinforced by a bitter civil war between King Stephen and the Empress Maud that began when Henry I died in 1135 with no male heir, and the Wars of the Roses (1461-1485) that ended with the establishment of the Tudor dynasty by Henry VII. Henry VII instilled in the Tudors the determination to establish order and dynastic continuity in England. It was this Tudor obsession with orderly succession (not ideological or theological dissent) that prompted the confrontation between Henry VIII and Rome that led to the establishment of the Church of England.

⁵⁷ Keith Fieling, *A History of England from the Coming of the English to 1938* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 97.

But, while the Tudors transformed the English monarchy from “first among equals within England” to “king and emperor,” they had to do so in the context of England’s unique political structures. Brute force and power were not enough; the Tudors also had to restore confidence in the monarchy’s ability and willingness to protect the rights of its subjects. The Tudors used Parliament to legitimize their authority and political patronage—high appointments, land grants, and other perquisites in return for obedience and loyalty to the crown—to tie the nobility to the monarchy. The English gentry became active participants in the government and an important source of patriotic commitment and national identity. This traditional equation of good government with internal harmony and shared values shaped Britain’s Feeling orientation.

The Tudors’ successor dynasty, the Stuarts, would pay a high price for attempting to alter the balance of power between the crown and Parliament. A period of civil war, dictatorship (the Cromwell Protectorate), and renewed civil strife ended in 1688 when Parliament lost patience with the last Stuart King, James II, and invited his Protestant daughter Mary and her husband William of Orange (Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic) to “remonstrate” with her father. William landed an army on November 5 and easily defeated the royalist defense. When Parliament declared William and Mary as King and Queen, it also issued a Bill of Rights that established that the king ruled not by divine right but through the will of the people as expressed by Parliament.

The crown has personified British national identity since Anglo-Saxon times; but in keeping with Britain’s Sensing, Feeling orientation, a successful monarch was also one who established harmony and consensus among his (or her) most influential subjects, thereby ensuring stability, effective government, and domestic peace. Bad kings were those who sought to enhance their absolutist (and in Britain, illegitimate) prerogatives at the expense of harmony and consensus. Under the Tudors, the royal court was the center of national power, but it was also the center of learning, culture, and refinement. As the political power of the monarchs declined after the 1688 “Glorious Revolution,” their cultural significance grew. By the reign of George I (1714-1727) the English monarchy, dependent on Parliament for its income, no longer enjoyed the wealth necessary to maintain lavish palaces and extravagant lifestyles. Instead, the British monarchy came to reflect uniquely British values—stability, family, tradition, and a certain doughtiness. This symbolic role of the monarchy has increased since the reign of Queen Victoria. The Hanoverian monarchs were not, themselves, British—George III was the first who spoke English with any proficiency—but this did not detract much from their mythic and symbolic role. The Industrial Revolution and the rise of empire transformed Britain into

the world's first modern, urban nation by the mid-nineteenth century, and the more urban, international, and industrialized Britain became, the more traditional, ritualized, and popular the monarchy became. Through most of British history, the crown had been the personification of national identity and unity, but in the modern age it also became the repository of a timeless national myth of a happier, rural, pre-industrial order in which traditional values of family, harmony, and stability—the values of being British—still ruled.

2. Common Law

Much earlier than anywhere else in Europe, the influential subjects of British kings lived under the rule of law. British national myth traces the origins of the rule of law back to 1215 when a band of patriotic peers forced the wicked and despotic King John (of Robin Hood fame) to sign the Magna Carta and thus set England on the path to constitutional monarchy and the Western world on the path to democracy. But the tradition of rule of law predates the events at Runnymede; the Magna Carta was a conservative document that reasserted traditional rights of the nobility against the king, rather than creating new ones. Still, it established once-and-for-all the broad outlines of the concept of liberty that would shape British history: taxation only by consent (which paved the way for the establishment of Parliament); jury trials for felony offenses (to replace trial by ordeal or trial by local sheriffs for offenses against the crown); and the right to writs of *habeas corpus*, which protected subjects from arbitrary imprisonment.

In Britain, “rule of law” was not a rational abstraction devised by philosophers, it was the expression of custom and values and a pragmatic system for effective government—it codified what worked. The rule of law balanced the rights and privileges of the king and his subjects, but it developed over the whole course of British history and was, in that respect, evolutionary and almost organic to Britain. By 1066, Anglo-Saxon England already had a more highly developed legal system than the Normans, but it was a system based largely on local custom and precedent and lacked a shared foundation of philosophical or theological principles that might bind it into a “constitution.” Henry II brought the plethora of local courts under the central administration of the king's justice, creating for the first time a legal system common to all English people. English Common Law took precedence over Canon Law as early as the thirteenth century, and Henry VIII banished Canon Law from the English legal system altogether in 1549.

British national myth venerates Common Law as the traditional foundation of order in British society through the ages. But Common Law is not a tidy, self-contained

legal code founded on abstract principles like the French Code Napoleon or even the US Constitution. Rather, it is a conglomeration of local custom, feudal privilege, and centuries of legal precedent that enables barristers and judges to pick and choose from various traditions on a case-by-case basis in a style indicative of Britain's Feeling orientation. Common Law balances the rights of the state and the rights of individuals; the pursuit of justice and the pursuit of liberty. And its almost organic link with the evolution of Britain's historical plot reinforces Britain's Sensing orientation.

3. Liberty

One of Britain's earliest national heroes was Queen Boudica, who in 61 CE led an alliance of British Celtic tribes in a rebellion against the Roman imperial administration in Britain. The Romans crushed the rebellion but undertook administrative reform having learned from their near disaster that, in the words of the historian Tacitus, "The Britons bear conscription, the tribute and their other obligations to the empire without complaint, provided there is no injustice. They take that extremely ill; for they can bear to be ruled by others but not to be their slaves."⁵⁸ The British love of liberty, it seems, was already born. The values that set Britain apart are unremarkable today: liberty, equality, and a patriotism that fostered a sense of shared commitment to the British nation. But for the Sensing British, these have not been abstract principles or goals, they were realities that evolved over the course of British history. They are fundamental qualities of being British. The Magna Carta is important because from the moment King John signed on the dotted line, freedom from arbitrary rule became a fundamental right of every Englishman. But the British tradition of liberty goes further, it also means that individuals have the right and the duty to participate in forging a consensus through which they might enjoy a common life in a manner that impinges as little as possible on individual freedom.⁵⁹

4. Britain's Extroverted, Sensing, Feeling Strategic Personality

On the surface, the ESF states look like realists. They are natural pragmatists who define their national interests in straightforward, material terms. But they also adhere to certain fundamental and deeply-held values which they strive to defend and promote, and which shape their Ultimate Concerns and national interests. Britain's historical plot was driven by its environment and experience. This, along with its geographical situation as an island nation physically separated from the continent, accounts in large part for its

⁵⁸ Peter Salway, "Roman Britain," in Kenneth O. Morgan, ed., *The Oxford History of Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 18.

⁵⁹ Samuel Beer, "The Roots of New Labour: Liberalism Rediscovered," *The Economist*, February 7, 1998, p. 25.

evolutionary Sensing orientation. The British enjoyed a greater degree of security than Germany, which contributed to Britain's vaunted insularity and to such policies as "Splendid Isolation." But Britain was never as completely isolated from the continent, its culture, and its political rivalries as Japan was from the Asian mainland, and it never felt completely secure from the threat of invasion or, at least, political interference from continental powers, either religious or secular. As a result, Britain falls squarely in the ranks of the Extroverted states and through its history conducted its foreign policy with the attitude that to survive and thrive it had to cope effectively with the international system.

The ESF focus on action and experience has led the British into international strategies driven by circumstances and events rather than ideologies. No example of this is more striking than what some historians have called Britain's "accidental empire." Britain was a come-from-behind competitor in the European race for overseas empire: Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands all had substantial head-starts. But as economic development led Britain to industrialize, the search for overseas markets and sources of raw materials was natural. Beginning with the establishment of the British East India Company in 1600, Britain administered its foreign trade interests through Charter Companies vested with government-guaranteed trading monopolies in designated areas. But as these investment companies grew, they became *de facto* national interests, often backed by defensive military power in the form of British Army garrisons in and around trading centers. Direct, governmental administration of colonies usually only developed after local crises or inept administration of charter companies left no alternative. The historical plot of the ESF British Empire turned the old adage "trade follows the crown" on its head.

The practical and straightforward nature of their interactions and interests has traditionally made Britain a fairly reliable defender of the status quo in Europe. As an ESF, Britain's Ultimate Concerns always depended upon its ability to ensure stability and balance in the international system; and in the late nineteenth century that status quo depended on maintaining British naval dominance and defending Imperial interests. The British Ultimate Concern was to maintain the era of British economic dominance by reinforcing the European balance of power, maintaining command of the seas, and maintaining stability within the Empire. Britain had the most valuable colonies, the highest industrial output, and command of the seas. During the nineteenth century, the "sun never set on the British Empire," and Britain's most vital interest was in keeping it that way.

The fundamental difference between the Feeling British and the Thinking Germans was the British determination to maintain order through consensus and balance among the European powers, where the Germans were more concerned with status and power. Henry Kissinger described nicely the distinction between Britain's ESF balance and the power-focused balance preferred by the Thinking Germans and French in his account of the role of William Pitt the Younger in forging the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe:

Power is too difficult to assess, and the willingness to vindicate it too various, to permit treating it as a reliable guide to international order. Equilibrium works best if it is buttressed by an agreement on common values. The balance of power inhibits the *capacity* to overthrow the international order; agreement on shared values inhibits the *desire* to overthrow the international order. Power without legitimacy tempts tests of strength; legitimacy without power tempts empty posturing.⁶⁰

C. CONTEXT OF THE RISE OF ANGLE-GERMAN RIVALRY

Prior to 1871, dozens of German states existed in loose, sometimes overlapping confederations in central Europe. Roughly seventy percent of the population in these states lived in rural areas. Germany was the last of the major European powers to unify, one of the last to become a major power politically or economically; it achieved unification, in addition to political and economic power, at a swift and efficient pace. With Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor, the states became a nation, the population began to shift from the countryside to the cities, industrial output increased rapidly, the new hybrid nation threatened and then defeated former victors, and the European balance of power had to accommodate a new and powerful German nation. Still, the strategic rivalry that plunged Germany and Britain into a costly and ultimately destabilizing naval arms race was far from a foregone conclusion in the decades immediately following German unification.

After welding the German states into the German Empire, Bismarck pursued *Realpolitik* to protect his newly forged nation from all the foes itching to disassemble it. By way of addressing Germany's Ultimate Concerns, the Chancellor urged the new Germany to modernize and industrialize, thereby strengthening its position on the continent. Bismarck understood, however, the problems associated with the appearance of a new power in the middle of Europe: the delicate balance of power set up at the Congress of Vienna—and defended vigorously by Great Britain—would no longer

⁶⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 77.

function as it was designed to do. His key task after establishing and consolidating the new Empire was to convince Europe that a strong Germany would not upset the existing balance. This task required working within and manipulating the existing structure. Bismarck achieved this diplomatic feat through the careful management of alliances and by mitigating the fears of neighboring powers, thereby ensuring that Germany would not be encircled by hostile nations. Like the consummate EST, Bismarck played European powers off against one another like chessmen, and maneuvered through diplomatic circles befuddling everyone. His approach worked: Germany became economically powerful and politically stable without threatening the existing order.

At the time that Bismarck was putting together the new German Empire, the memory of Napoleon was still fresh in the minds of Europeans; the British were no exception. British Prime Minister William Gladstone once characterized Bismarck as the most dangerous man in Europe, but during the latter nineteenth century Britain perceived France and Russia as the biggest threats to stability in the international order. At this time Britain was especially concerned with its colonies and France and Russia were pursuing imperial ambitions in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa that ran counter to British interests. The British had already fought the Crimean War (1853-1858) to keep the Russians out the Mediterranean, and were engaged in an ongoing competition with France to control the pieces of the crumbling Ottoman Empire in the Middle East—Egypt, Syria, Arabia, and Palestine. The British Naval Defense Act of 1889 is one example of Britain's perception of the European climate. This act stated that the Royal Navy must always be superior to the fleets of the two next-strongest naval powers, currently France and Russia.⁶¹ In addition, Britain was interested in finding an amiable continental power that could balance France and Russia and naturally looked to its cultural "cousin" Germany to fill that role.⁶² The British Royal family—the House of Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha—had deep ties to Germany. Prince Albert, Queen Victoria's beloved consort, was a minor German prince and Kaiser Wilhelm II was reported to be her favorite grandson.

Germany at this point was newly unified and too weak to play the kind of balancing role Britain envisioned for it. Britain came to the conclusion that the best way

⁶¹ Marder, Arthur J. *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), pp. 119-143, especially 130-131.

⁶² See for example Firchow, Peter Edgerly, *The Death of the German Cousin: Variations on a Literary Stereotype, 1890-1920* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1986); and Mander, John, *Our German Cousins: Anglo-German Relations in the 19th and 20th centuries*, (London: John Murray Publishers, 1974).

to pursue its vital interests was to strengthen Germany, enabling it to pose a plausible threat to its neighbors and thus distract their attention from their own imperial projects. Britain urged Germany to seek colonies and assisted it in establishing and training a larger navy.⁶³ Even as late as the summer of 1890, the Anglo-German Colonial Agreement was concluded; Britain got strips of East Africa and Germany gained Helgoland in the North Sea and also the so-called "Caprivi Strip" near Namibia in Southwestern Africa.⁶⁴ Britain was convinced that increased German power in a cultural and strategic partnership with their nation would advance Imperial security.

D. THE LIMITS OF LONG-TERM THREAT REDUCTION

1. Germany's Expanding Ambitions

Britain's plan to use Germany to balance France and Russia seemed brilliant in the 1880s, but the Sensing British had vastly underestimated Germany's latent economic and military potential over the long-term. Suddenly its counterweight became a potentially dangerous sleeping giant. Now it was Britain that had to turn its attention back to the continental balance-of-power that it had long seen as the key to defending its Ultimate Concerns. Germany's industrial output surpassed that of other continental European powers, its population increased dramatically, its political influence surged, and yet Germany was still treated like a weaker "cousin" by Britain. The aggressive and boisterous young Wilhelm became Emperor in 1888 and immediately sought to undo the hierarchical relationship. Wilhelm forcibly urged Bismarck to resign and began reversing his careful plans and policies.

Wilhelm had long admired the country of his grandmother, Queen Victoria. He admired the Royal Navy and its traditions and was overjoyed when the Queen made him an honorary Admiral of the Royal Fleet in 1889. But the Thinking Germans now expected the admiration and respect to flow both ways. Wilhelm's goal was to attain for the German Empire the respect of Great Britain and the rest of Europe.⁶⁵ At the time the currency of international power and respect was colonies, so Wilhelm shifted from Bismarck's strategy of manipulating the continental balance-of-power to a new strategy of *Weltpolitik* in an effort to earn Germany a "Place in the Sun" equal to its size and economic and military potential. It is important to note, however, that even in the late

⁶³ Massie, Robert K. *Dreadnought* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. xxiv.

⁶⁴ Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 180

⁶⁵ "He wanted a Navy because the English had one. Because it was a means of forcing the English to pay him attention, of making Germany an attractive ally." Quoted from Michael Balfour, *The Kaiser and his Times*, cited in Mander, *Our German Cousins*, pp. 215-216.

1890s Germany did not regard pursuing *Weltpolitik* as inconsistent with friendship and close cooperation with Great Britain.⁶⁶

A key official in the German Foreign Office, Friedrich von Holstein, suggested that Anglo-German tensions erupted in 1895 when Wilhelm intervened in British colonial affairs. Through the late 1890s, relations between the Dutch-descended Boers and British settlers in South Africa grew tense, culminating in the establishment of two independent Boer Republics. An 1895 British raid on the Transvaal Republic proved to be an embarrassing failure, but the Sensing Germans, who perceived the Boers as racial and cultural brethren, were incensed over British aggression against them. Wilhelm sent the president of the Transvaal Republic, Paul Krüger, a telegram congratulating him on his success in maintaining independence from the British. The telegram was a veiled suggestion that Germany would come to their aid against Britain if need be. In 1898, the Transvaal and Orange Free Republics declared war on Britain. Wilhelm would have likely intervened had he not been prevented by Germany's "impotence at sea."⁶⁷ As a result of this situation, Wilhelm ordered cruisers to be purchased immediately. For the first time, Britain looked at Germany not as a potential partner with shared values and interests but as a potential competitor and a threat to the British Empire. The public reaction in Britain was virulent. Windows of German shops in English cities were smashed and German sailors on the Thames docks were attacked.⁶⁸ And the Sensing British, determined to maintain naval superiority, responded to new German building by stepping up production of new, improved, and bigger ships.

The tension between Germany and Great Britain increased further as a result of a seemingly innocuous incident that spurred Germany actively to pursue additional naval expansion. In June 1897 in commemoration of the Queen's 60th year, Great Britain held a Diamond Jubilee, and invited 22 nations—complete with representations of their navies—to attend. The British proudly paraded 165 warships in five lines stretching over thirty miles in front of the fourteen nations represented; this event marked a grand hour for Britain, a celebration of their accomplishments and prowess.⁶⁹ The *S.M.S. König Wilhelm*, the ship representing the German Navy, was pitiful and embarrassing.⁷⁰ The

⁶⁶ Roehl, J.C.G, *Germany without Bismarck: the Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 163.

⁶⁷ Massie, *Dreadnought*, pp. 221, 169; Roehl, *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

⁶⁸ A description of the respective reactions to the Jameson raid and the Krueger telegram is located in Massie, *Dreadnought*, pp. 222-228. See also Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 184.

⁶⁹ Massie, *Dreadnought*, pp. 174.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xx.

ship puttered along in front of the representatives of the great powers, indicating to all that Germany might be a grand new empire, but it was still no match for Great Britain, France, the United States or even Russia; the German Navy ranked a poor fifth among the five major naval powers. For the EST Germans, the public humiliation of being shown up as an inferior in any measure of power was unbearable. Wilhelm vowed to reverse this embarrassment, and he enlisted the help of the newly appointed Navy Minister, Alfred von Tirpitz, also a great admirer of the Royal Navy and England, to help Germany even the balance.

The British were indeed in control of the seas during the nineteenth century, a fact that increasingly triggered Germany's historical fear of encirclement and strategic vulnerability. Germany feared that the British could easily use their massive fleet to bottle up Germany in the North Sea and threaten Germany's sovereignty. The British had established global hegemony and Wilhelm and many other Germans felt their national survival was potentially at stake. Only a massive German naval build-up could address this inequity and break the Empire from the shackles of British oppression. Supporters of naval expansion issued a White Paper, "The Sea Interest of the German Empire," to the Reichstag. This paper argued that since the formation of the Empire, Germany had done well "in most measurements of national power." However, the record of the German Navy was embarrassing. Between 1883 and 1897, the German Navy had declined from fourth in the world to fifth or sixth. The paper stated that in 1897, Great Britain had "sixty-two armored ships of over five thousand tons, France had thirty-six, Russia had eighteen, and Germany had twelve."⁷¹

Wilhelm, Tirpitz, and many other prominent Germans began pursuing *Flottenpolitik*, or the creation and expansion of an offensive German Navy.⁷² In 1898, Tirpitz, now Admiral, presented to the Reichstag his plan to expand the German Navy; the Naval Bill was passed and the number of German battleships was increased to nineteen. The idea was wildly popular among the German middle class, and also in 1898 a *Flottenverein* (Navy League) was founded to promote further naval expansion. (In 1898 it already had 78,000 members, and by 1906 it had over a million members).⁷³ Tirpitz planned to expand the German Navy so that it was just large enough to cause serious damage to the British Navy and thereby threaten British naval superiority. This "Risk

⁷¹ Massie, *Dreadnought*, pp. 177-178.

⁷² Roehl, *Germany without Bismarck*, "The greatest names at the universities—Brentano, Delbrueck, Schmoller, Weber and hundreds of others—toured the country giving talks on the Navy." P. 253.

⁷³ Massie, *Ibid.*, p. 178. Roehl, *Ibid.*, p. 255.

Fleet Theory” was typical EST strategy: it calculated that Britain would not risk their command of the seas and would go along with whatever Germany proposed, provided it did not directly threaten Britain. Hence, Germany needed to build more ships, yes, but it was not necessary to build a fleet larger than Britain’s.⁷⁴ In true EST style, Germany calculated its needs purely in terms of the balance-of-power, without concern for the message this might send to the previously friendly but now dubious British.

The Feeling British, however, understanding that consensus-building based on shared values were at least as important as military power in maintaining stability, made another attempt to maintain the traditional friendship with their German “cousin.” In 1899 they began an Anglo-German campaign for better understanding with the goal of forming an alliance between themselves, the U.S., and Germany, an alliance they saw as both natural (because of shared cultural roots) and potentially very powerful. The Germans, focused on their own strategic vulnerability in the middle of Europe, took a more hard-boiled view. Russia, at the time England’s rival, would view such an alliance unfavorably; and what could Britain do to help if the Russians marched on Königsberg?⁷⁵ It never occurred to the inflexible Germans that the pragmatic British might respond to the rebuff by overcoming Anglo-Russian differences and forging an alliance with Russia. Later that year, the Foreign Secretary and future chancellor Bernard von Bülow spoke to the Reichstag in favor of a Second Navy Bill, stating, “In the coming century, the German nation will either be the hammer or the anvil.”⁷⁶ Bülow also unwisely took a poke at Britain’s Ultimate Concern when he depicted England as a declining power that was desperately jealous of German achievements and also vaguely hostile (the first of many times the EST Germans would underestimate the staying power of the proud and principled British). British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain read Bülow’s speech and replied that it marked a definitive end to Anglo-German friendship or any sort of future negotiations.

Shortly following Bülow’s speech in January 1900, in the throes of the Boer War, British cruisers seized and searched three German mail steamers off the coast of South Africa. The British thought they were carrying rifles and cannon to the Boers. Two of the ships were released after a quick search, but the *Bundesrat* was taken into Durban and thoroughly examined. This ship was carrying mail and eighteen crates of Swiss cheese.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power*, p. 457.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 444-445.

⁷⁶ Massie, *Dreadnought*, p. 269.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.180, especially pp. 273-274.

The legalistic Germans howled in righteous indignation at this violation of international law. They demanded an apology, compensation, and guarantees that it would never happen again. Tirpitz used this opportunity to argue that only a more powerful fleet could prevent further such humiliation. In 1900, the Reichstag passed the Supplementary Bill, doubling the number of German battleships to thirty-eight. The British response was to order eight 16,300-ton *King Edward VII*s.

In October 1902, Lord Selbourne, First Lord of the Admiralty, focused in a Cabinet paper on the German Navy's threat to England, "The more the composition of the new German fleet is examined, the clearer it becomes that it is designed for a possible conflict with the British fleet."⁷⁸ Selbourne noted that the German fleet was very much a North Sea fleet; for example, the quarters were too cramped for long sea ventures and its ships had a restricted cruising radius. Indeed, during this period Tirpitz began to refer to the German "Navy Against England," and ordered five *Deutschlands* to be built. The British saw the new German naval policy as a threat to their Ultimate Concern. A prominent British Foreign Office analyst described the situation with Germany: "The union of the greatest military with the greatest naval power in one state would compel the world to combine for the riddance of such an incubus."⁷⁹ Winston Churchill likewise suggested, "With every rivet that von Tirpitz drove into his ships of war, he united British opinion.... The hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown."⁸⁰

The tension between Great Britain and Germany drove Britain to seek the formerly unthinkable: Britain began attempting to form a relationship with its historical blood-enemy France. In May 1903, King Edward VII went to France and made a speech announcing an Anglo-French friendship. The German reaction, again underestimating the feeling British flexibility and power of consensus-building, was that there simply could not be an Anglo-French entente due to conflicts of material interests between Britain and France's key ally, Russia, and the ongoing imperial competition. The Germans wanted to embarrass France and thus forestall an Anglo-French-Russian entente. Therefore they demanded that the Open Door policy now be applied to Morocco, where France had colonial intentions. In April 8, 1904, in response to Germany's demands, France and Great Britain concluded the Entente Cordiale, an agreement that involved settling the dispute over Morocco. Germany was not involved in the secret negotiations even though

⁷⁸ Massie, *Dreadnought*, pp. 184-185.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, pp. 192-193.

⁸⁰ Massie, *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

it had been a signatory during the 1881 Madrid Convention regarding the future of Morocco. The exclusion of Germany was a tremendous diplomatic slight.

The tense situation exploded in 1905, with the so-called Moroccan Crisis. As a result of French attempts to assert control over Morocco, the Germans felt Morocco was being "Tunisified."⁸¹ At Bülow's urging, the Kaiser made a flamboyant speech at Tangier upholding Moroccan independence. According to their understanding of the treaty signed in Madrid, the Germans felt it was their right to uphold the economic rights of Germany in the area. Due to a media blitz, British public opinion already by this time regarded Germany in a poor light: to them, Germany appeared to be bullying France, and this behavior brought Britain and France closer together.⁸² The British felt Germany was trying to humiliate France and force England to end the Entente. Britain would not tolerate being bullied. At the Algeiras Conference in January 1906, England supported "her Friend" France and afterwards pursued a precarious policy involving secret military and naval arrangements.⁸³ Algeiras marked a defeat for Germany. After the conference, the paranoia that lurks in the dark side of the EST strategic personality began to assert itself and Germany began to perceive itself as being progressively encircled by a "ring of enemies." Britain, for its part, perceived Germany as trying to establish a hegemonic position in Europe, an action that threatened Britain's Ultimate Concern and would be countered at all costs.⁸⁴

2. Britain's Response

Britain's initial plan had been to counter the short-term threat from France and, to a lesser extent, Russia, by encouraging Germany to build up a navy and colonies during the 1880s. By 1899, Britain realized that this policy had spun out of control: Germany had tremendous global ambition and was now more threatening than Britain's traditional foes. British defense of its Ultimate Concerns depended on its ability to maintain its command of the seas, but with both the German naval build-up and perhaps more significantly the American naval building program, the British saw their naval superiority

⁸¹ Fuller, L.W., "The Effect of the First Moroccan Crisis on Anglo-German Relations," *Colorado College Publication* 182 (Colorado Springs, 1932) p. 8.

⁸² Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power*, p. 466.

⁸³ Fuller, *Ibid.*, see especially p. 6.

⁸⁴ Hildebrand, Klaus, *German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: the Limits of Statecraft*, trans. Louis Willmot, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Hildebrand suggests that Germany posed more of a threat to Britain than France or Russia, because Germany appeared to be attempting to establish hegemonic power in Europe.

slipping.⁸⁵ In order best to address this problem, the British designed a secret new weapon that took years in the making. This new weapon was a battleship that was bigger, heavier, and had more guns than anything the world had seen before. This new ship was so enormous and powerful that it rendered all previous vessels obsolete. The new ship was named the *Dreadnought*, the term Queen Elizabeth I had used to describe the Royal Navy in the sixteenth century: it feared nothing. Likewise, the new class of battleship outclassed any ship from any opponent. The *Dreadnought* displaced over 17,000 tons, had ten 12-inch guns, and was turbine-powered and capable of going 21 knots. Among the many critics of the expensive *Dreadnought* program was David Lloyd George who called the *Dreadnought* “a piece of wanton and profligate ostentation.”⁸⁶ He suggested *Dreadnoughts* need not be built: Britain was only encouraging others to enter into a naval supremacy race. And this new class of battleships gave other powers a chance to begin a race for naval supremacy on equal terms by having made all previous battleships obsolete.

The secrecy surrounding the development and construction of this new warship caused great consternation in Berlin. Wilhelm and Tirpitz knew the British were building something, but they knew almost nothing about it until it appeared in 1906. When the Germans learned of the *Dreadnought*, they assumed it was a weapon aimed directly against them—the United States (whose fleet was at least as important in Britain’s decision to build its new battleships) was too distant from Germany’s Ultimate Concern to enter its EST radar screen. By that time the German Navy had been greatly expanded; however, the *Dreadnought* dwarfed the German ships that were being built even in 1906 and 1907. And the Germans faced another problem: the shallowness of the Kiel Canal limited the size of future German warships. After the expensive and time-consuming undertaking of deepening the canal, the German naval buildup accelerated and the Germans began building their own *Dreadnought*-class battle ships. Germany and Britain, two Sensing states focused on the current balance-of-power to the exclusion of almost everything else, had launched a naval arms race that neither could afford to lose, or win. The expensive and aggressive Anglo-German naval race that ensued played a key role in further souring the Anglo-German relationship and contributing to their eventual slide into hostility and the outbreak of the First World War.

⁸⁵ Even in 1905, the US and Germany tied for third place in terms of naval power. Britain was first [53 built, 8 building, one projected]; France was second with 20 built and 6 building; the US had 12 built, 12 building, and 1 projected; Germany had 16 built, 6 building, and 2 projected. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power*, [footnote on p. 442].

⁸⁶ Massie, *Dreadnought*, p. 487.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Shifting Balance of Ultimate Concerns

The slide of Anglo-German relations from strategic partnership in 1870 to rivals by the turn of the twentieth century is a case study in the failure of general deterrence. Long-term threat reduction is less a matter of presenting credible threats than it is of managing the balance of Ultimate Concerns in a way that prevents the relationship between two states from devolving into one of “defender” and “challenger.” Britain’s actions throughout the period were intended to shape a European balance-of-power and a role for Germany in it that would not threaten, and ideally that would advance, Britain’s Ultimate Concerns, which at the time were invested in the security of its empire. Newly unified Germany had one overwhelming objective in pursuing its Ultimate Concerns: to build and maintain a strong economic and political infrastructure capable of deterring or warding off hostile attacks from continental powers, many of which were less than thrilled by the emergence of a new German Reich. The European policies of Germany and Britain sought long-term threat reduction, and in 1870, there was little reason to predict that these two powers would be embroiled in a bitter rivalry by the first decade of the next century. The British regarded the Germans as “cousins” and under Bismarck their relations were amiable, even if the British wondered what Bismarck was really doing behind all the complicated diplomatic maneuvering. But more important, their mutual effort to maintain stability in Europe served both British and German Ultimate Concerns.

Both Britain and Germany were Sensing states, focused on current interests, and each pursued their early strategic partnership for reasons that were perfectly rational at the time. Britain was happy to have its continental cousin take a position of strength to balance its two powerful neighbors—France and Russia—and by helping Germany to strengthen its relative position, Sensing Britain was dealing with the immediate threat posed by those other two powers. But neither thought through the long-term evolution of the other’s national interests or the resulting effect on the trajectory of the European balance-of-power, their bilateral strategic relationship, and the balance of Ultimate Concerns. Britain certainly did not foresee the consequences of a post-Bismarck Germany and the more aggressive policies pursued by Wilhelm around the turn of the century. As long as the Iron Chancellor was in charge, stability in Europe would be maintained. No one may have felt in control of the diplomatic environment with Bismarck around (Bismarck was seen as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” and one official

stated, “[T]o deal with him meant to be duped by him”),⁸⁷ but it was clear he would not endanger the new Empire he had worked so hard to forge.⁸⁸ Bismarck arguably had more foresight than many of his contemporaries. In 1891 he said to Ballin, “I shall not live to see the world war [...] but you will. And it will start in the East.”⁸⁹

What Bismarck seemed to understand was that the security his careful statesmanship bought for Germany would lead it, eventually, to outgrow its limited role and eventually pursue its Ultimate Concern not only through continental power, but also through global power. Wilhelm became Emperor as Germany was increasingly in a position to demand more than its current status afforded it. Under Wilhelm, friendly relations between Germany and Britain could not be maintained because their Ultimate Concerns came increasingly into conflict. Britain still wanted to maintain the status quo and its command of the seas. Wilhelm’s Germany seemed stable internally, eventually exceeding Britain’s industrial output and wielding tremendous economic power; yet it lacked the respect from the international community Germans felt they deserved, and was gradually becoming an anti-status quo power.⁹⁰ Hence, by bolstering Germany and encouraging it to build-up the navy and seek colonies, Britain helped to create a future threat. Unintended consequences resulted from seemingly innocuous actions: after 1899, Germany became a would-be challenger to Britain’s Ultimate Concerns.

2. The Effectiveness of Threat Reduction

Britain’s long-term threat reduction strategy toward Germany proved ineffective for two principal reasons. First, from the outset, the Sensing British failed to think through how the interests that followed from British and German Ultimate Concerns might naturally change over time, even without increasing Anglo-German tension. Second, at crucial points in the development of the Anglo-German relationship, as Germany’s interests and ambitions changed, the British either failed to take steps to mitigate those changes and keep Ultimate Concerns in rough balance, or took usually unintentionally provocative actions that Germany saw as threatening to its Ultimate Concerns. But the fault was certainly not all Britain’s. Bismarck pursued a brilliant threat reduction strategy, but it too was short-sighted, making few allowances for either shifts in

⁸⁷“In the spring of 1876 it was still generally believed that Bismarck was a wolf in sheep’s clothing, and that to deal with him meant to be duped by him.” Langer, William, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 81.

⁸⁸ Hildebrand, *German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer*, p. 68.

⁸⁹ Massie, *Dreadnought*, p. 855.

⁹⁰ In 1913, Britain produced 13.6 percent of the world’s manufacturing output, where as Germany produced 14.8 percent.

Germany's definition of interests as its economy grew or regime changes that might (and did) leave much less skillful statesmen at the helm. Both powers went into the relationship with a fundamental misunderstanding of the other's Ultimate Concerns. Feeling Britain thought it had built a consensus with Germany based on shared values and historical cultural ties. Thinking Germany thought Britain recognized its legitimate quest for the power necessary to maintain its internal stability and external security.

Neither Britain nor Germany took the first steps toward their eventual naval arms race with the intention of being provocative. EST states control their fate and promote their Ultimate Concerns through the exercise of power and action. Germany undertook to modernize its navy as part of a broader program to acquire military power, and in so doing earn respect (and in its would-be enemies, fear) commensurate with its size and economic potential. The Germans did not take into consideration British sensitivity (in light of the degree to which its Ultimate Concerns were tied to maintaining the status quo) and hence did not anticipate just how provocative their actions would appear from the British perspective. ESF states control their fate through diplomacy, consensus-building, and communication. Britain wanted to maintain the continental status quo that had served its Ultimate Concerns so well in the past. In an era in which the sun never set on the British Empire, one of the most vital interests in service of Britain's Ultimate Concern was its global naval superiority. It ensured both the stability of its empire and the domestic security and stability which depended upon the Empire. The British failed to understand why, for the Thinking Germans, shared values were not a sufficient reason to turn over their long-term security to the good will of the Royal Navy. Had Britain understood the roots of the shift in the German interests and strategies in terms of its Ultimate Concerns, it might have structured its responses differently. Both were pursuing rational policies in pursuit of legitimate national interests and were trying to reduce perceived threats to their Ultimate Concerns, but both did so without fully considering the consequences to the overall balance of Ultimate Concerns.

3. Options for More Effective Threat Reduction

The post-World War I settlement focused on eliminating the threat from German military power. The Versailles Treaty stipulated that Germany was to lose all overseas colonies, the army was reduced to 100,000 men, their air force was to be eliminated, and they were not allowed to have any submarines or any navy beyond a simple and small merchant marine. In addition, the new postwar German government was required to pay huge reparations and also to agree to Article 231, the so-called War Guilt Clause, which stated that Germany was totally responsible for every aspect of the war. The Treaty of

Versailles, which was intended to create stability in Europe, failed miserably. It failed to accommodate Germany's Ultimate Concern, creating, over the long term, greater rather than less instability.

The failure at Versailles contributed greatly to the emergence of Hitler's Nazi Germany and, in 1939, to the outbreak of World War II. Germany's Ultimate Concern had been stomped on at the peace treaty following World War I and this factor, in combination with preconditions such as the late nineteenth century racist ideological movements, the horrific impact of World War I, and the extreme economic dislocation experienced during the Weimar Republic, contributed to the willingness of many Germans not only to support Hitler, but also to support a renewed war effort; they were defending the German Ultimate Concern.

In the post World War II settlements, the Allies integrated a democratic Germany into a stable European order through occupation, the European Community, and NATO. Given the permanent presence of US troops, Germany could become an important part of Europe without utterly disturbing the peace of mind of the rest of Europe. Assisted by the Marshall Plan, Germany's postwar "Economic Miracle" helped create a long-lasting stability in Germany and earned for Germany the position of respect so desperately sought through military means during the first half of the century. Germany's Ultimate Concern was thus accommodated. This early and inadvertent case of threat reduction, of recognizing and trying to work with the Ultimate Concern of an aggressor nation, integrated a powerful Germany into the European system in a way that advanced its Ultimate Concern without posing a threat to the Ultimate Concerns of its neighbors or destabilizing the international system.

V. THE INDO-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR BALANCE

A. INDIA'S STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

1. The *Mahabharata*

Indian tradition holds that the Aryan tribes from which India traces its civilizational ancestry invaded the subcontinent from the north over 30,000 years ago.⁹¹ Aryan chariot armies invaded in successive waves over several centuries, an age of perennial wars for supremacy between new and old clans that Indian myth remembers as the "Age of Misfortune." That Indian myth shows little interest in historical detail—the origins of the race, legends of expansion, or the lineage of dynasties—is a reflection of the Intuitive orientation of its strategic personality. The Aryan invasion is more important as a spiritual event than as an historical one because it brought the *Vedas*—the collection of religious hymns that provide the foundation for the various Hindu sects. The bloody, fratricidal warfare of the Age of Misfortune is recounted in mythic form in India's first national epic, the *Mahabharata*, composed through oral tradition over roughly four centuries (200 BCE – 200 CE). The epic tells the story of the Bharata war between an older clan—the Kauravas, and an upstart clan—the Pandavas, who eventually prevail because their righteousness earned them the favor of the gods.

The *Mahabharata* probably has its roots in a dynastic war between rival Aryan clans that may have occurred around 1400 BCE, but years of retelling have transformed those faint historical events into a cosmic moral confrontation between the forces of good (the Pandavas) and the forces of evil (the Kauravas). Embedded in the *Mahabharata* is the *Bhagavad-Gita*, a poetic dialog between the Pandava warrior Arjuna and lord Krishna on the eve of the climactic battle that ends the Bharata Wars. In it, Krishna (embodiment of the sun god Vishnu) lays out the basic tenets of the Hindu faith—*dharma*, *samsara*, *karma*—and explains the relationship between man and the gods. Hinduism venerates the *Bhagavad-Gita* as an independent spiritual text; but moral and religious teachings appear throughout the *Mahabharata*. In a sense, it plays a similar role for Hindus to the one that the Talmud plays for Jews. Over the centuries, whenever a political, moral, or social message needed to be conveyed to Hindu society, it was inserted into the retelling of the *Mahabharata*, explaining its declaration that "What is here is nowhere else; what is not

⁹¹ Archeologists place the likely date of the Aryan invasions considerably later, sometime around 2000-15000 BCE.

here is nowhere.”⁹² Together with the other great Indian epic, the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata* has also become part of secular national myth in modern India. As one Indian commentator put it, these epics provide “a common idiom, a shared matrix of reference, to all Indians, and it was not surprising that when national television broadcast a fifty-two-episode serialization of the Mahabharata, the script was written by a Muslim poet.”⁹³

2. The Mughal Empire and the British Raj

India’s Introverted and Intuitive orientations follow from its long history of shared civilizational (but unlike the Sensing Germans, not “racial” or linguistic) identity that seldom translated into real, political unity. The fratricidal wars of the Age of Misfortune eventually gave way to a long period of political competition between local and regional rulers. Only two indigenous dynasties, the Mauryan (322-185 BCE) and the Guptan (c. 375-977 CE), managed to unify any substantial proportion of the northern subcontinent. Both had political and cultural influence in the region far beyond the limits of their direct rule, however, and both are considered Golden Ages of Hindu culture. Waves of Muslim invasions beginning in 977 and culminating with the establishment of the Delhi Sultanates marked the end of the Guptan era and ushered in an age of Muslim domination that culminated with the Mughal Empire. The Muslim Mughal Empire initially ruled tolerantly and encouraged the peaceful coexistence of Hindus and Muslims. Indians consider the Muslim Emperor Akbar (r. 1556-1605) one of their greatest historical figures because of his enlightened leadership. Still, Hindus chafed under the heavy tax burden placed upon them to pay for the Mughal’s elaborate bureaucracy, extravagant buildings and infrastructure, and military adventurism; and when the later and less tolerant Mughal emperors tried to crack down on non-Muslim communities, resentment grew and unrest spread.

The British East India company set up business in India in the early 17th century with no idea of direct rule. But as Mughal power and internal control disintegrated, the ESF British intervened to restore internal stability and protect their investments. The slide toward empire ended with the Sepoy Rebellion and Indian War of 1857-1858. What the British call the “Indian Mutiny” and the Indians call the “Great War of Independence”

⁹² The *Mahabharata* is the world’s longest surviving epic. The original Sanskrit version is five times longer than the Christian Bible. Most English versions are abridged and “retold” rather than strictly translated. The summary and commentary here is derived from William Buck, *Mahabharata* (New York: Meridian Books, 1987 [1973]).

⁹³ Shashi Tharoor, *India: Midnight to the Millennium* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1997), p. 127.

was a confrontation between modernism and tradition, British extroversion, and Indian introversion—a true “clash of civilizations”—that left deep scars for generations. It also marked the end of the Mughal empire and the East India Company’s governance of British affairs in India. The British Raj officially commenced in August 1858.

The Great War of Independence taught the Indians some important lessons that shaped India’s Intuitive and Thinking orientations. Indian nationalists learned that political unity was a prerequisite to freedom. And a unifying “national consciousness” was a prerequisite to political unity. The Indian National Congress (known post-independence as the Congress Party), founded in 1885, brought together Indian elites of all religions and regions to seek ways to overcome traditional religious, class, caste, regional, ethnic, and linguistic differences that divided Indians and built a sense of national unity and shared identity. It was a challenge that historians Anthony Read and David Fisher characterized as tantamount to creating “a sense of Indian nationality among people with as little in common as Icelanders and Turks.”⁹⁴ Any lingering Indian faith in benevolent British rule died on April 13, 1919 when British troops under the command of Brigadier General Reginald Dyer killed 379 Indians and injured over 1,200 who had gathered to celebrate spring festival of *Baisakhi* in the walled Jallianwallah Bagh (Garden of Jalli) in Amritsar in the Punjab. There had been prior civil unrest, but the crowd that day was calm. Still, the British House of Lords declared Dyer the “Savior of Punjab” and the military found him guilty only of a “transitory error of judgment.”⁹⁵ The Indian National Congress transformed overnight into a radicalized, revolutionary nationalist movement. The Raj would last another thirty years, but the moral capital it lost at Amritsar marked the first step toward the hard-won independence India gained on August 15, 1947.

3. Gandhi and Nehru

The rational and systematic campaign for Indian Independence was a precursor to India’s Intuitive, Thinking strategic personality. That India was able to capitalize on British missteps was largely the product of a calculated political strategy devised and manipulated through an unlikely political partnership between Mohandas K. Gandhi—a devout Hindu ascetic hostile to modernism and Westernism, and Jawaharlal Nehru—a secular, Cambridge-educated engineer who embraced both modernism and Western, socialist economic theory. Gandhi and Nehru had different visions of India: Gandhi

⁹⁴ Anthony Read and David Fisher, *The Proudest Day: India’s Long Road to Independence* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 74.

⁹⁵ Stanley Wolpert, *India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 63.

wanted to return to a mythical, pre-industrial Golden Age, while Nehru envisioned a modern, secular, democratic, and industrialized India. Yet the two forged a devilishly effective political alliance between “intuitive” religiosity and “thinking” nationalism. As national heroes, their differences embody the two sides of the Indian strategic personality. Gandhi’s *Swadeshi* (“of our country”) movement—which included a boycott of British goods, marches to the sea to gather “illegal” salt in defiance of the British monopoly, and a campaign to encourage Indians to reject Western dress in favor of Indian homespun—were Introverted, Intuitive gestures even illiterate Indian villagers could understand. In the long run, Nehru’s legacy proved more relevant to modern India than Gandhi’s idealistic traditionalism. Nehru understood the internal contradictions of modern Indian identity. He embraced rationalism and modernism as necessary for India’s success as an independent nation. He also believed that India could reap the benefits of Western civilization without embracing the economic and cultural imperialism that threatened its cultural and religious identity. Nehru remains an important figure in Indian national myth, the embodiment of the complexity of modern India. For the new Indian Republic, “Nehru *was* India. . . the keeper of the national flame.”⁹⁶

4. *Dharma*

The religious philosophy that constitutes the core of Indian civilization is much less doctrinaire than those that are the basis of other INT states like Israel and Pakistan. Followers of the *mélange* of doctrines and rituals that make up the religious civilization of India did not call themselves Hindus until foreigners coined the term. Hinduism has no universal orthodoxy. The rituals through which they worship their gods, the names of the gods, the language they pray in, or whether they worship any gods at all varies widely. There is no organized Hindu church, no clergy, no compulsory beliefs, and no single sacred text. Because there is no orthodoxy, there is no heresy and no tradition of religious persecution. Hinduism has shown tremendous capacity to absorb other faiths and traditions, including pre-Aryan cults, Buddhism, Jainism, and elements of Christianity and Islam. Novelist (and former Mexican ambassador to India) Octavio Paz once described Hinduism as “an enormous metaphysical boa” with immense powers of assimilation that “slowly and relentlessly digests foreign cultures, gods, languages, and beliefs.”⁹⁷ In *Discovery of India* (1960), Nehru preferred to describe the unifying power of Hindu philosophy in terms of synthesis:

⁹⁶ Tharoor, *Midnight to the Millennium*, p. 27.

⁹⁷ Octavio Paz, *In Light of India* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), p. 55.

Foreign influences poured in and often influenced [India's] culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization.⁹⁸

All that being said, Hinduism does share broad elements of a common faith that have materially shaped Indian society, identity, and its Intuitive, Thinking orientation. One of the most important of these is *dharma*.

Dharma is the unwritten system of natural and metaphysical law that structures the universe. Both the "truth" that ascetics seek and the "good deeds" upon which one's karmic balance is calculated flow from *dharma*. Every individual, mortal and divine, has its designated *dharma* that serves as the guide for principled behavior. An individual's *dharma* varies according to his circumstances, but salvation and enlightenment come through living in strict conformance to one's *dharma*, whatever it might be. The relativism inherent in the concept of *dharma* is perfectly consistent with the abstract rationality of India's INT strategic personality: the universe is simply too complex for a single, specifically formulated set of rules to apply in all circumstances and among all classes. Its importance is reflected in the central position of the wheel of *dharma* on the flag of the Republic of India.

5. India's Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking Strategic Personality

The continual struggle to put its secular, pluralist national vision into practice and defend it from external pressures—beginning with those from its neighbor and estranged sibling Pakistan—has shaped the historical plot of independent India. In particular, the legacy of colonialism has left India vigilant in its defense against anything that threatens its economic, political, or cultural independence. Still, India does not see itself waging a cosmic battle of good against evil; rather, it sees itself standing up for justice for all those states that have (in its view) been treated unfairly by the major, Western powers. India's role as the leader of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War and its recent drive to become a recognized world power may seem to argue against its Introverted orientation; but its methods and motivations put it solidly in the ranks of the Introverted states. India has operated from the firm conviction that the best road to global respect is

⁹⁸ Some analysts have charged that Nehru's vision of an historical tradition of Indian civilizational unity followed from his fundamental ignorance of India's actual history. [See George K. Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay," in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Matoo, *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), fn.14.] From the perspective of national myth, however, it does not matter whether Nehru's vision was historically accurate or not; the fact that it was embraced and became part of the national myth of the Indian Republic makes it true for Indians.

taking the moral high ground and building internal strength—both economic and, more recently, military. As a world power, India would be in control of its own fate and better able to hold off the external (usually Western) demands and pressures to compromise its principles and rights. India's quest for world power follows from its INT vigilance. Like their fellow INTs, the Indians are not averse to participating in the international system, but they can be expected to continue to defend their vision and principles whatever the cost, even when to do so puts them at odds with the international mainstream.

India's emphasis on morality in its foreign policy differs from the value-orientation of the Feeling states. India's moral principles most often take the form of deeply held doctrines that Indian governments have followed through the years, even when they had a negative impact on important Indian interests. Indian civilization has long been characterized in part by the dual traditions that helped shape its Intuitive, Thinking orientation. India is well-recognized in the West for the spirituality and mysticism ingrained by both Hindu philosophy and the Sufism that so strongly influenced Indian Islam. But logic and mathematics have equally long pedigrees and deep influences on India's strategic personality.⁹⁹

India differs somewhat from the other INT states in this study (Israel and Pakistan) in that it has adopted a strictly secular national vision that, while clearly shaped by Hindu philosophies, is firmly rooted in the rule of law and has so far staunchly resisted redefinition as a "Hindu state."¹⁰⁰ India's secular nationalism is more like a vision of India as a mosaic whose basic outlines were established early and gradually filled in with individual pieces, each of which retained its unique color, texture, and character while contributing to the beauty and balance of the whole. India has been the homeland of a great civilization for over two thousand years, but a unified nation for only fifty. By Western standards, India seems inauspiciously pluralistic. But Indian nationalists like Nehru believe India has always been unified; not by a single doctrine, faith, or administration but by civilization and *Brahma*, the eternal truth that binds the universe. Historically, Indian unity is rooted in thousands of years, during which the histories of each of the many groups that make up India touched all the others' regularly

⁹⁹ Indian mathematicians developed the decimal system (for which the Arabs inaccurately get the credit in the Western world) and the concept of zero (which still escaped their contemporaries in Rome) around 400 CE; and Indian scientists explained the concept of gravity a millennium before Sir Isaac Newton.

¹⁰⁰ Even the Hindu nationalist BJP has backed away from its sectarian political agenda to force an effective political coalition capable of challenging the previously dominant Congress Party and forging an effective ruling alliance. It has done so even at the expense of alienating the harder line Hindu nationalist movements.

and intimately, but have interacted with the world beyond the limits of the subcontinent only marginally and intermittently. Until modern times, Indians rarely traveled beyond the subcontinent and had no historical tradition of exploration or even trade expeditions—they did not need them, for the world came to India.¹⁰¹ This sense of unity explains why the partition in 1947 remains a searing trauma in Indian national myth—part of the mosaic was chiseled out. The Indian Constitution is an embodiment of India's INT strategic personality; it is less a reflection of reality as it existed in 1947 (or as it exists today) than a blueprint for a national project to build a unified and successful nation out of a conglomeration of peoples.

India's determination to maintain its territorial integrity follows from its determination to defend its secular national vision. In this sense, its concern with territory is fundamentally different from that of the Sensing states. For India, holding on to all the territory that is currently part of India, including those regions that are predominantly Muslim, is vital to the viability of its vision. To accept the right of ethnic and religious minorities to secede from India—either to join Pakistan or to establish autonomous entities—would run directly counter to the fundamental precept of India's vision. The secular nationalist vision does not see India as a Hindu state, but as a state in which the rights and legitimate aspirations of all Indians of any faith can be fully realized. India has come to terms with the reality of partition in 1947 and it has no ambitions to reclaim territory lost to Pakistan then, but it will continue to resist any efforts to alter its borders and, hence, undermine the coherence of its vision now.

B. Pakistan's Strategic Personality

1. The Mughal Empire

If anthropologists are correct that the first civilization arose in the Indus Valley around 2500 BCE, then India and Pakistan share the first 4,447 years of their historical plots; so it is not entirely unexpected that they share the same strategic personality type. Pakistanis, however, trace the beginning of their independent historical experience back to the Muslim invasions that first brought Islam to the subcontinent. The zenith of Muslim power in India came with the Mughal Empire (1556-1858) that, during its three-hundred year tenure, imposed a degree of political unification and administrative integration on the subcontinent that it had never known before. The warlords and adventurers who brought Islam to India were more interested in power than in

¹⁰¹ Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought," p. 34.

colonization or conversion, and their ties to the Muslim Caliphates to their west were weak, giving Indian Muslims, like the Hindus, a self-contained, Introverted orientation.

In most respects, Islam and Hinduism could not be more different or less reconcilable, and they have given rise to two Intuitive nations with radically different, and (in Pakistan's view) mutually exclusive, visions. Islam is the world's strictest form of monotheism; Hinduism is a rich and varied conglomeration of doctrines and sects that embraces a plurality of gods. The most lasting legacies of the Mughal Emperors are the lavish burial tombs they built for themselves and their wives (including the Taj Mahal, a tourist icon of India); Hindus place no religious value on the temporal body and cremate their dead. Islamic law is, in general, more egalitarian than Hindu social practice, defining men's worthiness by their beliefs rather than their caste. Hinduism fostered an extremely hierarchical but decentralized social structure; Islam transcended all social ties—tribe, caste, class—and made all men brothers in faith and members of a single *'umma* (community of believers) who stood as equals before Allah. The greatest proportion of conversions to Islam came from the ranks of the lowest Hindu castes and out-castes who saw a chance to break out of the social and economic dregs *before* reincarnation, but no more than one-quarter of the indigenous population ever became Muslim.

Despite the deep cultural and doctrinal differences between the faiths, Hindu pluralism left its mark on Indian Islam. Under the Mughals, Indian Islam became as heterogeneous as the rest of Indian society, differentiating it from the purer, more doctrinaire regimes of the Middle Eastern Caliphs and contributing to Pakistan's Intuitive orientation. The majority of Indian Muslims were Sunni, but the Shi'a sect constituted a sizeable minority and the itinerate Sufi mystics (also nominally Sunni, but far from orthodox) were the principal vehicle for spreading Islam in India. Sufi spirituality and aestheticism, the poetry and hymns in its religious rituals, its veneration of saints, and the Sufi emphasis on the inner life of the spirit resonated with Indian non-Muslims. Sufi tolerance of local religious traditions and even local gods also facilitated conversions. The Islam of the Mughal power structure was disciplined, rational, and drew clear distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims; but the Islam of the masses was a highly emotional faith, little concerned with orthodoxy, that blurred religious distinctions, blended Hindu and Muslim concepts, and resulted in countless local versions of Islamic practice and piety.

2. Jinnah and the Two Nation Theory

The collapse of the Mughal Empire threw the Indian Muslim community into an identity crisis. The Muslim elite was no longer an elite, but just another minority vastly outnumbered in an overwhelmingly Hindu society revived and energized by the prospect of regaining control of its homeland after centuries of foreign (and for most of the time, Muslim) domination. Muslims feared that the Hindu majority constituted a mortal threat to their very survival as an *'umma*. Many Muslims believed (and still do) that Hinduism viewed them as defiled Hindus and would seek to reconvert them.¹⁰² One response to Muslim insecurity was an Islamic reformist movement that sought to purge the vestiges of Hindu spiritual and social practice and make the Indian Muslim community more doctrinaire and less digestible to the "Hindu boia." Another was to create a cohesive India-wide Muslim identity distinct from Hindu culture. As the prospect of independence under the Indian National Congress loomed ever more likely, the Muslim nationalist movement gained appeal. The idea of Pakistan was born when two Muslim leaders—a religious scholar, Muhammed Iqbal, and a Western-educated lawyer, Muhammed Ali Jinnah—codified Muslim aspirations in the "Two-Nation Theory." As in India, the spiritual allied with the rational to create a distinctly INT theory of Pakistan.

Jinnah unveiled the "Two Nation Theory" before the Muslim League¹⁰³ in 1940. In it, he argued that Islam and Hinduism "are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but . . . different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality." The Muslims and Hindus, Jinnah continued,

belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They never intermarry nor interline . . . they belong to two different civilizations which are based on mainly conflicting ideas and conceptions. . . . [They] derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is the foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap.

Muslims are, Jinnah concluded, "a nation according to any definition" and thus "must have their homeland, their territory, their state."¹⁰⁴ Jinnah instilled in Pakistani national

¹⁰² Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 48-49.

¹⁰³ The All-India Muslim League (1906) was an elite organization of Muslim intellectuals and politicians who feared that the ecumenicalism of the Indian National Congress was being replaced by a more sectarian attitude. The Muslim League's agenda was conservative: to maintain good relations with the Raj was the Muslim community's best hope for balancing the Hindu majority within India and protecting Muslim interests.

¹⁰⁴ Anwar Hussain Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 50-51.

myth the idea that the Muslim nation in India was born the moment the first Hindu converted to Islam. At that moment, the Muslim became not only a religious outcast, but also an outcast socially, culturally, and economically. For this reason, Hindus and Muslims had never merged their senses of identity and they never could; they had different visions and different rules.¹⁰⁵

3. Islamic Nationalism

Pakistan's real struggle for nationhood began at midnight August 14, 1947 when the partition of British India creating the two independent states of India and Pakistan went into effect. The Mughal historical legacy and the historical evolution of the subcontinent left Pakistan with a Muslim community with ethnic, linguistic, regional, and even religious diversity nearly as great as India's. The new Pakistani elites had little experience of self-government, no model of democratic leadership within their movement, and no pattern for creating meaningful links between the state and the people. A tiny intellectual elite long on visionary enthusiasm but short on pragmatic planning had led the Muslim League. Unlike the much more democratic Indian Congress Party, these elites made no real effort to rally popular support and had no grassroots political organization in place as the foundation for building national unity and a viable democratic system.¹⁰⁶

Pakistan's biggest challenge was the lack of consensus as to what kind of nation Pakistan should be. In fact, not all Indian Muslims agreed that the creation of a separate Muslim state was a good idea at all. Regional Muslim leaders had joined the Pakistani cause late and generally with an eye to preserving their local prerogatives, which they feared were under threat from the increasingly effective (and in the Muslim view, sectarian) Congress political organization. Jinnah had kept the idea of Pakistan deliberately vague, a decision that served the Pakistan nationalist movement well and the future state of Pakistan very ill. Before independence, Pakistan was all things to all Muslims; after partition it was a chimera.¹⁰⁷ Before independence, Pakistani nationalism

¹⁰⁵ S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 4.

¹⁰⁶ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 17, 65.

¹⁰⁷ In Urdu, the name the Indian Muslims chose for their new state—"Pakistan"—literally means "the land of the ritually pure." But it also constituted a sort of regional acronym: "P" for Punjab, "A" for Afghani (the Northwest Frontier Province), "K" for Kashmir, "S" for Sind, and "stan" for Baluchistan. Significantly, this definition of Pakistan included Kashmir, which did not end up part of Pakistan, and excluded Bengal, which eventually seceded from Pakistan to become Bangladesh.

defined itself almost wholly in negative terms: Pakistan was *not* Hindu and *not* India. After partition, when the threat of coercive absorption into the Hindu culture disappeared, so it seemed did Pakistan's sole basis for a unifying vision.

Jinnah realized that Islam was the only legitimate source of national unity, and in the months following the partition he defined a vision of an Islamic Pakistan. Pakistan should be built on Islamic principles of a just society, free from corruption and inequality; but it should have an Islamic legal code. Pakistan should be a secular society bound by its Islamic identity, but not a theocracy run by mullahs. It should aim to be a great nation, not just a great Islamic nation. But it should also embrace its Hindu and Parsi minorities as full members of the Pakistani nation and work together with India as partners in self-defense and economic development.¹⁰⁸ In Pakistani national myth, Jinnah became a Muslim Moses who led his people out of slavery toward freedom in a religious homeland. Unfortunately, like Moses, Jinnah only lived long enough to deliver his people within sight of the promised land: the one figure with the mythic stature to forge a national identity where there had never been one before died in 1948. Pakistan now had no charismatic leader capable of pulling the nation together, no national political party organization, and a threadbare state with no economic infrastructure and a minimal administrative one. The country was reeling from brutal post-partition sectarian violence and the influx of millions of refugees from India, and facing an external threat (a hostile India that the Pakistanis feared sought to re-absorb its territories). Under all this pressure, a power vacuum opened at the very center of the Pakistani state.

4. Pakistan's Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking Strategic Personality

It may actually be more accurate to say that Pakistan *needs* to be an Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking state than to say it is actually *is* one. Pakistan only works, and only makes internal sense, if it is grounded in a vision that is, in turn, grounded in Islam. Among all the Muslim and Islamic states in the world, Pakistan is the only one whose founding principle and sole source of national identity comes from Islam. But Pakistan's most important struggle since 1947 has been to find a version of Jinnah's Islamic nationalist vision that resonates with enough of the elite as well as the general population to enable it to take root and grow. Unfortunately, Pakistan's political, military, and religious elites have too often taken the easy route to national cohesion by focusing on the mortal threat from India, rather than on the hard internal work of forging a viable

¹⁰⁸ Ahmed, *Jinnah*, p. 177.

Pakistani vision. Pakistan has turned all of its INT vigilance on India, too often at the expense of everything else.

The inability of the early architects of Pakistan and its constitution to find a viable national model has given rise to a constitutional tug-of-war. The political and bureaucratic elite seek a secular state whose laws are rooted in but not directly based on Islamic law; conservative clerics, Islamic scholars, and (at times) “the street” advocate if not a theocracy, then a civil government with *Shari’a* (Islamic law) as its constitution. So far, the forces of secularism hold a considerable edge in the electoral process (when Pakistan is functioning more or less democratically); in national elections, Islamist parties have never been able to win more than 15 percent of the vote.¹⁰⁹ Ultimately, however, either solution presents problems for Pakistan’s vision. If Pakistan is a purely secular state, the question arises why it needed to exist at all. But if Pakistan’s vision relies on its being the protector of South Asian Muslims, then why could it not hold on to Bangladesh? The secular-Islamic debate has resulted in constitutional as well as social and political instability: Pakistan adopted secular constitutions in 1958, 1973, and after the fall of military dictator Zia al-Huq, but in 1956, 1963, and under Zia’s regime beginning in 1977, Pakistan defined itself as an Islamic state. In the absence of a robust secular-Muslim or Islamic nationalist vision, Pakistan has fallen back on its pre-independence source of national identity: Pakistan as *not* India.

Pakistan shares the INT focus on the quest for justice as one of its Ultimate Concerns, but almost exclusively in the context of its bilateral relationship with India. The Pakistanis believe the British and, even more, the Indians treated them unjustly at partition. Not only did Pakistan not receive its fair share of economic, bureaucratic, and military resources in 1947, but also India illegally tricked it out of territory that rightfully belonged in Pakistan. India’s goal, as the Pakistanis view it, was to keep Pakistan weak and dependent upon India for its economic success and security, hence advancing India’s hegemonic agenda in South Asia. Like the other INT states, Pakistan has engaged with the outside world largely in an effort to promote its own agenda against India. During the Cold War, the Pakistanis forged an alliance with the West largely to secure military aid and narrow the conventional imbalance of military power with India. The Pakistanis feel deep resentment that their former Western allies seem to have cast them aside—being treated as just another troubled third world country is a humiliation that has fostered much of the rise of anti-American, radical Islamist sentiment in Thinking Pakistan. China

¹⁰⁹ “A Capacity to Scare,” *The Economist*, May 22, 1999.

has proved a somewhat more reliable ally and is largely responsible for Pakistan's successful acquisition of nuclear weapons (something that serves IST China's interests admirably in terms of its own strategic rivalry with India); but even that alliance has faltered in recent years.¹¹⁰ Pakistan has attempted to compensate for these setbacks by assuming the mantle of guardian of the Islamic world—a claim bolstered somewhat by Pakistan's role in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, and its acquisition of what Islamist Pakistanis (although not the Pakistani Army) like to call “the Islamic bomb” in May 1998.

Pakistan shares with India the challenge of forging a nation out of a heterogeneous population, although it does not have to accommodate as many diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. Regionalism is also a serious problem for the establishment of a national identity; in particular, the other regions resent the political and economic dominance of the Punjab and its elites. Ethnic differences contributed directly to the 1971 civil war that resulted in the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. From the birth of independent Pakistan, Jinnah's “Two Nations Theory” has been under attack from the plethora of other cultural, religious, linguistic, and regional ties that divide South Asian Muslims. But the nation's very existence depends upon Pakistan's intuitive orientation—in Sensing terms (ethnicity, language, regional identification, even blood ties), Pakistan would be six nations instead of one.¹¹¹ Moreover, the lines between Islam and traditional Indian culture are not so stark as the Islamic nationalists implied before partition. In short, Jinnah's “Two Nations Theory” was flawed from the outset because it did not reflect the complexity of reality: that Pakistan is a sort of one-nation “clash of civilizations.”

Pakistan also shares with India (and most other NT states) a heavy, and at times exclusive, reliance on the state for the implementation and defense of its vision and internal cohesion. But where India's principle of non-violence and moral suasion resulted in a strong (if inefficient and corrupt) bureaucracy and a weak military; in Pakistan, paranoia concerning India and a long martial tradition before and during the British Raj have left Pakistan with a weak (but also large, inefficient, and corrupt) bureaucracy and a

¹¹⁰ China has been moving to improve its strategic relationship with India in order to turn more of its attention and resources toward more pressing concerns, especially Taiwan. China remained strictly neutral during the 1999 Kashmir crisis, refusing to back Pakistan's effort in the UN to force India to accept a cease-fire agreement that would leave Pakistani forces on Indian soil and link their withdrawal to India's acceptance of bilateral talks with Pakistan on the permanent status of Kashmir. “A Chance for Peace in Kashmir,” *The Economist*, July 3, 1999.

¹¹¹ “A Capacity to Scare,” *The Economist*.

very strong military over which civilians have little control. Also, while the power of India's bureaucracy is balanced, at least theoretically, by its strong secular national vision and constitution, Pakistan is totally dependent on the military and bureaucracy as the only institutions capable of holding the nation together in the absence of a robust unifying national vision. As a result, national interests as the military has defined them drive Pakistan's foreign (and to some extent even domestic) policy. So, for example, no civilian government has been able to get far in defusing tensions with India in hopes of diverting resources, now tied up in defense, toward bailing out Pakistan's moribund economy and modernizing its civil infrastructure. Civilian leadership is extremely careful not to cross military leaders, and when it does the consequences can be dire—as the 1999 military coup that overthrew the regime of Nawaz Sharif demonstrated. The military has, for the most part, remained strongly secular. Unfortunately for Pakistan, it has lacked the national legitimacy and trust that has enabled the military of ENT Turkey to play an important role in promoting and defending that nation's secular nationalist vision.

Another trait that Pakistan shares with India is the preoccupation with territorial issues; but as in India, this interest flows from two distinctly INT Ultimate Concerns: justice, and defense of its national vision. In addition to the fact that Pakistan believes it lost the state of Jammu and Kashmir through illegal Indian subterfuge, it is outraged at India's continuing refusal to honor a commitment it made to the UN to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir on self-determination or to recognize Pakistan's legitimate interests and its right to participate as an equal partner in any negotiations regarding the future status of the disputed territory. The most fundamental issue for Pakistan, however, is the fact that to concede Kashmir to India would amount (in NT Pakistan's logically consistent estimation) to a concession that Muslims in fact can live a safe and fulfilling existence within India. This concession would, in addition to the loss of Bangladesh, provide valuable ammunition to those (in India) who argue that Jinnah's "Two-Nation Theory" was a fallacy, and that Pakistan's entire claim to existence is illegitimate.

C. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT STATUS QUO

1. The Kashmir Dispute

When the British left the subcontinent in 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, angling for independence as a neutral buffer state—the Switzerland of the subcontinent—had not yet opted to join either India or Pakistan. Pakistan claimed Kashmir because it was geographically contiguous, strategically vital (claims that were equally valid for India), and had a sizeable Muslim majority. The Muslim nationalists

assumed Kashmir would eventually join the Muslim state. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir (a Hindu) frustrated those assumptions after Pakistan employed an economic blockade and incursions by Northwest Frontier tribal raiders to press for a decision in Pakistan's favor. The Maharaja's request for Indian military assistance was granted in exchange for an agreement to join the Indian Republic. The first Indo-Pakistani war in Kashmir was under way, and lasted until a UN brokered cease-fire—which went into effect on January 1, 1949—established the de facto line of partition between Azad (“Free”) Kashmir, which became part of Pakistan (roughly a quarter of the former princely state) and the rest of Kashmir, which became the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Numerous efforts to resolve the issue, both bilaterally and through the good offices of the United Nations and other international players, met with no success. Since Kashmir's accession in 1949, India had moved cautiously on integrating the state into the Republic. Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed special rights and privileges not afforded to other, less autonomous Indian states. When war broke out again in August 1965, it ended in a stalemate, largely owing to a US/UK arms embargo and pressure from the UN Security Council. The war was a military disappointment for Pakistan's Army, whose armored forces had performed poorly against the Indians. An additional blow came when the civilian government bargained away all the territorial gains it had made in the Tashkent Declaration (January, 1966). While both sides had agreed to return to the *status quo ante bellum*, the Pakistani Army's resentment contributed to a military coup in 1969.¹¹²

War broke out again in 1971, but not over Kashmir. Pakistan blames Indian interference and hegemonic ambitions for the 1971 Pakistan Civil War that led to partition and the creation of the independent nation of Bangladesh; which, in turn, undermined Pakistan's claim on Kashmir by bolstering the Indian view that religion is not an appropriate foundation upon which to build a national vision. India claims that it intervened in the 1971 war on the side of the Bangladeshis because the wave of Hindu refugees fleeing the brutal repression in East Pakistan (and the US failure to curb the human rights abuses of its Pakistani allies) threatened to destabilize the delicate ethnic and religious balances in India's northeastern states. India also feared that Bengali rebels would enlist supporters from among the refugees. India's interests were both legitimate and principled—India believed it had the right to intervene militarily to prevent Pakistan from exporting its internal instability to its neighbors. The civil war was, in fact, largely a product of Pakistan's treatment of the East Pakistanis, who increasingly resented the

¹¹² Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflict Since 1947* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 74-78.

degree to which they were patronized by the central government, and their interests subordinated and held hostage to Islamabad's obsession with Kashmir—an issue with no resonance in East Pakistan. As the economic disparities between East and West Pakistan became more and more stark, the East Pakistanis demanded regional autonomy. Fearing that any concession on autonomy would be seen in India as evidence of the spuriousness of the “Two Nation Theory,” Islamabad refused even to consider the Bengali demands and responded with more and more brutal repression. Internal unity was only marginally more stable in West Pakistan, but instead of facing some of the critical problems that underlay the unrest, Intuitive Islamabad responded to legitimate Bengali demands for political and economic equity with declarations of Islamic law, ignored the social and economic realities in the East, and dismissed legitimate unrest as political opportunism. The result was a civil war that ended with just what the Intuitive, Thinking Pakistani government had most feared—secession of Bangladesh and the further erosion of the legitimacy of Pakistan's Islamic national vision.

2. India and Pakistan Go Nuclear

By the mid-1990s, Pakistan had entered a period of severe (and some feared, terminal) political and economic decline. It also could no longer rely on either the US or China as permanent sources of the military aid that might keep it from falling hopelessly behind India. Pakistan's civilian leadership realized that its best hope of salvaging the economy was to pursue normalization of its relations with India. Statements by Indian Foreign Minister Inder Gujral in 1997 indicated that normalization might be a realistic hope. In a series of speeches he had outlined what came to be called the “Gujral Doctrine:” the first step toward winning global influence was to win the confidence of India's neighbors by pursuing unselfish resolutions of contentious issues and establishing a norm of noninterference in others' internal and foreign affairs.¹¹³ But just when normalization seemed within reach, the managers of Pakistan's long-undeclared nuclear weapons program made a fateful decision. In April 1998, much to the unease of the Sharif government, Pakistan's military engineers conducted a test of its Ghauri missile (which had a range sufficient to reach most of India's major cities). Sharif's reluctance to block the tests, however, followed from equally ill-considered actions on the part of the Hindu nationalist BJP in India and its Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Vajpayee became Prime Minister of India in March 1998 after he and his party ran on a platform of economic reform and military strength. Buried in the BJP agenda was a careless pledge

¹¹³ George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 390.

that India would retake the portion of Kashmir currently under Pakistan's control. Given its conventional weakness relative to India, Sharif felt the only hope for Pakistan to maintain some level of equality with India was to flex its ballistic missiles.

In India, the BJP victory ended the fifty-year monopoly of the Congress Party and brought to power the first government that did not have to honor the legacy of Nehru's moral aversion to nuclear weapons. In the BJP view, India's proper role in the world was as an equal partner with the major powers, not as a moral role model. Since its inception in the early 1970s, India's nuclear weapons development program had been entirely under the control of civilian politicians, scientists, and engineers. The military, consistent with the general pattern of Indian civil-military relations, had been excluded from all key decisions concerning both the weapons under development and their delivery systems. The civilian engineers, who in large part drove the decision to "exercise the nuclear option," demonstrated clearly INT motivations: to prove that India is a serious technological player capable of developing advanced military capabilities without any outside help (with the subtext that Pakistan, in contrast, had to buy its nuclear capability). The decision also advanced the BJP's domestic agenda: by proving that India was a client of no one and worthy of major power status, the nuclear tests would provide ideological cover for economic liberalization and a shift away from non-alignment.

Other elements of India's INT strategic personality contributed to the decision to go against international nonproliferation pressure and conduct nuclear tests in May 1998. The INT thirst for justice had motivated India to resist pressure to sign the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Not only did India object to the fact that the US and the other Western authors of the CTBT singled it out as a target, but it also took a more principled stand arguing that the Western nonproliferation agenda was hypocritical in not requiring the existing nuclear powers to disarm (and allowing them to modernize their arsenals by other means), and amounted to a system of "nuclear apartheid." As trusted Vajpayee advisor Jaswant Singh told National Public Radio following the tests:

We cannot have a situation in which some countries say "We have a permanent right to these symbols of deterrence and power, all of the rest of you . . . do not have that right. We will decide what your security is and how you are to deal with that security." A country the size of India—not simply a sixth of the human race, but also an ancient civilization—cannot in this fashion abdicate its responsibility.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, p. 441.

India also saw the tests as a matter of equity. The major powers could not deny a nuclear India the parity of esteem that it deserved. Pakistan's motivations were more locally focused: once India went ahead with its test, it opened the door for Pakistan to respond with nuclear tests of its own—six to India's five. Now, at least symbolically, Pakistan had achieved equity with its Indian rival.

3. The 1999 Kashmir Crisis

A 1975 accord between India and the state government made Kashmir a "constituent state" of India and gave the Indian president broader veto power over state decisions. Increasing resentment over the loss of their internal prerogatives was exacerbated by India's heavy hand in maintaining order in Kashmir. In 1986, the Indian government brought the tension to a head when the ruling Congress (I) Party resorted to blatant election fraud to block the victory of a pro-autonomy Muslim party in state elections. Indo-Pakistani relations had improved through the 1970s, and Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance against the Russians distracted the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq through the 1980s. But as resentment of India spread in Kashmir, Pakistan saw an irresistible opportunity to prod Indian security at relatively low cost to itself. Pakistan's second military humiliation at the hands of Indian forces in 1971 had led it to give up hope of taking Kashmir by direct means and to shift its strategy to covert sponsorship of "independent" insurgencies to "free" Kashmir from Indian "occupation." The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan with the end of the Cold War suddenly gave Pakistan access to a large, trained, armed, and righteously zealous cadre of jihadist guerrillas (some Pakistani, but also Afghan, Kashmiri, and Sikh). Beginning in 1989, tension increased as Pakistan-sponsored guerillas launched new violence in Kashmir, threatening another Indo-Pakistan war in 1990 and setting off nearly constant border tensions through the 1990s.

Pakistan's new, more circumspect strategy stemmed from the realization of India's clear conventional military superiority; but India's clear advantage was erased, at least in a strategic sense, in May 1998 when it made the decision to become a declared nuclear power. The tit-for-tat tests had turned a conventional imbalance that had afforded India an effective deterrent against full-scale Pakistani aggression for nearly thirty years into a nuclear dead heat. Border skirmishes, usually in the form of limited artillery volleys, were not an uncommon occurrence with the spring thaw in the Kashmir highlands along the line of demarcation. In the spring of 1999, however, those skirmishes escalated as the Indian Army found itself engaged against major "insurgent" forces. Pakistan insisted the insurgents were Kashmiri freedom fighters acting alone and on their

own initiative, but India charged that they were supported by and under the direct command of the Pakistan Army. As the level of fighting increased, the international community watched with increasing alarm and put pressure on Prime Ministers Sharif in Pakistan and Vajpayee in India to arrive at some sort of cease-fire agreement. The Pakistani Army and civilian government worked at crossed purposes in the early summer of 1999; as Sharif tried to open lines of communication with the Indians, the Army launched an ill-timed incursion into Kargil in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The regime was corrupt and ineffective, but it was military resentment over the civilian government's concessions to end the 1999 Kashmir crisis that prompted the October 1999 military coup that ousted Sharif and installed General Pervez Musharraf as the un-elected head of state in Pakistan.

D. THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE DETERRENCE

Because both are Intuitive states whose Ultimate Concerns are intimately tied to the robustness of their vision, it is safe to assume that the risk of crisis is highest when one or both perceive their vision as being at risk. It is also reasonable to assume that the risk of Indo-Pakistani crisis will remain high as long as Pakistan's national vision remains troubled. The fact that both are now declared nuclear powers promotes that risk from one of regional concern to one of potentially global concern. Kashmir remains the most likely flashpoint between India and Pakistan. How will India and Pakistan calculate their interests in future crises in light of their new nuclear status?

1. India's Assessment?

Despite its long-standing differences, resentments, and strategic competition with Pakistan, INT India has a vested interest in seeing Pakistan end its apparent slide toward becoming a failed state. India finds Pakistan threatening because it is non-democratic and sectarian. India's Intuitive, Thinking orientation leads, however, to its often-expressed conviction that were Pakistan to democratize on India's secular model, India and Pakistan would naturally become strategic and economic partners. More immediately, India has no interest in participating in or precipitating the devolution of Pakistan. To do so would, in fact, be directly contrary to India's Ultimate Concern. All along, India has argued that ceding Kashmir, either to Pakistan or to an independent state, would undermine India's secular national vision and potentially start the nation down the slippery slope to Balkanization. Its steadfast stand on Kashmir is meant to send a message to other minorities (such as the Sikhs) that the Indian government will not tolerate separatism. So, while Pakistan has long pursued a strategy that uses support for "internal" insurgencies to

put pressure on key nodes that might trigger a collapse of Indian unity, it will likely prove in India's best interest to avoid putting the same kind of pressure on Pakistan. While India sees instability among its neighbors as a potentially serious threat to its Ultimate Concern—as its 1971 decision to intervene in Pakistan's civil war demonstrated—apart from the obvious strategic concern over the consequences of the failure or “Talibanization” of Pakistan, India has an interest in avoiding any precedent for the dismantling of a national vision, even that of its oldest foe.

India's interest in finding a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir problem is likely to increase as it seeks to expand its global role and improve its economic, political, and strategic relations with the West, the emerging Central Asian Republics, and the Arab Middle East. Its options for doing that, however, are problematic. The first option is, of course, to carry through with Nehru's 1949 promise to the UN to hold a plebiscite on self-determination in Kashmir. Over the years, however, Indian repression and political meddling in Kashmir have triggered deep dissatisfaction and resistance to Indian rule within the region. While this has created more demand for Kashmiri independence than for incorporation into Pakistan, the least likely result of such an election, if held today, would be a decision to remain part of India, even with increased autonomy. Apart from the obvious consequences in terms of India's national vision and implications for other separatist movements, such an outcome would create a political problem for India regarding the status of Kashmir's sizeable Hindu minority. India's secular national vision almost certainly would suffer—and perhaps be replaced by a sectarian, Hindu nationalist vision—in the wake of another mass migration of Hindu refugees on the pattern of the bloody aftermath of partition in 1947. A second option, ceding all or part of Kashmir directly to Pakistan, would have the same problems. The third option, negotiating shared sovereignty, might work for India, but there seem to be few incentives for Pakistan to go along. Moreover, any future Pakistani leader might face the threat of the same sort of political backlash that prompted Yassir Arafat to refuse a similar shared sovereignty arrangement with Israel in East Jerusalem.

The option with the best likely outcome for India would be a negotiated settlement with Kashmiri rebels that involved some form of semi-autonomy for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Such an arrangement would not be easy. It would require negotiations with Pakistan to resolve their outstanding differences (and for reasons discussed below, Pakistan has its own interest in keeping the unrest in Kashmir smoldering). It would also require India to take steps to improve the quality of the paramilitary forces that currently police the region in order to avoid more of the injustice

and brutality that helped trigger the Kashmir rebellion in the first place. And Intuitive, Thinking expressions of high principle would not be enough. India would have to take concrete steps to disarm the resentment that brought on the irredentist movement by restoring the legitimacy of the Indian government, and more important, of the Indian national vision in the eyes of Kashmir's Muslims. Kashmir has not ceased to be a vital interest for India, for strategic as well as "intuitive" reasons; but the Indian national vision is fairly robust and could undoubtedly survive some degree of compromise, particularly if to do so frees Indian resources to pursue more productive and politically pressing interests, like economic modernization and social and political reform. Moreover, as an Intuitive state, India is keenly aware of the real power of political ideas. It is very concerned that dangerous ideas (especially Islamic militancy) might spread among its numerous minorities, triggering a Hindu backlash that could raise communal tensions and undermine the very nature of its vision—an outcome substantially more threatening to India's Ultimate Concern than compromise in Kashmir.

The bottom-line in India's future assessment of its relationship with Pakistan is that, in a very real sense, India believes it finally has outgrown its regional standoff with Pakistan.¹¹⁵ It still sees Pakistan and its irredentist agenda in Kashmir as a serious security threat, but India has expanded its strategic vision and the definition of its Ultimate Concerns well beyond the subcontinent. Since India suffered a humiliating military defeat against the People's Liberation Army in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, China has been the threat against which India structures its military capabilities. China is also the major power against which India seeks parity of esteem, beginning with permanent member status on the UN Security Council. Since 1962, India has operated from the assumption that China wants to prevent it from gaining equal status as either an Asian or a world power. Despite many shared interests—in containing militant Islam, and in challenging the US free hand in Asia—India still sees China not only as its major threat and the one against which India ostensibly seeks to build a nuclear deterrent, but also as a more fitting and worthy opponent for India than Pakistan. Along with the Royal Navy's withdrawal from east of Suez in 1967 and the irritating if not really threatening US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, India's strategic competition with China also provides justification for a major naval build-up.

The Chinese threat notwithstanding, an even more fundamental shift is taking place in India's approach to pursuing its Ultimate Concerns. Since the late 1980s, India

¹¹⁵ Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, p. 320.

has gradually acted on the realization that its long-standing positions of principled non-alignment and economic protectionism were not serving its interests well. India holds to its right to act solely in pursuit of its interests, and as a result economic liberalization has not unfolded in a straight line. Globalization is well under way in India, though, and probably beyond the point of no return. INT India finds ideological compromise in the interest of concrete gains difficult, but it also understands that the strength of its vision will be best proven to the extent that India can realize the full potential of its secular democracy. Like many other Introverted states, India now realizes that its best hope of defending its Ultimate Concern and transforming the idea of India outlined in the 1949 Constitution into political and social reality (not to mention disarming separatists) lies with economic growth and internal reform to reduce corruption and advance such important measures as improving education, health, and the standard of living for all Indians. Its success in achieving these goals depends much more on its relationship with the United States, the European powers, and other major economic powers like Japan than it does on its relationship with Pakistan. As BJP pundit Jay Dubashi has written, “A country’s foreign policy is meaningless if it is not backed by an economy strong enough to be able to sustain it.”¹¹⁶ But the legacies of imperialism and Indian pride, rooted in part in its strong Thinking orientation, demands that it pursue closer economic, military, and political ties with the West from a position of strength.

2. Pakistan’s Assessment?

Intuitive Pakistan clearly continues to see its struggle to wrest control of Kashmir away from India as vital to its Ultimate Concern. What is less clear is whether the best outcome for Pakistan is to resolve the issue (thus removing an important traditional mechanism for manufacturing a sense of shared national purpose, not unlike what happened after partition), or to keep the matter smoldering as a source of permanent conflict with India short of all-out war (and hence defending Pakistan’s de facto “not India” national vision, without risking another military defeat, or worse). The approach has its risks. Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir already contributed to the break with Bangladesh, and in the years since 1971, public support for the government’s Kashmir campaign has eroded in other regions as well.¹¹⁷ The government has used the jihadist elements within Pakistan, many of whom are radicalized veterans of the Afghan civil war eager to fight another holy war against India, to fan the flames of resentment within Pakistan and garner support for its policy. But in so doing, the government is taking a

¹¹⁶ Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb*, p. 320.

¹¹⁷ “Pakistan Started this Crisis, but Only Compromise Will End It,” *The Economist*, June 12, 1999.

great risk that those flames of radical Islamist zeal will spread within Pakistan, which has already seen an increasing incidence of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a sects in a sort of "civil war" for political dominance.¹¹⁸

The fundamental issue is that Pakistan's vision is in serious trouble. The inevitable insecurity that results is aggravated by Pakistan's Thinking orientation, which makes India's haughty refusal to treat Pakistan as an equal even more unpalatable and potentially incendiary. That sense of inferiority might well increase if Pakistan's place in India's pantheon of threats continues to drop. While this insecurity / inferiority complex is clearly a major factor in Pakistan's strategic decision making, its Thinking orientation also makes it well aware of its real, measurable military disadvantage relative to India. It is this awareness that triggered Pakistan to give up on challenging India conventionally and shift from a strategy of direct confrontation to one of sponsoring low-level, insurgent operations in Kashmir conducted (at least officially) by client Kashmiri, Sikh, and Afghani guerilla fighters—a strategy now backed by a nuclear deterrent against escalation. As long as it does not reach a level that would provoke a major Indian response, and as long as it keeps India off-balance and unable to turn its attention completely away from Kashmir, the strategy works.

Pakistan's status has also become more insecure in the realm of its alliances and ability to manipulate the international system to its advantage. During the Cold War, it was successful in capitalizing on Western fear of Soviet encroachment on Middle East oil reserves to further its ends; an approach that India's strict policy of non-alignment facilitated. Through the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan was able to use its alliance with the US to narrow its conventional military gap with India; but since the end of the Cold War, the alliance the Pakistani regime forged with Afghan freedom fighters (with US support and encouragement prior to 1989) has become a liability in its relations with the fickle (in Pakistan's Thinking view) United States. Moreover, the US has become less willing to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which it sees as a threat to its global nonproliferation agenda. Just as the end of the Cold War opened up India's strategic options, it seemed to close Pakistan's. But Pakistan hopes that the new nuclear stand-off on the subcontinent will once again enable it to rally international support for its position, at least as concerns its demand that India treat it as an equally interested party in any future negotiations to resolve the Kashmir issue.

¹¹⁸ "A Capacity to Scare." *The Economist*.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Balance of Ultimate Concerns

As things stand at present, the balance of Ultimate Concerns between India and Pakistan remains roughly even, regarding the ongoing Kashmir crisis. Over the years, both India and Pakistan have increasingly tied their national identity to their claims to Kashmir, making it an interest key to the Ultimate Concerns of both. But two factors point to the possibility that the balance of Ultimate Concerns may shift in a way that would increase Pakistan's incentive to challenge. The first lies in the nature of the conflict over Kashmir, which crystallizes the divisions and tensions between India and Pakistan, but did not create them. The real sources of tension are traceable to mutual resentments that grew during (and some Indians argue were created by) the British Raj and the bitter legacy of partition and accompanying sectarian violence. Thus, while resolution of the Kashmir issue might go far toward reducing the level of tension between India and Pakistan, it would unlikely make that tension disappear altogether, at least from Pakistan's perspective. Pakistan believes it needs to keep the conflict going in order to keep itself united, prevent India from realizing its goals of strategic hegemony, and hence avoid being absorbed into some future Indian-dominated South Asia Union (and hence becoming another economic and cultural satellite of India). One option for keeping Indian and Pakistani Ultimate Concerns in rough balance in Kashmir is for Pakistan to reform its national vision in a way that is less tied up with its opposite, zero-sum image of India. But this is very difficult and would take a very long time in the best of circumstances. Pakistan does not find itself in the best of circumstances.

A second factor contributing to a shift in the balance of Ultimate Concerns is India's expanding strategic ambitions, which will almost certainly increase Pakistan's sense of insecurity. India has consistently asserted that its military modernization programs, including its naval and nuclear programs, have two principal aims: to balance the threat from China, and to facilitate India's quest to become a major power outside the subcontinent. Pakistan, however, still looks at India through the lens of revenge (for post-partition violence, for Kashmir, and for India's role in the 1971 Pakistan Civil War) and sees any improvement in Indian military capabilities as directed its way. Any change in that perception will have to come from within Pakistan, and the nature of that change will depend on what direction its national vision takes. A more Islamist vision, which resonates with a small but outspoken portion of the polity, would promise little short-term improvement. But the chances of an Islamic government remain remote. Most Pakistanis want leadership that can provide competent administration, jobs, decent education, and

reliable courts. The Islamists do not have a good track record in those areas and so far their electoral appeal is extremely limited, as most Pakistanis want to see a secular Islamic but not Islamist regime and are extremely afraid of "Talibanization." Pakistan desperately needs to demobilize its economy, but as an INT (and hence driven by ideology), it is unlikely to do what Sadat did in Egypt and compromise long-term ideological goals for the sake of more immediate concrete gains. India has also found those kinds of trade-offs difficult, but the price of its military rivalry with Pakistan is relatively much lower.

2. Maintaining a Stable Balance of Ultimate Concerns

Their Intuitive orientations did not predispose either India or Pakistan to think through the practical consequences of their nuclear tests in 1998; but given the relative balance before the tests, India may be paying the greatest price for its Intuitive overreach. A Sensing India might have come to a very different decision, based on two realities of its strategic situation. First, given China's huge head start, India has little prospect of acquiring anything more than a minimal deterrent against China. While this would probably be enough to deter another Chinese border incursion, India's existing conventional deterrent is capable of doing that, too, and is substantially less provocative. Second, given that Pakistan was certain to respond to India's test by exercising its own nuclear option, India risked trading an almost insurmountable conventional superiority that had already deterred full-scale war with Pakistan for nearly thirty years for nuclear parity. Even given India's greater strategic depth and ability to absorb Pakistani nuclear attacks, the trade-off does not seem to play to India's strategic advantage in the realist sense.

The direction of the strategic competition between India and Pakistan will depend in large part on who wins the upper hand in Pakistan—the military, the Islamists, or the secular democrats. One oft-cited concern is the fear that a failing Pakistan (especially one under the control of a jihadi regime) might employ nuclear weapons in extremis to salvage its failing state. The INF Soviet Union did not do this. It is worth asking the question why it didn't. One reason may be that it couldn't, because of technical and political "fail-safes" that prevented any one person or group from launching a nuclear attack. Another reason may be that there was no "aggressor" to attack. The most likely devolutionary outcome should Pakistan fail is something that looks not unlike the dissolution of the Soviet Empire—with some states seceding from the Pakistani union and others engaged in civil conflict for their independence or autonomy. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible that a jihadist regime in Pakistan might try to pick a fight with India

in a last ditch attempt to salvage its crumbling political legitimacy, but it is highly unlikely that India would pick such a fight. The trick is to find a way to ensure that India would not have to rise to the bait in order to ensure its survival.

3. Third-Party Roles?

India sees China as the real threat to its security. Pakistan, however, is likely to continue to see any military modernization in India as provocative. Recent moves by IST China indicate that it may no longer see a pressing strategic interest in keeping Indo-Pakistani relations stirred up as it has in the past, and hence may be more willing to participate in stability-enhancing measures on that front. Any attempt to forge a more stable nuclear balance in South Asia should incorporate China and involve trilateral confidence-building, perhaps including regular communications, discussions of nuclear doctrine, and safety. This may be the best way to ensure that India can gain security vis-à-vis China without provoking a nuclear arms race with Pakistan.

India and Pakistan may be one nuclear deterrence challenge for which the Cold War stand-off between the ENF United States and the INF Soviet Union has some relevance. Mutual Assured Destruction is a nuclear doctrine that likely would resonate with the Intuitive Indians and Pakistanis just as it did for the US and USSR. But even greater stability might be gained through arms control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures on the Cold War model, although negotiated and implemented in a purely regional context. Their Introverted orientations, augmented by their mutual resentment of the unjust Western nonproliferation agenda, will preclude global solutions; and un-proliferation through some global regime is equally unlikely. Solutions to the Kashmir problem will also need to be regional, as India is unlikely to accede to international mediation of what it sees as an internal dispute in which Pakistan made itself an aggressor by introducing outside incendiary elements.

VI. STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

A. THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC PERSONALITY CONFLICT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DETERRENCE

The historical cases in this study evaluated the effectiveness of deterrence by focusing on four key questions. First, how did Strategic Personality shape how each state identified its Ultimate Concerns and translate them into interests and strategies? Second, did the balance of Ultimate Concerns favor the defender or the would-be challenger? Third, was the defender's deterrent credible? How did Strategic Personality affect the defender's ability to communicate effectively its interests and will to the challenger? How did the balance of Ultimate Concerns affect the credibility of the deterrent threat? Fourth, was the deterrent effective? How did the challenger perceive the balance of Ultimate Concerns, calculate risk, and decide how to act? This chapter draws on the lessons of the historical cases to answer a more prescriptive question: How can Strategic Personality contribute to structuring future deterrents that are both credible and effective? The first step is to identify the potential pitfalls that emerge from differences in state's Strategic Personalities.

1. Extroverted Defender versus Introverted Challenger

Virtually all of the likely challengers that the United States will face in the years ahead will be Introverted states, not because Introverts are more aggressive but because, at least for the time being, the Extroverted world (largely consisting of "the West") has concluded, after long, painful experience that—at least within their own ranks—collective security and other cooperative approaches are better ways of managing relations and resolving differences than the use of force. This in no way implies that the Introverted states are somehow backward or recidivist. It just means that, given their historical experience and cognitive predispositions, states with an Introverted orientation are much less likely than Extroverted states to turn their Ultimate Concerns over to the care of an international community they cannot control or completely trust. The Introverted states define their Ultimate Concerns internally and pursue interests that defend them from external pressures; and they do not share the Extroverted states' confidence that they can manage and manipulate the international system in a way that ensures that their interests are protected and advanced. To tie their Ultimate Concerns to those of other states, as the extroverted West has increasingly done, is counterintuitive to the Introverted mindset. In May 1998, an Extroverted (rather than Introverted) Pakistan

might have looked at its position and concluded that it could trade its option to “go nuclear” for some things Pakistan desperately needed: economic assistance, conventional military modernization, security guarantees, and international prestige. The real, Introverted Pakistan, however, could not see things that way. The domestic political cost of opting to let India enjoy a de facto nuclear monopoly on the subcontinent (especially in the eyes of its restive Islamic elements) would probably be the end of what remained of Pakistan’s secular democratic vision. Moreover, a Pakistan only recently “abandoned” by its Western allies as soon as their strategic threat disappeared could not trust the international community to defend its interests against the perceived Indian threat.

The Introverted states in the modern world tend to see themselves as lone Davids standing against the mighty Goliaths of the Extrovert-driven international system. Virtually every major and most minor interactions between Introverted states and the Extroverted United States will be colored by that perception, however benign the American intention. Moreover, it is likely that most future conflicts between the US (or NATO) and an Introverted state will center on the Extroverted states’ attempt to narrow the Introverted state’s prerogatives and freedom to pursue what they see as their legitimate Ultimate Concerns. Whether accurately or not, the Introverted state is likely to see any standoff with the United States in terms of defending their Ultimate Concerns against careless and arrogant Extrovert meddling. So, for example, NATO’s 1999 campaign against Serbia followed from the Extroverted view that the international system had a duty to prevent ethnic cleansing on various grounds: the US and EU emphasis on reordering society on the basis of liberal democratic norms and values, and the NATO mission to keep the peace in Europe. But Introverted, Intuitive, Feeling Serbia perceived the balance of Ultimate Concerns as clearly in its favor. Serbia, backed by its ally INF Russia, believed NATO’s goal was to deny Serbia the legitimate right to live out its national vision (albeit, a vision cynically manipulated by an opportunistic regime)—of a Holy, Orthodox Serbia in which the Kosovar Albanians have, at best, a subservient role—however it saw fit. The nationalist aspirations of the Kosovars posed a potentially mortal threat to that vision, and the Serbs believed they had the right to neutralize that threat. Far from convincing them to change their vision, the NATO campaign intensified its internal political / mythic power, even among those Serbs morally and politically opposed to the Milosevic regime and its policy of “ethnic cleansing.”

While Extroverted states are comfortable with the notion of creative competition and positive pressure, Introverted states want to do things in their own context and in their own time. With the Introverts, international pressure can, and often does, have the

opposite of the desired effect. While both sides increasingly saw conflict over China as inevitable, the Roosevelt administration's decision to pressure Japan into abandoning its campaign of conquest in China by imposing an embargo on the sale of strategic materials hastened and solidified Japan's determination that a massive challenge of the US position in the Pacific was its only acceptable option. US pressure on India to sign the CTBT in 1996, combined with India's perception that the tide of international opinion was turning against its continued resistance, hardened India's determination to exercise its nuclear option and prepared the ground for the BJP's decision to change India's status from an undeclared to a declared nuclear power. As one BJP spokesman explained

Whatever initiative the United States takes with South Asia on nonproliferation you carry baggage of centuries of history—colonialism, and then America's own role here including the USS Enterprise in 1971 We democracies take initiatives due to the compulsion of our domestic agenda . . . The US government feels a political compulsion to complete the CTBT by November 1996, your elections. So your leaders want to check off the CTBT box on their pad of paper. This is an occidental way of doing things. . . . We take more time. If you push us on your schedule's compulsion, it will not help. It will harden us.¹¹⁹

Likewise, the threat of sanctions had little effect on either India or Pakistan in their decisions to go ahead with nuclear tests in May 1988. In fact, in both cases, sanctions probably strengthened the resolve of popular opinion unwilling to see their national leaders blackmailed into trading away their rights for mere material security.

The real issue between the Extroverted and Introverted states is one of context. While international, cooperative approaches are workable for the Introverted states, they are most likely to be successful if structured in a more limited, regional, or bilateral context. The Extroverted world has a long historical tradition of thinking in terms of universal laws and international norms as guides to the international conduct of states. But these sorts of approaches do not resonate with Introverted states, who are likely to want to resolve their differences in a limited context on a case-by-case basis. The difference is reflected in US relationships with its own important allies: with its Extroverted, European allies it has pursued a collective approach—NATO, while its relationships with most of its Introverted allies—Israel, Japan, Korea, have remained strictly bilateral and, for the most part, informal. Attempts to impose collective approaches on relationships with Introverted states, such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, failed.

¹¹⁹ Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, pp. 372-373.

2. Intuitive Defender versus Sensing Challenger

While Intuitive states like the United States normally focus on patterns, trends, and ideas, Sensing states focus on the here-and-now and actual events. This has a number of important implications for thinking about effective deterrent approaches. First, as the US-Japan case study demonstrates, Intuitive defenders like the US need to back policies and ideals with concrete actions if they hope to structure credible and effective deterrents against a Sensing challenger. Last minute deterrent threats are unlikely to make a convincing impression on a highly motivated Sensing state unless the challenger has already experienced some effort to put muscle behind the Intuitive defender's ideals. Anything else runs the risk of sending the message that the Intuitive defender is not serious. Because of their focus on current realities, Sensing challengers can reasonably be expected to catch when US interests and threats are out of balance and a deterrent threat is not credible. In 1973, Egypt knew that Israel would not risk the consequences of a massive retaliation (among which might be direct superpower intervention) if all Egypt did was attack its defensive position in the Sinai. The Sensing states will, however, assess the balance of threats and interests in largely material terms. The result can be a tendency in Sensing challengers to misread the defender's intentions to their disadvantage and challenge when the defender is, in fact, willing to retaliate. While this will likely mean defeat for the challenger, a more desirable outcome would be a deterrent that is clear and credible from the outset, thus avoiding the challenge altogether.

Intuitive and Sensing states also differ in how they send and receive strategic messages. Intuitive defenders must take care to send clear and consistent messages to potential Sensing challengers. Signals from the United States led Japan to conclude through the 1930s that its anti-communism would lead the US to tolerate Japanese aggression in China. Likewise, Iraq believed that US preoccupation with revolutionary Iran, its casualty-sensitivity, and prior disinterest in Iraq-Kuwait border disputes gave it a freer hand in the Persian Gulf. In both cases, the conclusions of the Sensing challengers were not unreasonable, just short-sighted. One way to ensure that a Sensing challenger is receiving the right messages is, first, to think through what messages current and past actions might be sending, and second, to "translate" Intuitive interests into explicit, Sensing terms. It is also important for the Intuitive United States to be constantly aware of the risk of trying to deter, in circumstances in which we are not certain of our own will to carry out the threat. This is crucial for two reasons. First, a Sensing state is likely to generalize from one experience of flagging resolve and assume all the Intuitive defender's deterrent threats are "paper tigers," as Saddam Hussein did in applying the

Vietnam / Beirut analogies to the 1990 Gulf Crisis. Second, a harsh deterrent threat issued to a determined challenger might appear more provocative than the defender's intentions really are, as was the case with the US embargo against Japan, which would have carried much greater credibility if backed by forces in-being and in theater.

It is important as well that an Intuitive defender consider the credibility and effectiveness of its deterrent, against both Intuitive and Sensing would-be challengers, at all appropriate levels. Israel succeeded in deterring the all-out war that posed the greatest threat to its Ultimate Concern; but if it had also paid more attention to the "tactical" level it might also have deterred, or at least repelled, Egypt's limited war strategy. In this respect, India's decision to introduce declared nuclear capability into the South Asian balance has created a similar problem. It can probably deter a major aggression by Pakistan, but it has significantly eroded India's capability to deter lower-intensity operations. Given the vast US superiority in both nuclear and conventional capabilities, such asymmetric challenges are likely. In attempting to deter Japan, the Intuitive US made demands that aimed, at least rhetorically, to "reshape" the world. Its deterrent, however, was barely adequate at even the tactical level. The message Japan received was that the US strategy was essentially defensive (to hold the Philippines and Hawaii), and that the broader threat was not serious.

Intuitive states can also capitalize on some advantages in deterring Sensing challengers. Intuitive states can benefit from a considerable element of inscrutability in their dealings with Sensing states; Sensing states will find it difficult to structure reliable counter-deterrents against Intuitive states. Because Intuitive strategic decision making takes place at least some remove from the limits of current, material realities, their decisions can be unpredictable from the perspective of the more practical Sensing challenger. Cautious Sensing challengers may limit their objectives (as Egypt did in 1973) to reduce the risk of an Intuitive defender's "irrational" response (like Israel's determined resistance in the War of Attrition, which totally defied Sensing Egypt's calculation of Israel's likely costs and benefits). The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was, in effect, an attempt to deter the United States. The Japanese General Staff admitted at the time that it had no real idea how the United States would respond; it gambled, and lost.

The threshold of acceptable risk and loss may be more easily identifiable for Sensing challengers. In Iraq, both Saddam Hussein and CENTCOM knew just roughly how much of his military power he could afford to lose before the internal survival of his regime would be put at serious risk in pursuit of an interest at best secondary to Iraq's

Ultimate Concern. In crafting a deterrent threat against a Sensing challenger, it is important to know how vital the interests at stake are in terms of the challenger's Ultimate Concerns, and thus how much risk and damage he can absorb before he will conclude that the peril to his Ultimate Concerns is unacceptably great. In the case of Japan, for example, the interests at stake were so important (in Japan's view) to defense of its Ultimate Concern that its threshold of pain was extremely high—virtually suicidal. Conversely, Sensing states have a very difficult time judging an Intuitive defender's threshold of pain to know how much it is willing to pay to achieve its objectives. This normally leads them to underestimate that threshold, as Japan did in 1941 and as Egypt did in its War of Attrition against Israel. This is also the underlying assumption of terror campaigns like the one currently being waged by the followers of Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden's brand of Islamism is fundamentally Sensing in its emphasis on protecting traditional Muslim societies from external cultural pollution and forcing infidels off the holy territory of Islam. They see the balance of Ultimate Concerns as overwhelmingly in their favor, and believe terrorist attacks will eventually raise the level of pain beyond what the Americans are willing to absorb. Sensing states often do not understand the Intuitive state's capacity for zealous revenge. The challenge for Intuitive defenders, especially those with a Feeling orientation like the US, is to maintain sufficient consistency to make their will absolutely clear to the Sensing challenger (and avoid the kind of mixed messages sent by the Reagan administration's retaliation in the wake of bombings in Europe and the downing of Pan Am 103, in contrast to its withdrawal from Beirut in the wake of the bombing of the Marine barracks) and ensure that there is no ambiguity regarding the will to defend; so their uncertainty leads them not to challenge rather than to miscalculate, challenge, and lose.

3. Intuitive Defender versus Intuitive Challenger

Despite the fact that these are often the most ominous looking strategic stand-offs—steeped as they often are in absolutist or apocalyptic rhetoric—they may be the most natural and effective category of deterrence for the United States. Intuitive states may not share the same visions and values, but they do tend to think in the same abstract, absolutist terms. Mutual Assured Destruction probably worked during the Cold War at least in part because the US and the USSR were both Intuitive states who understood that confrontation really could, and quite possibly would, lead to “Armageddon.” Neither doubted the other's willingness to initiate Armageddon if challenged too directly (even if they, at times, doubted their own). For this reason, the US-USSR deterrence model may have utility in building a stable nuclear deterrent between India and Pakistan, also both

Intuitive states who define their differences (and, perhaps more important, the other's goals and will) in potentially apocalyptic, life-or-death terms.

Still, the problem does get more complex when we are talking about a US deterrent aimed at a smaller, Introverted, Intuitive challenger like Iran. In most plausible future deterrence scenarios, the challenger's vision and Ultimate Concern will be more directly at stake than ours. As a result, their risk tolerance and thresholds of pain are likely to be higher as well. The existence of the Great Satan may look like a mortal threat to Iran under certain circumstances, but the Iranians know they cannot pose a mortal threat to the United States. They also know that, absent a direct and mortal threat to US Ultimate Concerns, the United States is unlikely to initiate a nuclear exchange to deter Iran from, say, renewing its conflict with Iraq or seeking to consolidate its hold on Abu Musa and the Toombs. Still, would-be Intuitive challengers are more likely than more pragmatic Sensing ones (like Iraq) to believe that their righteousness is such a threat to the "misguided" US vision, or that the US is so evil, that it just might try to destroy them on the least provocation, a perception that can increase the credibility and effectiveness of US deterrence.

It is not automatically the case that Intuitive defenders are good at deterring Intuitive would-be challengers. Sometimes deterrence is ineffective because it fails to recognize the implications of a particular Intuitive challenger's vision. Deterrence failed and military strategy disappointed against the Serbs in the 1999 Kosovo crisis because the US and its NATO allies structured their deterrent, and later their military strategy, in Sensing terms based on experience nine years earlier in Iraq, a Sensing state. But Serbia is quite different. Milosevic couched his aims in terms of the national myth and national vision of Holy Serbia. Did he really care if economic embargoes produced a few Serbian martyrs, or if the televisions did not work or the electricity was off? A determined Intuitive challenger can be very difficult to deter (especially when a deterrent aims at its internal prerogatives) because by their nebulous nature; visions can be difficult to put at risk and often standard "Sensing" sorts of military targets are all that are available. Eventually it will be possible to wear down Intuitive states by attriting their military capabilities and infrastructure, but as NATO learned in Kosovo, it can take much longer and impose a much higher cost on the defender—in both material and moral terms—than anyone expected. Had NATO initiated the Kosovo campaign with a more realistic assessment of just how much violence it would take to wear down its Intuitive challenger (that it would take weeks or months rather than days), the coalition might have avoided some of the political tensions that arose and undermined allied cohesion as the war

dragged on. It is important to recognize those limits going in, not just to forge more effective deterrent threats, but also to ensure more realistic expectations for success should deterrence fail.

In its long-term threat reduction strategies, the United States should pay particular heed to Intuitive states whose national vision is weak, seriously threatened either internally or externally, or in obvious flux. The most valuable threat reduction strategy may be thinking about ways to mend, reinforce, or rebuild viable national visions in places like Russia and Pakistan. There is little the United States can do to shape these new national visions, but there may be things it should not do—such as pressuring them to adopt policies that conform to the US vision without taking into consideration the compatibility of US values with indigenous ones. At the very least, it is as important carefully to monitor the evolution or mutation of their national visions as to monitor their military capabilities. It is not automatically the case that Intuitive states are likely to resort to force to save a collapsing vision. But it probably is true that the US should think very carefully about capitalizing on such collapse to gain a strategic advantage. The Western powers got this right when the Soviet empire began its collapse in 1989. The most dangerous possible response would have been to send tanks and aircraft into Eastern Europe to help speed things along. Likewise, India would be wise to avoid any moves that might be seen in such a light should Pakistan begin to crumble—defense against unrest spreading into India, yes; intervention, no.

Intuitive states can be difficult to deter if their vision is directly threatened. At the same time, they may be easier to deter than Sensing states when the interests at stake are primarily material; at the very least, they may be more amenable to compromise. The perspective of the Yom Kippur War case study was Israel's attempt to deter the Arabs; but looking at it from the other side, Egypt was in fact quite successful in deterring Israeli escalation to a level of force beyond Egypt's capabilities. Intuitive Israel was not willing to risk Egyptian SCUD missile attacks against Israeli cities in a war for bargaining chips. The right wing in Israel seems to have learned this lesson and has, since 1973, taken steps to extend the reach of Israel's vision beyond the traditional Eretz Yisrael through the establishment of settlements; but until September 2000, the Intuitive Israelis remained willing to trade land for the lasting peace that might bring permanent security for Israel's Ultimate Concern—its Jewish nationalist vision. Iran eventually negotiated an end to the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Although the Ayatollah Khomeini declared the concessions as bitter as poison, the territorial concessions Iran had to make to get peace and avoid US intervention on Iraq's behalf were more acceptable than the mindless, pointless slaughter

that increasingly threatened the stability and long-term survival of Iran's Islamic Republic. Citing the will of Allah, Khomeini announced his decision to accept the UN Cease-Fire resolution on July 18, 1988. As New York Times correspondent Elaine Sciolino explains:

Iran's leaders were convinced that the United States was determined to get into the war. And that judgment helped them see that the war that had boosted Iran's revolution for so many years had begun to destroy it.¹²⁰

The Intuitive state's willingness to make material compromises only applies when, as in the case of both Iran's and Israel's concessions, to do so does not require compromising their underlying vision (and hence their Ultimate Concerns). In accepting the cease-fire in 1988, Iran did not have to compromise either its vision or its sense of the righteousness of its cause. (In fact, Khomeini swathed his decision in a veneer of righteousness, saying that "I had promised to fight to the last drop of my blood and to my last breath. . . . I submitted myself to God's will and drank this [poison] drink for his satisfaction.")¹²¹ This distinction lies at the root of India's strategic challenge in dealing with Pakistan. If a more confident India decided its vision could survive or even benefit from trading "Kashmir for Peace," the threat from Pakistan still might not go away unless the Pakistanis are successful in crafting a national vision that moves beyond hatred and resentment of India as its cornerstone. Right now and for the foreseeable future, the competition with India is the only glue holding Pakistan's vision together.

The Intuitive states will be nearly impossible to deter if they see their vision threatened. Russia proved willing to pay a huge price in blood, treasure, and international good will to hold on to Chechnya, the loss of which would not only further threaten Russia's internal cohesion but would also undermine its status as a military, if no longer an economic or political, superpower. Likewise, the Serbs in 1999 saw their standoff with NATO over Kosovo as central to their national vision. To be sure, a different Serb leader might well have found a way to resolve the crisis that did not involve war with NATO, but Milosevic's skill at playing to the Serb vision enabled him not only to pursue his confrontational policy with growing popular support but also to prolong his political tenure, which had faced significant internal opposition only a couple of years earlier. That said, the Intuitive states are not any more likely than any other states to go out and pick fights. While conflicts may be inevitable, the best way to avoid a catastrophic failure of deterrence against an Introverted, Intuitive challenger will be to avoid threatening its

¹²⁰ Elaine Sciolino, *Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), p. 179.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

internal prerogatives. In this regard, future proliferation of nuclear weapons may force the United States to stomach some pretty unpalatable future Kosovos.

4. Feeling Defender versus Thinking Challenger

Thinking states may not find a deterrent threat expressed in terms of values very credible; perhaps because they do not see values as a legitimate foundation for international policy (as China has occasionally argued under US pressure on human rights, for example), but more likely because they do not understand the vocabulary of values Feeling states employ. Feeling states tend to translate their interests into deterrent threats that are, from the Thinking perspective, bafflingly open-ended and imprecise. For a Feeling state's deterrent to be credible to a would-be Thinking challenger, it needs to state a clear cause and effect relationship— "If you withdraw your forces from Kuwait within 48 hours we will not pound your military capabilities into dust." Feeling defenders may have to present their positions in more explicit, legalistic terms in order to be credible, believable, or even comprehensible. Germany did not believe in 1914 that Britain would go to war over a "scrap of paper" (Britain's promise to defend Belgian neutrality) in part because the British had not sent clear messages concerning what the consequences would be of a violation. Would Britain declare war (Germany had reason to believe, based on other statements by the British government, that it would not), would it break off relations with Germany, impose an economic embargo, or just be very offended? In the months leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War, the messages the Allied powers sent to Adolf Hitler were even more muddled and lacking in credibility.

Because the Feeling state's rationality is so subjective and often apparently inconsistent, a would-be Thinking challenger is likely to find a Feeling defender's strategic calculus baffling. The threshold of pain for a Feeling defender is likely to be much higher for some values than for others, and Thinking challengers often find it difficult to anticipate which values are supreme at any given point or to determine when the relative priority of a particular values shift. It did not occur to Thinking Israel, for example, that Feeling Egypt might rather fight to regain the Sinai than negotiate for it. After the humiliation of 1967, however, regaining self-confidence and morale was at least as important to Egypt's Ultimate Concern as regaining the Sinai. For Egypt, the balance of values was more important than the balance of forces. While it knew Israel had the qualitative advantage in terms of military capabilities, Egypt was confident that it enjoyed the moral advantage.

Communication often breaks down or is ineffective between Feeling and Thinking states because the latter wants everything to add up. When NATO forces accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia in 1999, the Thinking Chinese could not accept that the United States did not act intentionally. The Chinese would probably have been more comfortable if the State Department had told them a story about a conspiracy among mid-level intelligence analysts to punish China for its support of Serbia's position than they were with the explanation they got—that the whole thing was a terrible mistake. China relieved the resulting cognitive dissonance by going on believing that the bombing was on purpose in pursuit of some unfathomable Feeling objective. Which points to another quality of Feeling to Thinking communication: when a Feeling state's message fails to make sense, the Thinking states are likely to interpret it in a way that imposes "sense," even if that is not the original intent of the message. To the extent possible, Feeling states should take care to send messages Thinking states can understand without "filling in the blanks" themselves.

All of this is exacerbated by the fundamentally subjective and untidy nature of political debate in most Feeling states. To be sure, political debate tends to be untidy in all democracies (in both Feeling and Thinking states), but Thinking democracies tend to be more systematic in how they translate political debate into strategies and policies. Because they are motivated by different values at different times, and sometimes different values at the same time, the messages that go out from Feeling states can be not just mixed, but internally contradictory. Depending on what they want to hear, potential Thinking challengers can select from a broad spectrum of messages. The messages to China regarding the motivations behind a US decision to deploy or not deploy a National Missile Defense system range from "we should not do it because it may look threatening to China," to "we need to protect ourselves from rogue states, and it has nothing to do with China," to "China is a dangerous competitor and we need to protect American children from its nuclear bombs." This is business as usual for Feeling states, but Thinking states are likely to cope with the mixed messages by focusing on the one that makes the most sense to them (which may not, in fact, be the one that makes the most sense or have the most political support within the Feeling state itself).

Feeling defenders often assume that Thinking states share or at least understand the importance of values in their international approaches. Britain assumed it shared the same view of the balance-of-power in Europe with Germany because they shared the same basic values. US relations with its French and German allies have often become strained over differences along the Feeling—Thinking axis—most recently over the

utility and legality of maintaining the economic sanctions against Iraq. Thinking states, in fact, often find Feeling states' relativism hypocritical or even immoral. Germany resented the implication that while it was good for everyone for Britain to have its empire and maintain its naval superiority, it was dangerous for everyone to let Germany build an empire and a navy proportional to its size and potential. India has condemned the Western nonproliferation agenda as an immoral attempt by the "imperialist" major powers to force non-nuclear powers to limit their defensive options while, at the same time, refusing to give up their own nuclear arsenals.

The relativism of the Feeling state's analyses can undermine the effectiveness of a deterrent threat against a Thinking would-be challenger. Even when the threat is explicit and defines cause-and-effect, a Thinking challenger may conclude the risk is worth taking. Saddam Hussein, for example, refused to pull his occupation forces out of Kuwait despite explicit threats because he believed that casualty avoidance was a more pressing value for the United States than the liberation of Kuwait and that, if he could inflict a few casualties on US forces, the war would be over. Feeling states need to make the values at stake explicit and ideally should translate them into the kind of objective terms the Thinking states best comprehend.

5. Feeling Defender versus Feeling Challenger

Relativism is a two-way challenge to effective communication between a Feeling defender and a Feeling would-be challenger. Two Feeling states rarely define their Ultimate Concerns and pursue interests according to precisely the same values. It is in the subjective nature of values that they mean different things to different people at different times, so even when states do share the same basic value systems, they can act upon them in very different ways. The American colonies went to war to gain independence from Britain (whose values had been transplanted to America in the first place) largely because they disagreed as to the meaning, legal and economic implications, and proper implementation of "liberty." These disconnects become even more apparent between an Extroverted Feeling State and an Introverted one. Two of the most stubborn and miscommunication-laden strategic standoffs in US history have been with Introverted Feeling states—the Soviet Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran (despite the fact that from a purely "realist" perspective, the US and Iran share more strategic interests in common than differences). The absolute prerequisite to effective communication between two Feeling states is an understanding of the interaction between their value systems and the implications for their Ultimate Concerns.

Absent the subjective-objective disconnect that often undermines effective communication between Feeling and Thinking states, it may be somewhat easier for Feeling states to formulate messages that other Feeling states can understand. But treading in the territory of values also has its perils for structuring an effective deterrent threat. Successful deterrence may depend not only on finding ways to threaten a would-be challenger's values and Ultimate Concerns, but also on offering alternatives that answer the potential challenger's legitimate concerns in terms of values. By the eve of World War II, the tension between US and Japanese interests and values had reached a point of no return. Short of capitulation by one side or the other—which was out of the question by mid-1941—the US deterrent, and the Japanese counter-deterrent, were both doomed to fail catastrophically. But the roots of that failure lay farther back in time. For much of the period leading up to Japan's decision to attack the US, United States policy toward Japan was largely oblivious to or at least insensitive to the degree to which its values offended the Japanese and threatened, if they spread to Japan, to undermine their traditional social structures and stability. Had the US been aware of the link between Japan's values and its Ultimate Concerns, interests, and actions, and how those, in turn, shaped its policies and approaches, the relationship might have developed more gradually but less provocatively to the mutual benefit of both.

Two Feeling states can have strong conflicts of values. It is important, for both threat reduction and deterrence, that US strategies recognize and mitigate those conflicts without overtly trying to alter the potential challenger's values. The message must be that the United States wants a challenger to do something different, but not that it must become something different. It is much easier to shape actions than to reshape values. During the Cold War, the United States and its Western allies sent fairly clear messages to the USSR concerning what they wanted to deter, and the Soviets sent fairly clear messages back. Both sides had a pretty good notion of what the other's Ultimate Concerns were and their implications for interests and actions. So both sides generally knew how far they could push without triggering a deterrence crisis, although there was always a certain degree of uncertainty and testing of wills (as during the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises). Despite apocalyptic and messianic rhetoric on both sides—"Better Dead than Red," or "We will bury you on the ash heap of history"—neither side really expected the other to change its guiding values and become something different. The dynamic between the US and Iran has been quite different. Ostensibly, the United States has sought to "contain" the Iranian Revolution and deter it from supporting terrorism; but the definition of these objectives is open-ended, and milestones that the

Iranian regime must meet to satisfy US demands are unclear. The Iranians perceive, in the vague and uncompromising US policy, an unspoken objective: to overthrow the Islamic Republic, or at least pressure it to collapse from within as the Soviet Empire did.

B. USING STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TO STRUCTURE EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

1. The Balance of Ultimate Concerns

The success or failure of deterrence ultimately all comes down to the balance of Ultimate Concerns between the defender and the would-be challenger, but Ultimate Concerns are rarely explicit. For any state to challenge a nuclear deterrent or to exercise one, the perceived threat to its Ultimate Concerns must be extreme; but how any particular state defines such an “extreme threat” may not be readily apparent from the outside. To understand what is really at stake in a conflict between any two states, it helps to know what the balance of Ultimate Concerns is. Does a would-be challenger perceive an extreme threat to its Ultimate Concern? Would a decision to challenge bring a pay-off that would justify the risk? Does the defender perceive its Ultimate Concern as sufficiently threatened by the action it seeks to deter to justify the likely consequences of retaliation? And how does the challenger perceive the balance of Ultimate Concerns and levels of risk?

Strategic Personality provides a way to understand how particular states define their Ultimate Concerns and translate them into interests and actions. If we know interests (and empire in China) and a state’s Strategic Personality (ISF Japan), then we can begin to extrapolate what is really going on in terms of the Ultimate Concern (social and economic pressure from modernization, Westernization; desire for lebensraum; cultural quarantine). An analysis structured in these terms can point to where compromise is possible, and where the conflict of Ultimate Concerns is irreconcilable and is likely to lead to a deterrence crisis. If compromise does look possible, an analysis in terms of Strategic Personality can pinpoint the problems that need to be resolved, identify the key questions and issues that need to be answered, and make the most effective use of regional and technical expertise to find alternative solutions. If compromise is not possible, a Strategic Personality analysis can facilitate structuring credible and effective deterrents and options for mitigating a deterrence failure.

2. Threat Reduction

The best possible outcome is to identify tensions and potential conflicts and mitigate them before they ever become deterrence events. The balance of Ultimate Concerns shapes all relationships between states—friendly, competitive, and hostile.

Strategic Personality facilitates a better understanding of relations between allies as well as competitors and can help pinpoint how shifts in the international environment (globalization, regional economic and political integration, shifts in the economic or political balance-of-power) might alter the balance of Ultimate Concerns between the US and its allies, and how those Ultimate Concerns might come into play in a crisis (like the 1990 Gulf Crisis, Kosovo, or the collapse of the Israel-Palestinian peace process) and shape our ability to work together toward a solution. Understanding the balance of Ultimate Concerns is also invaluable in shaping relations with potential peer competitors like China and Russia. It is important, before making major decisions about our strategic role or capabilities, to understand how any changes might influence (or be seen to influence) the balance of Ultimate Concerns between the United States and potential peer competitors. By identifying rising conflicts ahead of time, it may be possible to draw on regional and technical expertise to structure our decisions and actions in a way that mitigates potential imbalances in Ultimate Concerns long before they trigger hostility or crisis.

One of the most likely deterrence scenarios in the near future is a crisis between two parties in which the United States is not a direct participant. The India-Pakistan case study looks at one such possibility, but there are others: Iran-Iraq, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, India-China, China-Russia. Most seem unlikely in the near term, and a few are actually becoming less likely, but a combination of histories of tension and actual or potential nuclear capabilities may push them back above the horizon at some point. The key questions in thinking about such crises would be the same: what is the balance of Ultimate Concerns? How does each side view that balance? Are defenders' threats credible and likely to be effective? What changes is the US role. As a potential mediator, we need to know what the "make-or-break" interests at stake are in terms of Ultimate Concerns, whether and how conflicts of interests and Ultimate Concerns might be reconciled or mitigated, whether the United States would be a credible, honest broker, and if not, who would be. If reconciliation or mitigation seems unlikely, then Strategic Personality can provide insight into the credibility and effectiveness of the deterrent at work and what, if anything, the United States, the international community, or another third party might do to stabilize regional deterrence.

3. Structuring Credible Deterrence

The credibility of deterrence depends on three factors: 1) the degree to which the defender's Ultimate Concern is at risk and is perceived to be at risk; 2) the defender's technical capability and political will to carry out the threat; and 3) the defender's ability

to communicate its interests, capability, and will to a particular would-be challenger. Communicating with a would-be challenger means sending messages that he is likely to notice and can understand, and that make sense in terms of his own Ultimate Concerns. Analyzing the messages a defender sends in terms of Strategic Personality facilitates a better, and proactive, understanding of the likely sources of miscommunication between the United States and a potential challenger. In so doing, it can facilitate the crafting of effective messages and avoid unintentionally provocative ones. It can also help to answer some key questions regarding the credibility of a deterrent: is the deterrent credible in the eyes of a would-be challenger? If not, what would make it more credible? If the threat is not credible, and the United States is not willing to do what is necessary to increase credibility (because its Ultimate Concerns are not, in fact, sufficiently threatened to justify the risk), then is it possible to mitigate the source of tension by de-conflicting interests and Ultimate Concerns, or by other means?

4. Structuring Effective Deterrence

It is possible for a deterrent threat to be credible and still not be effective. To evaluate the effectiveness of a deterrent, it helps to return to the balance of Ultimate Concerns, this time through the eyes of the would-be challenger's calculation of risk and potential gain. Understanding a potential challenger's Strategic Personality provides insight into how he perceives the balance of Ultimate Concerns, how he calculates his risk in light of a credible deterrent threat, and whether and how he is likely to challenge. If the challenger perceives his Ultimate Concerns as significantly more threatened than the defender's, or his potential payoff as significantly greater than the potential cost to the defender, then even a credible deterrent may not be effective. As the Egypt-Israel case study demonstrates, deterrence failures need not be total. Strategic Personality Typing can also help predict how a potential challenger might attempt to get around, or under, a US deterrent threat through asymmetric responses or political maneuvers (like Iraqi attempt to split the 1990 Coalition by stressing US ties to Israel). Strategic Personality Typing provides a tool to think through the rationality of a would-be challenger to consider how he might perceive the US, its Ultimate Concern, will, and capabilities and how he might go on to calculate his own options, risks, and preferred courses of action. By so doing, it is possible to assess whether a particular deterrent is likely to be effective, what changes must be made to make a deterrent more effective, whether the United States is willing and able to make the necessary changes, and whether there are ways to enhance deterrent effectiveness with face-saving measures or by relieving tensions between Ultimate Concerns.

C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC PERSONALITY

Any attempt to rethink nuclear deterrence strategies should start with a comprehensive analysis that proceeds from a clear understanding of the US strategic personality and its implications for future US strategic options. For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to pursue a national strategy that reflects its Extroverted, Intuitive, Feeling Strategic Personality. While shifts in administrations and political moods may bring periods of military disengagement on the margins—such as reduced participation in peacekeeping deployments in places like Bosnia and Kosovo and fewer humanitarian deployments—the degree and duration of such “isolationist” periods are unlikely to be extensive or sustainable. First, economic and political engagement lie at the very heart of the US strategic personality, are key to US Ultimate Concerns, and will continue unabated. The goal for the ENF US is not so much to build wealth, economic power, and political influence for their own sake as to maintain a hospitable economic environment that will allow it to continue expanding the frontiers of economic liberty.

It is an unavoidable reality of the current economic and strategic world that the United States cannot accomplish the interests and objectives that flow from its Ultimate Concerns without maintaining its long-standing obligations and continuing to strive, at the same time, to expand the territory of economic liberty throughout the world. So as long as economic engagement remains at the heart of US Ultimate Concerns, and thus the key objective of its national strategy, the enlargement of the territory of political liberty will likely remain a priority as well. It is a fundamental of US foreign policy that goes back at least to Theodore Roosevelt's policy of “power with high purpose,” and is even more entwined with economic engagement today. And despite the well-intentioned advice of Realists like Henry Kissinger, values will continue to shape both US interests and the strategies it implements to pursue them. Hence, US policy will remain complex and, in the eyes of the outside world, bafflingly changeable and inconsistent. The United States sees its power as a sign of its righteousness. It is great and mighty because it strives to make the world a better place; and if it stops following its higher purpose and starts acting only from narrowly-defined self-interest, it risks losing that power.

Much of what US entrepreneurs seek to market abroad—computers, communication, popular culture, and ideas—are inherently threatening to repressive or culturally conservative regimes. This brings us to the second implication of the US strategic personality: even if the United States could back away from all its outstanding military commitments—in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—its very existence would create potential challengers. The only way the United States could hope to live free from

any hostile challenger would be not only to keep its military forces home but also to keep its people, products, and ideas at home along with them. To do so, apart from being impossible in this day and age, would be so debilitating to US Ultimate Concerns that it would lead to stagnation and identity crises of mammoth proportions. New challenges will arise, and the United States will remain the principal target for the frustrations of insecure and disaffected groups and nations the world-over. Feedback loops between the US strategic personality and those of would-be challengers will lead to new, unanticipated dynamics with each unique challenger. Thus, there is much to be gained in terms of the effectiveness of deterrence from an understanding of those dynamics, and how strategic personality analyses can shape more effective deterrent approaches.

APPENDIX A

STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AND ULTIMATE CONCERNS:

The Introverted Types

The Extroverted Types

**STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AND ULTIMATE CONCERNS:
The Introverted Types**

STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TYPE	NATURE OF ULTIMATE CONCERNS
<p style="text-align: center;">IST: Introverted, Sensing, Thinking</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend territorial cohesion against external encroachment • Maintain social, political, economic order and stability • Defend cultural identity • Enforce the system of rules or laws that under-gird stability • Maintain cultural and political boundaries • Prevent external stresses from undermining internal order and stability • Prevent hostile encirclement
<p style="text-align: center;">ISF: Introverted, Sensing, Feeling</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain territorial integrity to ensure the link between the land and the culture • Defend cultural identity and uniqueness against external influences • Maintain social and political stability through consensus on values • Defend the hierarchy of values that underlies social harmony • Prevent external stresses and influences from undermining social and political stability
<p style="text-align: center;">INT: Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement and defend the national vision • Uphold and defend the system of law and principle that under-girds the national vision • Prevent external stresses from undermining the internal authority of the national vision • Do not compromise underlying principles in the face of external pressures • Create a "zone of safety" for the national vision
<p style="text-align: center;">INF: Introverted, Intuitive, Feeling</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement and defend the national vision • Promote and defend the hierarchy of values through which the vision is realized • Prevent external stresses and influences from undermining the power of the vision and values • Do not compromise values in the face of external pressures • Create a "zone of safety" for the vision

**STRATEGIC PERSONALITY AND ULTIMATE CONCERNS:
The Extroverted Types**

STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TYPE	NATURE OF ULTIMATE CONCERNS
EST: Extroverted, Sensing, Thinking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish and maintain territorial security • Maintain social and political order and stability • Enforce the system of rules or laws that undergird stability and political legitimacy • Expand the scope of rules and laws to govern international interactions • Seek economic power as a source of social order and stability and external influence • Maintain international order and stability by manipulating / managing the balance-of-power
ESF: Extroverted, Sensing, Feeling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish and maintain territorial security • Maintain shared values as a source of social stability and political legitimacy • Seek economic growth as a guarantor of social stability and external influence • Maintain international order through balance-of-power and agreement on shared values
ENT: Extroverted, Intuitive, Thinking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement and expand the national vision • Stand as example to the world of light of reason • Execute the legal and rational “blueprint” for the nation (usually through the state) • Apply the principles underlying state “blueprint” to international arena to impose order on chaos • Apply rational “reasons of state” as basis for international affairs
ENF: Extroverted, Intuitive, Feeling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement and expand the national vision • Stand as example to the world of righteousness • Conduct domestic and international affairs consistent with the values that underlie the national vision • Apply the values underlying national vision to international arena to make the world a better place • Conduct international affairs in manner that promotes and spreads shared values

APPENDIX B
THE STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TYPES
AND EXEMPLAR STATES

**THE STRATEGIC PERSONALITY TYPES
AND EXEMPLAR STATES**

THE INTROVERTED TYPES	THE EXTROVERTED TYPES
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>IST:</i> Introverted, Sensing, Thinking</p> <p style="text-align: center;">China</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Saudi Arabia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>EST:</i> Extroverted, Sensing, Thinking</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Germany</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Sweden</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ISF:</i> Introverted, Sensing, Feeling</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Japan</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Egypt</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Spain</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ESF:</i> Extroverted, Sensing, Feeling</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Great Britain / United Kingdom</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Italy</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>INT:</i> Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Israel</p> <p style="text-align: center;">India</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Pakistan</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ENT:</i> Extroverted, Intuitive, Thinking</p> <p style="text-align: center;">France</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Turkey</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>INF:</i> Introverted, Intuitive, Feeling</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Iran</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Russia / Soviet Union</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Yugoslavia / Serbia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ENF:</i> Extroverted, Intuitive, Feeling</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Portugal</p> <p style="text-align: center;">The Netherlands</p> <p style="text-align: center;">The United States</p>